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BOOK REVIEW

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AFRICAN LABOUR MOBILISATION IN NORTH-WESTERN RHODESIA FOR THE SOUTHERN RHODESIAN MARKET, 1903-1914: A CENTRE-PERIPHERY RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE MICROSCOPE

by E.P. Makambe

INTRODUCTION

The mobilisation of African labour in North-Western Rhodesia for Southern Rhodesia, at the beginning of the colonial era, was conditioned by various factors. First, there was the need for settler capital below the Zambesi River to exploit cheap labour supply on the basis of the migrancy system which stymied the transformation of African labourers into a fully-fledged proletariat and at the same time left these labourers marginalized and partly dependent on a subsistence agricultural economy whose primary function was to subsidize capitalist accumulation in the African sub-continent. In this way, African subsistence agriculture was called upon to bear the burden of African labour reproduction and thus subsidize capitalist accumulation.² Secondly, there was the pronounced desire within the British metropolitan circles to have the Zambesi as the northern frontier for white settlement in Southern Africa. Although the British South Africa Company (BSACO), the dominant force in the Zambesian territories, did not in theory share the views of the metropolitan authorities, in practice, however, the consortium lent great credibility to the policy of minimal white immigration into its trans-Zambesian territories through its reluctance to provide an adequate infrastructure for large-scale settler presence in the region.³ In the end, both North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia (later joined to form Northern Rhodesia) remained peripheral to the priorities of the metropolis with the result that the activities of the colonial state officials in those territories were limited to the collection of tax and African labour for the economic enterprises of the South especially during the early phase of the colonial period.⁴ Consequently, North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia were turned into virtual labour reserves for their sister state, Southern Rhodesia, below the Zambesi. Thirdly, North-Western Rhodesia in particular was ruled on the basis of the South African tradition which rejected administrative paternalism towards the African subject communities.⁵ Basically, the administrative philosophy applied in the territory entailed the rigorous exploitation of the African in a system that was buttressed by an ideology of racism and the institutions of colonial conquest.⁶ It was within this context that

African labour mobilisation in North-Western Rhodesia for the Southern Rhodesian market was effected giving rise in the process to an exercise that established enduring centre/periphery relations between the two colonial possessions.

THE ADVENT OF THE RNLB IN NORTH-WESTERN RHODESIA

The Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) arrived in North-Western Rhodesia immediately after its birth in 1903 and at a propitious time when that territory's administrative structures had begun to crystallize whilst the environment in general had also become ripe for an alliance between the colonial state and private capital to promote primary accumulation in the BSACO possessions. At that stage, the BSACO authorities had established a more meaningful colonial social order in North-Western Rhodesia with Kalomo as the headquarters and the whole territory divided into five administrative districts. Later, Lewanika, the Lozi ruler, was coaxed into accepting the imposition of tax and the subsequent loss of Lozi political hegemony over former tributary groups like the Ila, Tonga, Toka, Subiya and others. In fact, the Lozi aristocrats could thereafter only operate as collaborators with BSACO officials on whom they depended rather heavily to prop the remnants of their pre-colonial traditional authority.⁷

A more significant aspect of the advent of the RNLB in North-Western Rhodesia was the extent to which the colonial state was bound to cooperate with that organisation in the sphere of African labour mobilisation for Southern Rhodesian capital. In this instance, the North-Western Rhodesian colonial state was forced to take a stand not only due to its peculiar character as a product of a commercial consortium that doubled as a 'combination of accumulation and political control in the agency',⁸ but also because it was a victim of those contradictions which generally characterized the colonial state when it was expected to act as an instrument for both primary accumulation and political legitimization.⁹ In the circumstances, the North-Western Rhodesian Administration accepted the significance of the Bureau as a medium through which colonial officials could effect primitive accumulation on behalf of settler capital and coerce Africans onto the colonial labour market without exposing themselves to external censure. After all, the functions of the RNLB, like those of similar semi-official labour organisations, were conveniently streamlined to meet situations of that nature. In a related paper, it has been argued that the Bureau played a very useful role in the processes of African labour mobilisation and distribution in the BSACO territories. In simple terms, the organisation was expected to squeeze out the unscrupulous private agents from the sphere of African labour mobilisation; to bureaucratize coercion by introducing strategies

whereby ideological rather than physical forms of force were to become an important feature of the campaign to extract unfree African labour; to obfuscate the role of the colonial state in the exercise to recruit African labour for private capital; and finally, to eliminate all aspects of ruinous competition amongst the colonist employers of African labour and thus enable these employers to manipulate the terms on which that labour entered the market.¹⁰

It was against the background noted above that in October 1903, barely a month after the bureau was formed, the North-Western Rhodesian administration issued instructions advising close cooperation between those agents of the organisation duly accredited by Val Gielgud, the RNLB manager, and the territory's District Commissioners. The purpose of the instructions was not only to emphasise the role of the colonial state in promoting capitalist accumulation; they were also intended to establish Bureau monopoly over labour mobilisation in North-Western Rhodesia and thereby forestall all forms of competition from private agents in the field. In this specific case, the major targets of the official measures were the so-called 'undesirable' and 'irresponsible' agents of the Wankie railway sub-contractors, operating in the Falls (Kalomo) and Batoka districts in particular. These agents, alleged to be largely of Greek origin and low class in social status,¹¹ had apparently antagonised the authorities of the territory through their violent and privateering methods of labour recruitment reminiscent of the earliest phase of colonial rule in Africa. Because it was feared that the activities of these private labour agents might in the long run undermine the colonial social order in the Falls and Batoka districts, the North-Western Rhodesian Administration took advantage of the situation to bring in Bureau functionaries 'properly introduced to the natives'¹² and guaranteed 'to receive every assistance possible' from the district officials.¹³

The cooperation between the RNLB and the North-Western Rhodesian colonial state was to evolve into a very serious affair. Once it was brought into play, Bureau agents were accorded preferential treatment everywhere as happened to Pieter Nielsen, the Bureau agent for the Mapanza division of the Batoka district where he was allowed to recruit African labour notwithstanding the fact that Company control in the area had not yet stabilised and also in spite of the local demand for the same commodity amongst the nearby copper miners.¹⁴ In most instances, the cooperation between the Bureau and the colonial state officials compelled the latter to forego the call for administrative paternalism and deliberately lead their African charges into dubious contracts through deceptive assurances that 'they [the recruits] would be safe in engaging to work for the Bureau, and [would] be regularly paid and fairly treated'.¹⁵ In a fundamental manner, this cooperation was responsible for the extension of taxation measures between 1904 and 1905 to include Barotseland proper and also

for the abolition of domestic slavery as well as the general transformation of the feudal nature of the Lozi state.

Since transformation of any social formation from above is generally carried out in the interest of the ruling class, the BSACo authorities were compelled to find some accommodation with a Lozi aristocracy that was bound to view the prospect of 'freeing' and 'proletarianizing the serfs' as a threat because these aristocrats had, in Samir Amin's phrase, depended on expropriating the surplus generated by the subject groups and in that way frustrated the rise of healthy commodity relations.¹⁶ But in the final analysis, the alliance between the Bureau and the North-Western Rhodesian colonial state seems to have been justified to boast that by pressuring Lewanika to abolish domestic slavery, it succeeded in widening the spheres of African labour mobilisation in the territory.¹⁷ Thus, F.C. Macauley, the District Commissioner at Mongu, had in 1904 commented triumphantly on the massive response of the residents of the Barotse Valley to labour migration with the result that whole villages were said to be 'very empty [since] many boys [were] going to seek [work] in the South [Southern Rhodesia]...'.¹⁸ Due to the manner in which the transformation exercise had marginalised the lower echelons of the Lozi ruling class who thereafter had less access to Lewanika's share of the tax and other royal perquisites from the BSACo,¹⁹ it is not surprising that a majority of the Lozi were forced to resort to labour migration to the employment centres of Southern Rhodesia where they took up posts as clerks, compound police or other positions of responsibility which tended 'to foster their sense of tribal distinction'.²⁰ The movement intensified in spite of Lewanika's anxiety over the matter and, as a demonstration of its dimensions, there was the reported death of the son of Ngambela Mokamba, a leading figure in Lozi political structure, at that early stage at Wankie for which the Ngambela received some monetary compensation in consequence.²¹

After the 1903-1906 interlude when the slack Southern Rhodesian labour market had reduced the RNLB to a mere surrogate of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA),²² the organisation was to burst onto the trans-Zambesian scene with new zest and increased vigour. In North-Western Rhodesia, the Bureau's renewed commitment to the cause of labour mobilisation for Southern Rhodesia coincided with the departure of Major Robert Coryndon for Swaziland in April 1907 and with it the less formalised system of administration he had instituted. For the Bureau, the Coryndon regime was less favourable because it undermined the organisation's recruiting monopoly by tolerating the residual influence of private labour recruiters and the unsavoury reputation associated with them as a class.²³ Coryndon's successor, Robert E. Codrington, was, on the other hand, a stickler to bureaucracy and regulations

whose handiwork was soon to be evident in the restrictions and numerous requirements imposed on labour agents under the *Native Labour Proclamation No. 18 of 1907*.²⁴ Through this legislation, Codrington weeded out of the field remaining private agents like the recruiters for Major Maurice Heany's East Gwanda mines in Matabeleland who had up to 1907 enjoyed special privileges because of the intimate friendship between their boss and Major Coryndon. In short, the Codrington regulations had two main objectives: to deal with labour agents of 'an undesirable character',²⁵ and to enable the Bureau to raise revenue through various punitive measures imposed on recruiters and also on the recruits for breaking their contracts in form of desertion or other numerous infringements.²⁶ Moreover, the registration fees, ranging from 2/- to 5/- per head, prescribed by these regulations on labourers recruited for service in North-Western and Southern Rhodesia might have appeared ridiculously little to the metropolitan officials in London,²⁷ but it shows how the North-Western Rhodesian colonial state was determined to see the Bureau thrive as a viable concern.

It has been shown elsewhere that the Bureau's strong commitment to the mobilisation of African labour in the trans-Zambesian territories during the post-1907 period was evident from the restructuring exercise the organisation embarked upon.²⁸ In North-Western Rhodesia in particular, the Bureau introduced various structural changes which drastically affected its field force between 1907 and 1910. Consequently, by 1910, the organisation's machinery in the territory was manned by a seven-man team headed by P.E. Webb, the Bureau's Compound Manager and Recruiting Agent for the Kalomo, Sesheke and Senanga districts, but with Livingstone as his base of operations.²⁹ Even in that seven-man team, a notable last addition was W. Fryberg, the Special Recruiting Agent for the Kasempa district where the colonial social order was so wobbly that it was only in June 1910 that recruits from the area started to arrive in Bulawayo.³⁰

To some extent, the restructuring of the Bureau might have been prompted by growing concern in the top ranks of the organisation's management especially at its headquarters in Bulawayo where anxieties were expressed over the visible decline in the volume of recruits coming down from North-Western Rhodesia since 1909. This development could have been occasioned by railway construction work and the beginnings of a sizeable capitalist agricultural sector in that territory, symbolized in this case by extensive land alienation for white settlement along the railway belt following the failure of Tonga resistance under Chief Monze.³¹ But still it bothered the management of the Bureau whose major preoccupation was to procure trans-Zambesian labour for Southern

Rhodesian settler capital. The subsequent tour of the region in June 1909 by T.N. Micklem, the Bureau Inspector at the Bulawayo headquarters, in an endeavour to increase the flow of the trans-Zambesian labour was obviously prompted by the management's anxiety. Since Zomba had by then not yet permitted the organisation to recruit labour in the Nyasaland protectorate whilst North-Eastern Rhodesia had also been compelled by the outbreak of sleeping sickness to shut its doors to labour recruiters,³² the concern of the Bureau management was quite understandable. From this perspective, it is obvious that both the re-organisation of the Bureau's structures in North-Western Rhodesia and Micklem's tour of Barotseland were desperate measures by the labour body to redeem itself as an indispensable ingredient in the whole process of creating an adequate labour-reserve for Southern Rhodesia's mining and agricultural capital. This desperation was further underlined by the Bureau's futile attempt to also procure African labour from German South-West Africa (Namibia) launched at the same time.³³

Even in the post-1907 period, the endeavours of the RNLB to mobilise African labour in North-Western Rhodesia for the Southern Rhodesian market were too often supplemented by other crude measures of the colonial state to facilitate the exercise. Just as in the Coryndon era up to early 1907, attempts were made in the post-1907 period to deploy colonial state power for the benefit of the Bureau functionaries in their campaign to recruit labour. One way by which colonial state officials achieved their objective was through the obstruction of alternative means whereby Africans could acquire cash and frustrate the response to wage labour which, as Vail asserts, who practised among the Ngoni of North-Eastern Rhodesia.³⁴ In North-Western Rhodesia, this colonial strategy became the subject of complaint amongst the Lozi aristocracy during the visit of Lord Selborne, the High Commissioner for South Africa, in October 1907. For the Lozi, agriculture, the collection of rubber and the sale of cattle were no longer satisfactory as alternative conduit for Africans to enter the money economy. The sale of cattle was for instance seriously hampered by the absence of markets for the purpose and the wanton exploitation perpetrated by 'Kaffir truck' traders who offered a paltry 30/- per beast to Barotseland cattle-owners whilst the same stock sold for £6 per head in Bulawayo. It was the reluctance of the African cattle-owners of North-Western Rhodesia to be exploited which misled Lord Selborne to blame the alleged-conservatism of that class when he complained that:

Nothing could be more apathetic to progress than the way in which a South African native normally treats his cattle. He neither sells them, eats them, nor uses them...[but] simply looks at them as a miser does at his treasure.³⁵

In his zeal to promote the cause of labour mobilisation, the British official failed to appreciate the fact that Africans of North-Western Rhodesia had engaged in trade in which cattle played an important role as a commodity for exchange since the pre-colonial times. The Lozi for example had depended on cattle and ivory as their commodities for exchange since the arrival of George Westbeech in the trans-Zambesian region in the 1870s. In fact, because of the manner in which Barotseland escaped the devastating consequences of rinderpest in the 1890s, Lozi trade in cattle with Southern Rhodesia and the Bechuanaland Protectorate had assumed greater importance by the beginning of the twentieth century.³⁶ On the whole, the moves to undermine African trade in cattle as an alternative means of earning cash income appears to have fulfilled the intentions of the North-Western Rhodesian colonial officials. Thus, towards the end of 1907 when the nearby Broken Hill and Bwana Mkubwa mines were closed down temporarily, the rate of labour migration to Southern Rhodesia rose significantly; a fact accepted as a 'good' sign for that country's settler capital which was urged to improve conditions on the labour market in order to render the migration phenomenon more viable.³⁷

A fascinating aspect of the reported upsurge in labour migration from North-Western to Southern Rhodesia in 1907 is the manner in which various African societies responded to the pressures generated by the wanton expropriation of their resources and the demand for labour in different ways. In the Ila (Mashukulumbwe) country, the intensification of labour migration to Southern Rhodesia proportionately raised the concerns of the elders over the development. Apparently, the idea of increased numbers of Ila young men leaving to work in Southern Rhodesia and never returning to their homeland caused great resentment amongst the elders against the government of North-Western Rhodesia which nearly festered into an uprising by September 1907. In all respects, the Ila elders seem to have been placed in a cruel dilemma whereby they had to choose between losing their cattle in exploitative stock sales in order to meet the government's tax demands on one hand and sending their youths onto an uncertain journey to Southern Rhodesia on the other. In the end, it was the pressures arising from this virtual Hobson's choice which forced the Ila parents to burn down the mission outpost of the Primitive Methodist Missionary Society in their midst and in the process drove the society's resident missionary, the Rev. William Chapman and his wife, helter skelter into Broken Hill.³⁸

The other form in which colonial state power was applied to coerce African labour in North-Western Rhodesia was of course through wanton aspects of fiscal demands on the subject societies. On this score, the manner in which taxation served as a direct form of administrative coercion was demonstrated in the way in which tax defaulters were driven into the tentacles of the Bureau and

thereafter canalized to the Southern Rhodesia labour market. A tale on how this practice was regularly carried out in North-Western Rhodesia surfaced in October 1907 when Codrington was on holiday in Madeira and Colonel John Carden of the Barotse Native Police was the Acting Administrator of the territory. According to a mischievous private source, it was an accepted rule in North-Western Rhodesia for the Administration 'to collect natives who [had] not paid their tax within the prescribed time, and send them under escort, to work off their obligations to the Southern Rhodesian Mines; in other words, to impose a period of forced labour in the mines as a penalty for non-payment of the tax.'³⁹ Although Colonel Carden tried to underplay the seriousness of his government's involvement in this direct system of forced labour by arguing that what he did was to 'encourage' tax defaulters 'to get into touch with recruiting agents from the South, and engage themselves for a period of mine work,'⁴⁰ it is however very clear that the colonial state in North-Western Rhodesia was frequently obliged to play its part quite openly in the alliance between it and settler interests to promote capitalist production and accumulation. What might have gone amiss in this case was the extent to which the colonial state could go without exposing itself to the charge that it had become 'the obedient servant of capital' rather than a mere 'protector of capitalist social relations.'⁴¹ As the activities of the Bureau in North-Western Rhodesia proceeded, the colonial state was repeatedly caught in the ambiguities of its contradictory role as an ally of settler capital on one hand and a protector of the colonial social order as a whole on the other. Events in the Gwembe division of the Batoka district between 1907 and 1910 were to expose the contradictions in a very serious manner.

LABOUR MOBILISATION AMONG THE GWEMBE TONGA

The Gwembe Tonga were a riverine people inhabiting the banks of the Zambesi river which divided them between North-Western and Southern Rhodesia, but with a greater proportion settled in North-Western Rhodesia due to cultural and historical reasons.⁴² Because of cross-cultural links on both sides of the Zambesi, the Gwembe Tonga had been able to manipulate the situation in the Valley to their advantage in order to avoid the burdens brought about by early colonial rule. Thus, with the imposition of hut tax by the governments of North-Western and Southern Rhodesia at different stages between 1898 and 1904, the Gwembe Tonga were able to shift from one country to another and in this way escaped the fiscal demands of the colonial authorities.⁴³ In the Buni-Kariba (Gwembe) division of the Batoka district in North-Western Rhodesia for example, the imposition of hut tax in 1904 not only forced the Valley Tonga to come to terms with the idea of permanent settlement, but it was also followed by a chain of events which rendered BSACo rule unpalatable to the local

communities. For instance, between 1904 and 1907, J.C. MacNamara, the Collector for the Gwembe division, was said to have treated his subjects 'with utmost brutality' and in this way defied even the paternalistic assumption that the various Tonga groups welcomed Company rule as some form of liberation from the periodic Lozi and Ndebele raids that characterized the nineteenth century.⁴⁴ MacNamara was obviously one of those officials who believed that force was an indispensable prerequisite in the process of creating an appropriate environment for capitalist production and accumulation within the context of a colonial setting. For this reason, the Gwembe division official's activities were justified in colonial official circles as 'only to be expected in a district inhabited by a particularly raw and uncivilized type of native....'⁴⁵ More important was also the fact that the context of colonial violence created by MacNamara in the Gwembe division coincided with the arrival in early 1907 of G.A. Cooke, the Bureau agent for that area and the neighbouring Ila country. Thereafter, MacNamara was to apply his coercive stratagems on behalf of the Bureau on the pretext that they were necessary in order 'to create and sustain capitalist relations of production, particularly in the early stages of primitive accumulation when direct producers [were] forcibly separated from the ownership and control of the means of production and the product of their labour....'⁴⁶ Under these circumstances, the Gwembe Tonga were forced to resist, leading to reports on a 'minor uprising' in Chief Sigongo's area.⁴⁷

The presence of Cooke in the Gwembe division was significant in another respect. It demonstrated, for instance, the manner in which the alliance between the RNLB and the colonial state operated on the ground to promote primitive accumulation on behalf of settler capital. In this Gwembe case, the operations of the alliance were minutely monitored by Charles Venables, a settler farmer of the area who had fallen out with the colonial state authorities and consequently sided with the African victims of the alliance who nicknamed him *Mandala*. From his 'Venablesdale' Farm which straddled the two Gwembe chiefdoms of Sigongo and Simamba, Venables observed how MacNamara was caught in the meshes spawned by the contradictions of capitalist accumulation and political control in an endeavour to meet the needs of settler interests and also preserve the legitimacy of the colonial social order at the same time as was peculiar to most African colonial situations of that period.⁴⁸ But as the activities of the MacNamara/Cooke alliance gathered tempo in the Gwembe sub-district between 1907 and 1910, the contradictions of accumulation and political control in the area became more complex, hence Venables' confession that 'too many interests were involved'.⁴⁹ In the end, Venables could only rationalize the complex situation created by the alliance and its activities in the following

dialectical explanation:

...all over [North-Western] Rhodesia... labour is forced for Govt (*sic*) purposes and for the mines whose working up high pressure demands a large supply of native labourers, and as the British South Africa Company depends largely for its commercial revenue (as distinct from administrative revenue), on the royalties paid it by the mines the largest returns of natives of their District employed through the RNLB gains official credit: and not only so, but one continually hears it alleged of officials of the Native Department that they are receiving a share of their commission from their recruiting agents, and presents from mine managers and others for supplying them with native labourers.⁵⁰

In simple terms, the activities of the MacNamara/Cooke alliance in the Gwembe division were a reflection of the nature of the whole colonial set up in North-Western Rhodesia and other BSACo territories. In these territories, the BSACo held both the economic and political trump-card,⁵¹ a fact which accounts for the contradictions that plagued the colonial state officials as they carried out their chores. There was obviously an inexorable conflict between the commitment of these officials to primary accumulation and the call for administrative paternalism towards the African subject societies. In the Gwembe division, the commitment of the Bureau and the colonial state to promote the interests of settler capital implied that there was no room for administrative paternalism which was instead replaced by violence and coercion. Venables observed the various brutal methods applied by the MacNamara/Cooke alliance in the campaign to mobilize Gwembe Tonga labour for Southern Rhodesia which demonstrated the stance of the alliance. For instance, a month after Cooke's arrival in the Gwembe division, tax defaulters and other opponents of fiscal pressure were 'tied up to their necks in sacks and set in the sun'; they had 'their arms tied up above their heads' only to be released 'after some time when blood had receded from their arms'; they were flogged with 'sibaba' (sjambok) with atrocious consequences or simply had their corn-stores burnt down whilst the owners were shot for alleged insurrection especially in cases where these men tried to run away into the bush in a bid to avoid the brutal treatment.⁵² Since a sizeable proportion of the victims of MacNamara's flogging either died or committed suicide as happened among Chief Sigongo's followers, the temptation to resist was quite understandable.

In short, extreme forms of violence and authoritarianism were applied by the Gwembe colonial state officials in the cause for African labour mobilisation.

The potential for the labour mobilisation campaign to disrupt Gwembe Tonga agriculture and thereby cause famine, which was always hovering ominously over the Gwembe Valley,⁵⁹ was not the concern of the MacNamara/Cooke alliance. Basically, what worried the alliance most was the inability of Southern Rhodesian settler capital to operate effectively in a capitalist market of free labour supply. In the circumstances, this settler capital had to depend on institutions of colonial conquest and domination, sanctioned by the colonial state, for adequate labour supply as commonly occurred in other African colonies.⁶⁰ Thus, in a bid to assist settler capital, the Gwembe Tonga were rounded up by messengers of the district office for the Bureau and marched to specific labour depots 'with ropes around their necks' like 'criminals' who, it was feared, 'might run away'.⁶¹ At the same time, attempts were made to underplay the role of coercion in the exercise and portray the recruits as voluntary labourers rather than victims of authoritarianism. Venables again described how recruits were 'persuaded' to appear happy and support the official facade of voluntary engagement when he stated that:

...it was the custom when labourers were required for any purpose to send out Government messengers (natives) through[out] the district. These messengers would return with gangs of natives tied in a single file with ropes round their necks. When they approached the settlement the ropes would be taken off and messengers would order them to sing, and those who did not do so they [messengers] would 'encourage' with sjambok, and that... was why natives used to appear as delighted at the prospect of doing the particular work they were brought in for.⁶²

The attempts of the Gwembe district officials to cover their trails and disguise their role in the forcible extraction of African labour were however unnecessary because the exercise had the blessings of top officials within the administrative hierarchy of the North-Western Rhodesia colonial state. Frank Worthington, the colony's Secretary for Native Affairs, was for example an enthusiastic supporter of official involvement in primitive accumulation on behalf of settler capital in the BSACo territories. In this regard, he had assured his juniors at the district level that '... *sub rosa*, they could inflict flogging and imprisonment' on their African charges in the process of labour mobilisation and other administrative functions and 'if any complaints were made on the matter he [Worthington] would see that they did not get into trouble over it'.⁶³ Worthington himself was a man of extremely harsh negrophobic views with little respect for the notion of administrative paternalism towards the Africans.⁶⁴ By encouraging

This violence and authoritarianism intensified where African resistance surfaced and was viewed as an attempt to subvert the colonial social order. As far as MacNamara was concerned, the measures he adopted towards the Gwembe Tonga may also have been prompted by the failure of his official tours with Cooke, intended to introduce the Bureau agent and also collect some recruits. But because the Gwembe Tonga held their boss 'in such dread', they panicked when he camped in the neighbourhood of their villages and 'stampeded into the bush and did not return until Mr. MacNamara's departure...'.⁵³ Through such resistance, the overtures of the MacNamara/Cooke alliance were initially frustrated; hence the vengeful character of the subsequent operations.

Another fascinating aspect of the proceedings in the Gwembe division is the manner in which African peasant production was seen as a threat to the success of the Bureau campaign. The Gwembe Tonga were credible agriculturalists with a subsistence economy based on the cultivation of millet, sorghum and maize as the staple crops.⁵⁴ This subsistence agriculture was buttressed by livestock ownership (cattle, sheep and goats), though cattle-ownership was handicapped by the presence of tsetse fly in some parts of the Gwembe Valley.⁵⁵ But for the Bureau and the North-Western Rhodesian colonial state which badly required labour for the Southern Rhodesia market, even the modest success of this pre-capitalist economy was viewed as unwarranted since it rendered Gwembe Tonga participation in wage labour discretionary and spasmodic.⁵⁶ From the point of view of the colonial institutions involved, what was needed were strong-arm tactics to emasculate Gwembe Tonga agricultural production and by so doing progressively separate the producers from the means of production (land) as a precondition to their proletarianization, as was happening in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.⁵⁷ Thus, it became customary for the MacNamara/Cooke alliance to recruit labour in the Gwembe Tonga country at the peak of the agricultural season when harvesting and other heavy chores required the presence of able-bodied men. It was therefore in an attempt to forestall the sinister designs of the MacNamara/Cooke alliance towards Gwembe Tonga agricultural economy that Venables protested in March 1909 as follows:

The Gwembe District is overrun with baboons and wild pigs and in addition birds descend in storms on the fields of ripening kaffir corn and millet; now that all the men are being carried away, a greater proportion of these crops are bound to be lost, the women and children being quite incapable, by themselves, of protecting the fields from the ravages of these pests, and later on in the season, famine is bound to result....⁵⁸

his juniors to brutalize the African subject communities, this colonial supremo may have wanted to bring the officials concerned under his ambit and by so doing forge a uniform approach whereby the colonized people would be subjected to crude forms of domination and exploitation reinforced by the institutions of colonial conquest and a virulent racist ideology.⁶⁵ In the Gwembe division, Worthington's instructions were faithfully adhered to and a fraudulent system of 'District Discipline' was even instituted with tax defaulters and other resisters arbitrarily imprisoned and euphemistically classified as 'District Visitors' liable to be drafted either for forced labour on the local market, involving government construction work and other chores designed to benefit private settler interests, or for exportation by the Bureau to the South.⁶⁶ Generally, district colonial officials throughout North-Western Rhodesia had, by 1913, when Worthington left the service of the BSACo, applied the philosophy of their boss, in one form or another, to procure carriers for themselves even though conditions in the portage industry, especially under government employ, were patently deplorable.⁶⁷

What has to be accepted in relation to the proceedings of the Gwembe sub-district between 1907 and 1910 in particular is that they were the handiwork of an alliance between the RNLB and the colonial state which had exceeded the limits of extra-economic coercion and authoritarianism to assist settler capital. Yet in spite of the potential of these activities to subvert the colonial social order, they were nonetheless supported by the metropolitan authorities in London and South Africa. In this way, the disputed theory that the colonial state was an agent of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and that the operations of the former were preconditioned by the dictates of metropolitan capital⁶⁸ was somehow validated in an oblique manner. In the Gwembe case, metropolitan authorities showed a great deal of empathy towards the North-Western Rhodesian colonial state as it tried to protect itself by discrediting Venables and his accusations against MacNamara. The strategy of the Livingstone Administration to weaken Venables' evidence by portraying him as a renegade and a man of ignoble character who was in the habit of keeping African 'concubines', however seriously misfired. First, Venables was quite ready to admit his inability to withstand the hardships and loneliness of a frontier life which had forced him to seek the company of African women. Secondly, he exposed the widespread nature of the practice involving top colonial officials like Codrington, the territory's Administrator who died in 1908.⁶⁹ In fact, it was only after Venables had threatened to expose more highly placed colonial officials, who literally kept harems of African women, that the defensive strategy based on a moralistic crusade was dropped.⁷⁰ In the process, moralistic vilification of the witness thus failed to whitewash the crude activities

of the MacNamara/ Cooke alliance in the Gwembe division.

One factor which might have precipitated the onset of the MacNamara/Cooke campaign in the Gwembe sub-district is the manner in which independent labour migration to Southern Rhodesia had emerged as a viable phenomenon in the area and consequently marginalized the colonial state officials and Bureau functionaries as cogs in all aspects of trans-Zambesian labour mobilisation. In accordance with parallel developments in other parts of the trans-Zambesian territories, African labour migrants were becoming increasingly conscious of the differences between 'controlled' (unfree) and 'fringe' (free) labour markets in their respective destination territories. As a result, these migrants were opposed to being canalized to 'controlled' labour markets which they associated with a rigid pattern of worker mobility; weakened bargaining power of labour against capital and less opportunities for resistance (desertion) to exploitation and abuse.⁷¹ The resistance to 'controlled' labour markets had apparently so popularized independent labour migration among the Gwembe Tonga that by 1910 they were descending in large numbers onto the employment centres of Southern Rhodesia like the Ayrshire mine in the Lomagundi district of north-western Mashonaland after 'a journey of from eight days to a fortnight and [carrying] an abundance of food from their homes for the journey....'⁷² This Gwembe Tonga independent labour migration was of course assisted not only by the cultural links which these migrants shared with their kinsmen in the Wankie, Sebungwe and Urungwe districts of Southern Rhodesia, but also because these people had had a long history of working in that country since the end of the nineteenth century.⁷³

To a large extent, the advantages posed by independent labour migration were basically responsible for antagonizing both the RNLB and the North-Western Rhodesia colonial state hence the determination of that alliance to place Gwembe Tonga migrants under tight control. For their part, the colonial state authorities viewed their commitment to promote the interests of settler capital as by no means at odds with the protection of the overall welfare of their African charges. If anything, some colonial officials actually treated their involvement in African labour mobilisation as necessary to pre-empt settler initiative in that field which was bound to lead to such unrestrained violence and plunder that the legitimacy of the colonial social order would be put at risk.⁷⁴ The activities of MacNamara and his immediate successor in the Gwembe sub-district, R.I. Hughes, have therefore to be measured against this kind of background. These district functionaries operated against a perspective endorsed by top administrative authorities in North-Western Rhodesia which justified the application of coercion and violence as inseparable aspects of the process of African labour mobilisation. L.A. Wallace, the Acting Administrator of the

territory, pursued this line of reasoning when he defended the continued funnelling of Gwembe Tonga tax defaulters to the Southern Rhodesian labour market through the Bureau in September 1910. In Wallace's opinion, administrative coercion was justified on the pretext that tax defaulters were simply 'advised that it [was] their duty to earn money... and if work [could not] be offered to them locally [in North-Western Rhodesia] they [were] shown that there was a means in the Bureau of earning [money] easily....'⁷⁵ Wallace even injected a sanctimonious note into his argument by conveying the impression that the activities of his junior officials in the Gwembe sub-district, relating to labour recruitment by coercion and discouraging independent migration, were prompted by paternalistic commitment to the welfare of the Gwembe Tonga people. On the basis of this bizarre logic, Wallace informed Lord Gladstone, the High Commissioner for South Africa, that:

Knowing the evils that resulted before from the independent stream of labour going South I cannot agree that it is to their [labourers'] advantage that passes should be indiscriminately given to them or that recruitment should be allowed to anybody except to the Labour Bureau which has the guarantee of the Southern Rhodesian Administration [on fair treatment and medical examination].⁷⁶

The various arguments put forward by the North-Western Rhodesian Administration on the modalities of African labour mobilisation and their justification were not quite relevant to the material conditions which prevailed in the territory by the 1900s and 1910s. What should be noted is that there existed a strong alliance between the colonial state and settler interests with the RNLB as the interpolating median. This alliance was seriously committed to capitalist production and accumulation in the BSACo territories even if such commitment implied the extraction of African labour by force and other disparate extra-economic methods. For these reasons, the alliance was highly rated by settler interests on both sides of the Zambesi. In North-Western Rhodesia, appreciation of the worth of the alliance was well captured by Leopold Moore, a settler pharmacist and radical populist of the *bête noire* mould who had moved from Southern Rhodesia to Livingstone in 1904 where he also published the *Livingstone Mail*.⁷⁷ In spite of his differences with the BSACo on other issues,⁷⁸ Moore accepted the endeavours of the alliance between the North-Western Rhodesian colonial state and settler interests to coerce the African onto the colonial labour market. To this end the *Livingstone Mail* accordingly justified the tactics deployed by the alliance on the ground that 'To

force [the Africans] to work was only to assimilate his condition to that of the white man.'⁷⁹

Although it could be argued that the alliance between the North-Western Rhodesian colonial state and settler interests was reinforced by the administrative sanctions wielded by the former which it could apply as a weapon for intimidation against the latter by for instance mounting measures 'to boycott the settler complainer' or 'refuse to re-issue a trader's licence without giving any reason for [the] refusal',⁸⁰ there was a general consensus on the role of extra-economic coercion to procure African labour in both the colonial official and white settler circles. What seems to have caused some cracks in the alliance was the rise of capitalist agriculture in North-Western Rhodesia itself. Whilst BSACo thrust in the trans-Zambesian territories was, in the early phase of colonial rule, directed mainly on the exploitation of mineral resources with agriculture as a very minor priority,⁸¹ capitalist agriculture was nevertheless inexorably encouraged by the post-1909 land alienation exercise along the railway belt and the spurt of white immigration which accompanied it. Indeed as early as 1909, settler farmers in North-Western Rhodesia were beginning to question a situation whereby 'all the available natives [in North-Western Rhodesia] were [being] regularly drafted to work on the Southern Rhodesian mines through the RNLB'.⁸² By querying the very ethos of the centre/periphery relationship between North-Western and Southern Rhodesia, the emergent settler farming community of the former territory managed to gain some concessions from the BSACo authorities in the form of an arrangement whereby the Bureau was to supply all those recruits, rejected by the organisation's medical officers at Livingstone and Broken Hill as unfit for mine-work in Southern Rhodesia, to the local settler farmers; a service for which these farmers paid a capitation fee of 5/- per labourer to the Bureau and also guaranteed wages ranging from 5/- to 7/- 6d per month for the said rejects.⁸³ Through these means, the Company authorities ascertained the continued survival of the alliance between the colonial state and the burgeoning local settler interests in North-Western Rhodesia. In turn, the strong alliance assured the continued viability of African labour mobilisation in the territory for Southern Rhodesia.

LABOUR MOBILISATION IN OTHER AFRICAN COMMUNITIES

The Gwembe Tonga were not the only victims of the Bureau campaign to mobilise African labour in North-Western Rhodesia to meet the needs of Southern Rhodesian settler capital. Similar exercises occurred in other districts between 1907 and 1914. In the Kalomo division of the Batoka district, the Toka communities were subjected to a three-cornered contest for labour involving the RNLB which required the commodity for the Southern Rhodesian market; a

growing agricultural sector symbolised by the increase of white settler farmers in the locality from only 11 in 1908 to 38 in 1913 due to the rising tempo of economic development induced by railway construction through the district; and finally, the district colonial administration whose chronic demand for carriers was prompted by an inadequate transport system that hindered the movement of colonial officials throughout their bailiwick.

Because of the more favourable working conditions that prevailed in the Southern Rhodesian market, the Bureau was more successful in mobilising African labour in the Kalomo division with the result that, between 1913 and 1914, the organisation was reported to be collecting 'many hundreds of the most physically fit natives of the [Batoka] District [who were] sent away to work [on the Southern Rhodesian mines] every year'.⁸⁴ This development placed the colonial authorities of the division, the traditional allies of the Bureau, in an invidious position since it frustrated their attempts to raise adequate recruits for *tenga-tenga* (portage industry) on which they relied heavily for transport. In addition, labour mobilisation for Southern Rhodesia had made the Toka conscious of the inadequacies of the domestic labour market and in that way sharpened their resistance to exploitation. Hughes, the Assistant Magistrate of the Kalomo division, confessed as much in February 1914 when he stated that:

Natives who have been working in [Southern] Rhodesia no doubt object to what they consider the low rate of pay [for carriers] and in consequence the native who are available for this kind of work are generally middle-aged men who are past work.⁸⁵

But rather than renege on their existing alliance and cooperation with the Bureau, the Kalomo authorities were forced to resolve the contradiction by resorting to coercion as a means to raise enough carriers for their own needs.

In the Kalomo division, like in other parts of the Batoka district, it was easier for the RNLB to outsmart its rivals because the people concerned were used to working on the Southern Rhodesian labour market and were therefore more prepared to proceed thither than engage for domestic employment. Moreover, that favourable situation compelled the Bureau to tolerate an unusual state of tension in the alliance between the Batoka district authorities and the labour organisation. Matters were certainly different in relation to the Kasempa district where the Bureau was forced to resort to desperate measures to achieve its objectives. In November 1909, the Bureau encountered serious African resistance to labour mobilisation in the Kasempa district: an occurrence which could only be contained successfully through the intervention of the North-

Western Rhodesian colonial state by tightening fiscal pressure over the Kaonde people of the area. To this end, taxation in the Kasempa district was raised from 5/ to 10/ per head per annum in a calculated move to force the residents to join labour migration to Southern Rhodesia through the RNLB. On this score, the North-Western Rhodesian colonial state also demonstrated its commitment to the cause of the Bureau by deliberately ignoring the economic and geographical disadvantages faced by the Kaonde people resident some 200 miles or so west of the railway line and described by one British imperial official as 'the remote and most uncivilised district' in North-Western Rhodesia.⁸⁶ Still the Livingstone authorities stuck to the unrealistic assumption that the Kaonde were capable of paying higher tax than their Lozi neighbours and in the process allowed the Bureau to operate in the Kaonde country.⁸⁷

On the whole, the measures adopted by the Livingstone Administration towards the Kaonde and the distorted views associated with them were not very effective in smothering the resistance of these people to the Bureau's labour recruiting activities in their communities. This resistance became apparent in 1911 with the killing of Chlund, a Bureau agent of Swedish origin based in the Kasempa district, for the high-handed methods he applied to extract Kaonde labour recruits. But, as usual, the colonial state officials refused to query the Bureau's operations and instead sought the answer in obscure explanations. On this matter, blame was for instance placed on the vengeful temper of the Kaonde allegedly triggered by the deaths of their kinsmen in the Southern Rhodesian mines wither they had been dispatched by the Bureau. In spite of the fact that the riotous situation spawned by the Bureau's activities in the Kasempa district in 1911 very much resembled similar developments engendered by that organisation among the Ila in 1907, the Livingstone government continued to protect the Bureau and its operations in the area ultimately provoking external intervention from the metropolitan authorities on the matter. In essence, metropolitan intervention over the Kasempa issue and the suspension of Bureau operations, on the pretext that the Kaonde were 'less ripe for exploitation by the Labour Bureau',⁸⁸ were necessitated by the realisation that, in the words of Lonsdale and Berman, 'the legitimacy of state authority [was]... being threatened and the maintenance of a wider social order challenged by the resistance of dominated classes'.⁸⁹ But even conclusions of this nature failed to impress the Livingstone administrators who reluctantly accepted metropolitan intervention mainly for the reason that the Kaonde and the Lunda were the only African groups in the territory that were still armed.⁹⁰

In the neighbouring Balovale sub-district the recruiting campaign of the RNLB between 1911 and 1912⁹¹ was adulterated by a new phenomenon altogether. This was the collaboration of the Lozi aristocracy with the Bureau/colonial/state

alliance in an effort to mobilise labour for Southern Rhodesia. In this connection, it should be noted that the pre-colonial Lozi state was a class-structured social formation in which the Lozi ruling class had thrived by appropriating the surplus of both the Lozi lower classes and the non-Lozi subject peoples in form of tributes and unfree labour.⁹² The advent of colonial rule had apparently failed to totally destroy these class structures and the Lozi aristocracy could still exploit some of its residual influence to assist the recruitment of labour by the Bureau amongst the former *Mawiko* (tributary) groups. Another aspect of the Balovale case is the manner in which Bureau operatives pursued their recruiting activities with the great abandon and unscrupulousness that approximated the campaigns of the private labour agents of the pre-1903 era.⁹³ Webb, commonly known as *Mutenguna* within the African communities, was one of the Bureau operatives whose activities resembled those of the pre-1903 private agents.

Supported by the Lozi aristocracy anxious to strengthen its material base as a substitute to the political power that had been corroded by the new colonial social order and also relying on the empathy of district colonial officials like D.E. Stirke, the Native Commissioner of the Balovale sub-district whose hard-line racial views were reflected in the way in which he regarded his African charges as wild and nervous⁹⁴ in their behaviour and therefore deserving to be treated with 'harsh measures'.⁹⁴ Webb could be excused for the extreme forms of violence and privateering which he assumed in dealing with the Lunda and Nkonya societies of the sub-district. In this case, the collaboration of the Lozi aristocracy was evident from Lewanika's behaviour when he singled out the region between the Lukulu and the Kabompo rivers, inhabited by some Lunda and Nkonya people, as an area 'where all malcontents [in Barotseland] for years past had been placed by the Khotla [Lozi Court]' and that when he was informed of the rampant activities of Bureau agents in the same area in 1912 and 1913 'he only laughed and said he would believe it...'⁹⁵ Lewanika's lack of concern over the plight of the Lunda and Nkonya naturally encouraged the Bureau agents to intensify their operations.

A rather sinister feature of Webb's activities in the Balovale division is also apparent in how Bureau officials deployed African messengers and touts, 'the bully-boys of colonial control' whose significance lies in the fact that they not only symbolised the bureaucratisation of the means of coercion,⁹⁶ but they also represented the social hierarchic division of expertise to maximise domination and exploitation.⁹⁷ The ramifications of this strategy adopted by Webb were in the end very profound as was portrayed by one Lunda headman to the commission of enquiry in 1913, when he indicated:

I remember last year [1912] the Bureau runners Siampoko, Kakeke and Sepatela coming to my village. They said [to Lunda headman] 'Get up and go with us. If you forbid young people to go and work, Mutenguna (Mr. Webb) will put you in chains.' They had already gathered the young men together when I arrived saying they were going to take them. They said they were taking them to Sipalo (Bureau). They told them they would be paid much money. They took three young men from my village. They are still away [in Southern Rhodesia]. They did not wish to go but went because the runners said I should be put in gaol if they did not go.⁹⁸

Due to the alliance between the Bureau and the North-Western Rhodesian colonial state and the intimidating effect this alliance had on the African subject communities, the Lunda and the Nkonya were coerced into labour migration to Southern Rhodesia against their will. Moreover, they were convinced that 'Mr. Webb was a Government official... sent by the Government to collect the people to Bulawayo' where they could get '£1 a month for ploughing [farmwork]'.⁹⁹

Just as their compeers in other parts of North-Western Rhodesia, Webb and his African functionaries went about discouraging independent labour migration to Southern Rhodesia in favour of canalization through the Bureau. This applied even in cases where the recruits concerned had previously gone to the South on their own and were therefore well acquainted with the working conditions at specific labour centres.¹⁰⁰ Secondly, like other African collaborators in the colonial set-up,¹⁰¹ Webb's surrogates took advantage of the situation to maximise their fringe benefits by demanding favours like sex from even the pregnant wives of the victims of their trawling exercise often with disastrous consequences.¹⁰² Thirdly, Webb's collaborators were themselves products of the class-structured Lozi social formation and therefore in their activities, they discriminated minutely between the Lozi and non-Lozi elements with the latter invariably bearing the brunt of the crude recruiting campaign. A Lozi government messenger who witnessed the harassment of the Lunda residents in his home area demonstrated the selective nature of the exercise perpetrated by Webb's runners in the following vein:

I was in the veldt another day and... was called from a distance by two of Mr. Webb's runners.... They shouted: 'Come here you, Come at once'. I went and asked what they meant by calling me thus. They said: 'Don't you know we are police come to take the people?' I replied: 'Those you can take you may but don't try to take me. I know you are no police.' They replied: 'You say thus because you are a

Murose [Lozi]. It is the Malunda we [the Bureau] have been given and if you had been Malunda we would have taken you'. Another day many Malunda including women ran to our [Lozi] village for refuge saying they were being persecuted by Mr. Webb's runners. These people all belong to the Malunda chief Shima. They said they would stay with us as the runners [of Mr. Webb] left us alone. They said Lewanika had given them up to be chased about by these people [the Bureau runners]. We [Lozi] replied: 'It is not Lewanika it is the white people'. I had heard that Mr. Webb's runners were catching the Malunda and leaving all the other tribes.... It was common talk in all the villages.¹⁰³

Lozi loyalists might have tried to exonerate the incidence of collaboration between their aristocracy and the Bureau/colonial/state alliance, but these attempts were stultified by the assertion of Webb's runners to the contrary. By reiterating that their activities had the blessing of Lewanika because 'Lewanika [was] a person of the Government and we [the Bureau] [were] people of the Government... too',¹⁰⁴ Webb's runners strongly validated the existence of collaboration between the Lozi ruling class and colonial institutions in North-Western Rhodesia. In the process, these functionaries succeeded in strengthening the belief that the Lozi aristocracy had been turned to collaborators of both settler capital and the colonial state which used that class as, in Amin's words, 'conveyor belts' in the process of economic exploitation and political subordination.¹⁰⁵ What is more, the fears of the Lunda and Nkonya victims of Webb's campaign may have been seriously confirmed by the reluctance of Lewanika's Ngambela (Chief Councillor) to solve by their problem and instead advised their chiefs and headmen to 'better leave the matter alone for the present'.¹⁰⁶

In the final analysis, the Lunda and the Nkonya devised their own kind of resistance in the form of mass desertion from their villages at the appearance of the organisation's officials and functionaries. Micklem, then the Bureau Manager for Northern Rhodesia, and C. Bisset, the organisation's Inspector for Recruiting in Barotseland, encountered this Lunda/Nkonya resistance in mid-1913. In short, at the appearance of these officials:

The Malunda and Malovale near the camp without exception... ran away together with other [ethnic groups of the area] further north as the news reached them of the arrival of the Bureau representatives.¹⁰⁷

In this respect, it could thus be argued that the activities of Webb and his functionaries had very disturbing consequences for the colonial social order in

North-Western Rhodesia which had become part of Northern Rhodesia since 1911. It is from this context that we must understand the closure of the Balovale sub-district to labour recruitment in October 1913 and the subsequent removal of Webb from the region in favour of David Salmon.¹⁰⁸ Sooner or later, even Micklem and Bisset were forced by the aftermath of the unrest in the Balovale division to quit and in the process allowed the management to restructure the organisation and generally to clear the air in Barotseland and its environs.¹⁰⁹ But the damage to the RNLB had already been done and could only worsen with the advent of the World War I.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, it has been argued that the mobilisation of African labour in North-Western Rhodesia for the Southern Rhodesian market between 1903 and 1914 demonstrated a number of significant issues. First, it shows the extent to which Southern Rhodesia depended on its sister states across the Zambezi for African labour supply and in that way entrenched the centre/periphery relationship between the South and the North in the BSACo possessions. Secondly, it marked the consummation of the alliance between the colonial state's and settler interests in the Company territories and how that alliance was committed to capitalist accumulation at the expense of the economic viability of the African societies whose role was primarily to supply cheap labour. Thirdly, because of the alliance between the colonial state's and settler interests, the recruiters of labour were given a licence to carry out their activities unfettered by fear of censure and interruption from the administrative authorities in the possessions. Consequently, the operations of some RNLB agents were so reckless that they verged on the extremes of privateering and authoritarianism characteristic of the pre-1903 era when private agents dominated African labour mobilisation. In the end, it was the activities of such Bureau operatives and their potential to engender political unrest which considerably undermined the credibility of the organisation as an instrument for African labour mobilisation in North-Western Rhodesia for the Southern Rhodesian market. The repeated threat of unrest and resistance amongst those African societies targeted by these activities seriously strained the alliance between the colonial states and the Bureau, forcing the latter to re-examine its position. But the damage had already been done.

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67. C.O.417/539: R.I. Hughes, Assistant Magistrate, Kalomo, to Goode, Livingstone, 14/2/1914.
68. Lonsdale and Berman, 'Crises of Accumulation, Coercion and the Colonial State', pp.56-7.
69. See how some top colonial officials actually defended the practice of cohabiting with African women in Gann, *op. cit.*, p.151.

70. C.O. 417/493: Venables to Lord Gladstone, 11 May, 1910.
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72. C.O. 417/483: Venables to Imperial Secretary, Pretoria, 18 July, 1910.
73. Colson, *Social Organization of the Gwembe Tonga*, p.32.
74. Lonsdale and Berman, 'Crises of Accumulation, Coercion and the Colonial State', p.61.
75. C.O. 417/484: L.A. Wallace, Acting Administrator, Livingstone, to Lord Gladstone, 9/9/1910.
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78. See Moore's role in the campaign against the importation of Asian labour into Southern Rhodesia in E.P. Makambe, 'The Asian Labour Solution in Zimbabwe, 1898-1904: Labour Practices and Racial Attitudes in a Colonial Society', *Transafrican Journal of History*, Vol. 13 (1984).
79. *The Livingstone Mail*, 5 February 1910. See also the hard-line views expressed by most white settlers on forced African labour in Rolin, *Le Lois et L'Administration de la Rhodesie*, p.159.
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81. D.J. Dodge, *Agricultural Policy and Performance in Zambia: History, Prospects and Proposals for Change* (Berkeley, CA, 1977), p.5.
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87. *Ibid.* Wallace to Burns-Begg, 25 November, 1911.
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94. C.O. 417/539: D.E. Stirke, Native Commissioner (hereafter N/C), Nalolo division. Barotse District, to Acting Resident Magistrate, Mongu, 3 January, 1914.
95. *Ibid.*: C. Mackinnon, Acting Administrator, Livingstone, to Lord Gladstone, 24 February, 1914.
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103. *Ibid.*: Statement of *Muhongo* before Palmer, 11 November, 1913.
104. *Ibid.*: Statement of *Headman Kawanga* before Palmer, 11 November, 1913.
105. S. Amin, 'Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Origins and Contemporary Forms', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1972), p.518.
106. *Ibid.*: Statement of *Induna Liatitima* before Willis, 28 November, 1993.
107. *Ibid.*: Palmer, N/C Balovale to Resident Magistrate, Mongu, 3 January, 1914.

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GERMAN THREAT AND THE VALUE OF WEST AFRICA TO THE FRENCH IN THE INTER WAR YEARS

by Yomi Akinyeye

INTRODUCTION

In an article in the volume LXXVII No. 286 edition of the *Revue Française d'Histoire D'Ouïre Mer*, Charles Robert Ageron tried to show French attitude to the colonies using public opinion as a guide. He concluded that in spite of the vigorous efforts of the colonial party in France to get the French interested in the colonies, French public opinion remained at best apathetic until 1927 when the colonial party recorded some modest achievements. The gained ground was however lost again in 1932 until the 1935 German threat made a majority of the French to believe in safety through the colonies.

The two wrong impressions one gains on reading Ageron are that German threat in France's perception did not develop until 1935 and the value of the colonies as a refuge in the face of this threat was not appreciated until then. However, a use of sources more reliable than public opinion will show that German threat in French perception developed much earlier than 1935 and that the plan of safety through the empire antedated that period. This essay seeks to show French perception and preparations against German threat before the period acknowledged by Ageron. It will as, using French West Africa as a case study, establish that in spite of ignorant public opinion, French official plans for safety throughout the Empire began at the same time with the feelings of German threats.

GERMAN THREATS IN FRENCH PERCEPTION, 1919-1933

The spectre of a resurgent Germany remained a nightmare for France right from the end of the First World War. The history of French-German antagonism dates to the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War which humiliated French national ego and provoked a desire for revenge. The course of seeking this revenge and the consequences for Franco-German relations belong more to the European diplomatic history. It can however be noted in passing that this desire for vengeance largely influenced the French delegate to the Versailles treaty ending the First World War. The constraint of space and familiarity with the 1919 Peace Settlement would not allow one to repeat the provisions of this treaty. Suffice to note that so severe were the clauses of the peace treaty on Germany that the treaty had on one hand been described as a "Carthagenean peace treaty" and regarded as a "Diktat" by Germany on the other hand.¹

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Germany did not disguise her dissatisfaction with this peace treaty and sought a available means of repudiating the treaty whenever she was opportuned to do so. France on the other hand started to look for every available means to secure itself against likely future threat. As the Paris peace conference was in progress, the French government and Marshal Foc pleaded with the allies that the future security of France and the peace of Europe depended on the severance of the whole left bank of the Rhine from Germany. This the allies did not accept. When the League of Nations was being set up, France suggested that the body be provided with an international army to enforce strict observance of the peace treaties. This was once again rejected. However to placate France, a defensive triple alliance by the terms of which the United States and Great Britain would jointly guarantee the territorial integrity of France and come to its military assistance if it should be attacked by Germany was proposed.² However, the refusal of the United States to ratify this treaty nullified the alliance.

On her part, Germany started to take measures to repudiate the Versailles peace treaty. A nationalist association consisting of ex-service men in occupied parts of Germany, intended to take action against France should she attempt a vigorous enforcement of the treaty was formed. A secret society was formed in Pfalz with the express purpose of fostering anti-French propaganda and maintaining the nationalist spirit among the youth.³

The nationalist association referred to above was organised into brigades, battalions and companies. It was reported to be with large quantities of arms in occupied Germany.⁴ Whether this allegation of arms build up by Germany was correct or not should not bother us. It is however instructive that it was made by France. In a letter to the British Prime Minister a year after, the French president called the former's attention to, '*La position périlleuse de la France en cas où elle serait menacée d'une nouvelle agression de l'Allemagne*'.⁵ To guard against this threat, the President proposed: '*La conclusion entre la France et l'Angleterre d'un Pacte défensif et conclu en 1919*'.⁶

The call for a joint Anglo-French defence pact was followed in 1925 by another French proposal to Britain for British troops to occupy the Rhineland till 1935 as a guarantee of French northern frontier against German aggression.⁷ This occupation was to be followed by a joint Anglo-French guarantee to Belgium when she decided to revert to her position of neutrality. This proposal, the French hoped, would deter Germany from attacking France while Britain remained in the Rhineland, knowing that there was no way Germany would attack France without interfering with British troops or their lines of communication. This proposal like the French president's request for a defence pact was rejected by Britain. It did, however show the magnitude of French

perception of the German threat.

The refusal of the French proposal by the British parliament did not however prevent France from seeking subtle diplomatic means to get an assurance against potential German aggression from Britain and other quarters. French colonial agents and governments all over the world were instructed to be on very cordial relations with their British counterparts.⁸ In a similar move, France initiated a programme of mutual assurance between herself and Britain that the defence capabilities of both powers in Europe were not directed against each other.⁹ In taking this initiative, France wanted Britain's goodwill to enable her to concentrate all her energies and resources against Germany.

France's diplomatic efforts at insuring against German threats were, of course, not limited to Britain alone. In the 1920s, France entered into a series of defence pacts and alliances with any power that cared, with the intention of getting either practical assistance or moral assurance against likely German aggression. The terms of these agreements either obliged the signatory countries to come to the aid of France in case of an attack by Germany or to serve as a bulwark against likely German expansion along their common frontiers. On June 2, 1920, France entered into a joint defence pact with Belgium. By this pact, both signatory countries undertook a defence system whereby they would coordinate the defence of their frontiers and the Eastern frontier of Luxembourg. They also agreed to organise a regular meeting of their forces and hold a joint assembly.¹⁰ In February 1921, France signed a military convention with Poland and concluded a similar one with Czechoslovakia between January 26 and 31, 1924. By those conventions, the signatory countries agreed to come to the aid of one another in case any was a victim of unprovoked aggression. France signed accords with Romania and Yugoslavia in 1927, by which the signatories were obliged to find ways of cooperation between their armies and exchange views on the technical conditions of these cooperations.¹¹ The importance of these accords from the French point of view was that Poland and Czechoslovakia would form important places of manoeuvre to the east of Germany. Their geographical positions are such that would not have allowed France to send her land forces without a guarantee of security to her line of communications.

Meanwhile, Germany continued to manifest her anti-French tendencies. German authorities took reprisals against the occupants of the Rhineland who had assisted French forces of occupation in 1930. France's appeal for a Franco-German understanding was rebuffed.¹² French feeling of insecurity in relation to Germany was heightened by a number of factors. France's military manpower was inferior to Germany's. A survey of European population carried out in 1924 showed that while Germany was increasing, France had a declining population.

Moreover, the male population of between 20 and 35 years [arms bearing age] in Germany was 4.5% of the total population in 1924. It was projected that this figure would rise to 5.5% in 1933. That if France was 3.0% of the population in 1924 and was likely to drop to 2.7% in 1940.¹³ Furthermore, Germany was better endowed than France in other natural resources for war manufactures. Also, much of France's meagre industrial and natural resources were located along Franco-German borders within easy strike of Germany.¹⁴ France was expected to be particularly vulnerable in 1935 as a result of the anticipated fall of her military manpower. The number of serving conscripts was expected to be very low that year. This was at a time when Germany was rumoured to be cleverly evading the military restriction on her. Apart from not fulfilling her obligations under the Versailles treaty, Germany was believed to have an illicit military organisation. She also had a concealed scheme for mobilisation embracing the Reichswehr, the police, several societies and organisations, which amounted to a considerable number. Germany also had a large stock of arms, ammunition and possibly weapons forbidden by the treaty of Versailles.

This was coupled with a remarkable strategic system of roads and railways on German Western frontiers and the Rhineland which was commercially unjustifiable.¹⁵ France therefore perceived Germany as secretly preparing for war and believed that such a preparation was most likely to be against France.¹⁶ France also dreaded the possibility of an alliance between Germany and Italy with which her [France's] relations were all but cordial.

France's consternation about potential German threat was worsened with the rise to power in Germany of Adolf Hitler. Hitler's categorical statement in 1933 that Germany would not acquiesce to her inequality with other European countries on the armament question, made France to start taking practical steps about her national defence. French military situation in 1933 was that half of her national army had barely 7 months before their discharge, while the other half consisted of recruits with just one month experience in soldiering. France therefore devised a contingency plan based on the use of her North African divisions and *divisions de marche* consisting of men with over 6 months experience in the army.¹⁷

France also increased her diplomatic efforts to win allies internationally and intensified her military preparations to guard against surprises internally.¹⁸ The French press continued to hammer on the importance of Anglo-French cooperation in international affairs. The editorials were of the view that any apparent divergence of opinion between France and Britain at the Geneva conference should be seen as of minor importance. The common interests of both should lead them to cooperate and act if not always in common, yet always

in harmony in the defence of peace in Europe.¹⁹ The French minister for foreign affairs followed this up a month after with a visit to Britain to discuss the problems of Europe as a whole in the spirit of friendship which united the two countries.²⁰ Although details of the discussions in the meetings held on the French Minister's arrival were not made public, press comments on the outcome of the meetings and the goodwill message sent by the British prime minister to the French foreign minister give a clue. From these two sources, the Anglo-French confab centred on the problems of peace and security in Europe. The British Prime Minister in a note to the visiting French minister expressed the hope that the minister's visit would be a success because it was his [the Prime Minister's] firm conviction that Franco-British cooperation was essential to the peace and well being of Europe.²¹ Writing some days later, the *London Times* opined that the French Minister's visit would be about the organisation of security in Europe by means of a pact of mutual assistance.²²

Thus German threat in French consciousness was much earlier than 1935 and, as could be inferred from above, French preparations to meet this threat also went side by side with the awareness of the threat. Part of the preparation to counter German threats by France had to do with the utilisation of the resources of the French overseas possessions to assist the mother country in times of trouble.

WEST AFRICA'S VALUE TO FRANCE, 1919-1938

With French awareness of German moves against the peace treaty of 1923, the French *Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale* [CSDN] started to deliberate on the means of organising France for a future war in times of peace. The CSDN held its inaugural meeting on October 20, 1923 [the year in which France accused Germany of having a nationalist association in battle formation]. It met several times subsequently at the end of which it concluded that in the light of the experience of the last war, future wars would not be between armies alone but all forces and resources of warring nations. It advised that:

En temps de paix pour préparer mobilisation et en temps de guerre pour assurer dans l'unité de ses attributions, la défense nationale, chaque ministère fait évaluer:

1. les besoins auxquels il a mission de satisfaire,
2. les matières, denrées, produit, de transformation outillage, de communication (transport et transmission) et autre ressources pour subvenir à ses besoins.²³

The French Ministry for colonies was accordingly directed to survey the resources of the colonies and their possibilities of meeting French needs in time of war. The ministry observed: '*que nos production nationales ne pouvaient suffire à assurer l'équilibre économique et la sécurité du pays*'.²⁴ To make up for this deficiency in French national resources, the ministry went further: '*les yeux se sont portés sur nos possessions tropicales*'.²⁵ The colonial ministry therefore sent various inspection missions to the colonies. The mission to French West Africa undertook a comprehensive study of the resources of the subregion and their potentialities to support France in time of crisis.²⁶ In the maiden report of the inspection mission to French West Africa, the mission maintained that given the benefit of modern technology, French West Africa was capable of great agricultural productions and support to France. French West Africa was rich in oil bearing trees which from researches were bound to be of importance in the immediate future for motors and automobiles. The mission therefore urged France to give priority attention to West African possessions for this purpose. Senegal which exported on the average about 250,000 tons of groundnut per annum was capable of much higher yields if mechanised. Similarly, French West Africa possessed 1,750,000 hectares of palm trees which, if regularly improved was capable of yielding 164,000 tons of oil and 438,000 tons of palm kernels.²⁷

The output of palm oil, the mission pointed out, was hampered by traditional methods of production in French West Africa which made the subregion to lose about 50% of the oil content of palm fruits. If mechanised, palm oil production would double its annual output in West Africa. Mechanised oil extraction was already being practised in Malaysia with salutary effects. Thus, Malaysia with 100,000 hectares of palm trees was capable of producing 200,000 tons of acid free palm oil in 1930.²⁸ French West African palm oil, by virtue of the proximity of the subregion to Europe would be more advantageously exploited than that of the Far East in times of crisis.²⁹ France was in fact, aware of these potentialities and had started taking steps to improve the oil production capacity of her West African possessions shortly after the First World War. In 1920, there was the prospection for palmeries in Dahomey, Togo and Côte d'Ivoire. Plans for setting up palm oil research centres at Lamé in Côte d'Ivoire, and Pobe in Dahomey were drawn up. Construction works on the laboratories in these two settlements started in 1921/22 and a team was sent to prospect the forest region for the mechanised cultivation of palm trees in French West Africa in 1923. This was followed in 1924 by the extension of agricultural and industrial researches in West Africa. The inspection mission also directed the attention of the French government to the abundance of shea butter in French

Sudan and Dahomey, the export of which could be increased from its normal 30,000 tons to between 50,000 and 100,000 tons. This product, the mission emphasised, could provide 50% of French butter needs.³⁰

The inspection mission also showed the potentialities of French West Africa in the production of fibres especially cotton. West African cotton was to be rated highly in case of the future when French cotton industries could be threatened by war. France consumed about 1,200,000 bales of cotton at a cost of 2,000,000,000 frs annually of which only 300 bales were imported from the colonies.³¹ Like most countries of the world, France relied on the U.S. which produced 85% of the world's cotton needs. However, U.S. disposable cotton to world market was declining due to cotton-destroying parasites on one hand, and increasing domestic consumption by American textile industries. Thus, while the U.S. supplied the world with 14,885,000 bales of cotton in 1913, she was only able to supply 111,000,000 in 1914, U.S. cotton supply to world market stagnated at 12,000,000 bales between 1915 and 1920 and then declined again to 8,340,000 between 1921 and 1922. The cotton consumption of American textile industries was, however, consistently on the increase. In 1901, American textile industries consumed 20,800,000 bales of American cotton. The figure rose to 30,597,000 bales in 1912 and 34,387,000 bales in 1921. Thereafter, it continued to increase by 500,000 bales annually.³² The inspection mission argued that if this trend of U.S. cotton supply continued, France's source of cotton supply would most certainly become untenable in the not too distant future. To avoid this situation, it advised that France should invigorate the cotton culture in French West Africa.³³ It can therefore be seen that French threat perception was not limited to military insecurity but also to economic uncertainty. The plan for safety from these threats centred so much on the colonies in general and French West Africa in particular.

To exploit French West African cotton culture in the event of the American source becoming untenable, the French government took a series of steps to boost the cotton production of the subregion. It sent a study mission to the U.S. in 1921 to see how the cotton culture of French Niger could be perfected. In 1922, American and Egyptian cotton varieties were introduced to three points on the Niger valley for observation in both dry and irrigated cultures. These were then cultivated in selected points in Niger and Senegal on experimental basis to determine the conditions of the two modes of cultivation and create the cotton varieties best suited for the West African environment. In Niger, a subventioned company created an area of 2000 hectares at the end of 1923 for cotton cultivation. In Senegal, some areas were successfully utilised for dry cotton cultivation.

France also looked up to her West African colonies for the supply of wool. According to the 1923 Inspection Mission to French West Africa, the subregion was rich in wool producing animals. The wool output from these animals, like the sylvan products, was poor because of the method of sheep breeding on one hand and the specie of the sheep on the other. To boost wool production from French West Africa for French need in time of crisis the French had started to take some measures since 1908. Such measures included the establishment of sheep fold in Oualadji in Niger with the aim of creating a local population of merino sheep from local breeds which would be adapted to tropical climate. The fold was to be reconstituted in 1924. The Mission also counselled the use of irrigation techniques for the breeding of these sheep. The French planned to increase the population of their West African possessions' merino sheep in 1924, at experimental stations. France also had the plan to boost sisal and fibre production in West Africa for rope and jute manufactures.

Although records of the action taken by the French government on the recommendation of the 1923 inspection mission could not be located by this author, there is no doubt that the French government took them seriously. In a similar exercise of taking stock of French West African potentials for assisting the mother country in case of crisis, conducted in 1924, the governor-general of French West Africa gave what could be described as the progress report on the preparation of West African resources since 1926. This included the establishment of groundnut oil processing factories manned by Europeans at various parts of French West Africa but with the greatest concentration at Senegal.³⁴

Apart from the above primary products, France also hoped to rely on French West Africa for meat to be obtained from French Sudan, Senegal, Mauretania, Côte d'Ivoire, Upper Volta and Dahomey. She also hoped to get bananas from Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, pine apples from Guinea and Dahomey, cocoa from Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, among others. Although it must be pointed out that France sometimes exaggerated the potential of her West African possessions to support her in times of emergency, the targets set nevertheless show the value placed on them as a refuge in spite of ignorant public opinion.³⁵ To ensure that actual supply of primary commodities met the anticipated demand targets in West Africa, France resorted to the stockpiling of these commodities in peace time.³⁶ French West Africa was instructed to reduce its exports to countries other than France to the barest minimum. In time of mobilisation, the subregion was to forfeit her freedom of trade entirely and take stock from time to time of all its resources that could be sent to France in time of war.³⁷ The ministerial instruction also provided for the establishment of a local purchasing commission

in West Africa to liaise with a similar one in the metropole for the institution of French monopoly.

Thus 1935 which Ageron acknowledged as the commencement of the feeling of safety through the colonies by a majority of French public opinion was no more than the beginning of public awareness of a process long begun by the French government. Two years later (1937), France again reevaluated her resources to meet a general conflict. Like before, she again hoped to rely on the colonies to a great extent. These colonies were classified into two namely, *possessions principaux* and *possessions secondaire* on the basis of their perceived ability to assist the metropole in time of trouble. French West Africa was classified as colony *principale*:

*En raison de l'importance exceptionnelle de la contribution qu'il est susceptible d'apporter d'une part à la défense de la metropole, d'autre part à la défense de l'Afrique du Nord, du rôle essentiel de la base naval de Dakar pour la défense de nos communications maritime avec l'Amerique du sud, ainsi qu'avec l'extreme orient, de l'importance des ports defendus de port Etienne, Konakry et point Noire....*³⁸

A fresh stocktaking of the resources of French colonies to support the mother country in the impending Second World War was taken on the eve of the war. Projections were made on the basis of the output of the prospective colonies for 1937. In 1937, of the total 281,905 tons of groundnut without shell from French colonies, 174,025 tons came from French West Africa. The subregion accounted for 5300 tons of groundnut with pods out of a total of 5534 tons from all French colonies, all the 2710 tons of cotton grains, 15,940 tons out of 16,745 tons of shea nuts, all the 6695 tons of shea butter, 81,500 tons out of 147,210 tons of palm kernels, 20,000 out of 38,000 tons of palm oil; 10,425 tons out of 38,776 tons of coffee, 55,390 tons out of 167,105 tons of banana, and 4000 out of 15,290 tons of cotton. Other items included 730 of 784 tons of sheep skin, 4400 of 7010 tons of sisal, all of 6500 tons of Gomme Arabic, 5293 of 11,293 carats of diamond and 4000 of 4834 kg of gold.³⁹ The French also nursed the hope of getting manganese in high quantity and gold from Cote d'Ivoire.⁴⁰

The part allocated to French West Africa in the safety of France in the inter-war years was not limited to the provision of foodstuff and industrial raw materials. West Africa occupied a key position in French overall strategy for the defence of their seaborne trade. The strategic location of Dakar both in the geopolitics of the West African subregion and international maritime trade had long caught the attention of the French.⁴¹ Dakar constituted the only bridge

between Gibraltar and Gabon, and was the first terminus of trade from the Sudan to the Niger valley.⁴² Dakar therefore occupied a central position for the French to control their vast African empire. The French also saw in Dakar the potentials of a commercial highway from Europe to Asia Minor, North Africa, the Antilles, Panama and South America as well as Equatorial Africa and beyond.⁴³ The French had earmarked Dakar as a port of refuge for battle flotilla in the ocean. It was also intended to be a bridge between the French post in the North Atlantic, the English channel and the Mediterranean for unity of combat by the navy.

Dakar was admirably placed to combine her action with Brest and the fort de France. Like Sierra Leone, Dakar was intended to be the alternative gateway to the Far East in case of the closure of the Suez Canal. These considerations made the French to build a naval base in Dakar from 1898. She served as the base for anti-submarine campaign against Germany in the First World War.

The significance of Dakar in the face of threats to France in the inter war years was, in French perception, to continue undiminished because: "*Dans les grands conflits Européen de l'avenir, Dakar jouera un rôle plus important encore que pendant la dernière guerre....*"⁴⁴ For this reason, the French took steps to facilitate the maximum production of West African resources to assist France in case of trouble: "*Ce point d'appui doit être considéré en raison de l'action comme faisant partie d'opération Européennes*".⁴⁵ It was through Dakar that France obtained supplies in 1917-18 (during the critical period of submarine warfare) from Australia. Dakar was expected to fulfill the same function in a future war. She was to be France's only point of escape from the danger of submarine warfare. As a result of her strategic location, Dakar was to be a base for transporting men and materials to France.⁴⁶ She was to be, in case of another war, the base of operations of vessels charged with maintaining the security of French communications with West Africa and South America. In case of mobilisation, Dakar was to be:

*refuge aux navires de commerce de plus en plus nombreux qui fréquentent les parages d'un port dont une loi d'Aout 1920 prévoit une extension basée sur l'essor économique que prendra l'AOF avec la culture intensive du coton.*⁴⁷

Dakar's defence was to be rated as very important because French national interests, obligent à défendre Dakar en raison de son rôle comme:

- (a) base de départ de force noire
- (b) base d'opérations navales

(c) de port de refuge

(d) d'entre port de denrées pour la métropole

(e) de protection indirect de l'AOF.⁴⁸

The increased strategic value of Dakar in post World War I French thinking in the face of perceived threats made the *Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale* (CSDN) to classify it as a first class naval base which should be organised along the same line as naval bases in the metropole.⁴⁹ The various defence arrangements made by the French to enable Dakar to play its vital role in the strategic calculation of the French to combat all eventualities of threats has been shown elsewhere.⁵⁰ It is therefore enough to note here that even during the period of cordial relations with the British (their only neighbour in West Africa), the French did not neglect the defences of Dakar. This was because the base was intended to serve some roles in the strategic plans of the French, which considerations were strange to the realities of the West African subregion. The French also had defended ports all over West Africa at Etienne, Konakry, Abidjan and point Noire, as well as an auxiliary submarine station at Duala to meet likely threats. All these were built before 1935.⁵¹

In addition to its economic resources and strategic location, France also hoped to tap the immense manpower resources of West Africa in the face of German and other threats. Plans were made to this end right through the 1920s. The French had exploited West African manpower for military labour from time immemorial. The excessive demands of France from West Africa in this regard had provoked a universal revolt against France in her West African colonies during the First World War. However, as a result of the demographic disadvantage earlier noted, the French hoped to rely very heavily again on West African manpower resources to perform certain functions for which the French had no alternative means of performing. The French suffered very heavy casualties in the First World War. Moreover, among the provisions of the 1919 peace settlement was the clause providing for the occupation of the Rhineland by allied forces - the bulk of which were French. France therefore needed a lot of manpower and this made her dependence on West Africa inevitable. France deployed the *Tirailleur Sénégalais* as part of its army of occupation to the Rhineland, for garrison duties in metropolitan France itself as well as Syria and North Africa. French West African troops were also used to suppress revolts in other parts of the French empire.⁵²

France therefore found the black troops indispensable. Like the preparation of French West African resources, and the defence of Dakar to meet French needs in time of emergency, series of inspection tours of the *Tirailleur Sénégalais* were held to prepare the force for its important role in French

defence calculations. One of such was held by Marshal Pétain, the President of the CCDC and Inspector General of colonial troops, in 1925. In his report, Pétain reminded the French Government of the threat facing the French nation and the role assigned to French West Africa as a veritable reservoir of men. He counselled the establishment of a scheme for the systematic recruitment of West Africans in peace time so as to have a steady strength under arms in case of a new conflict. France should aim at a permanent black army of eighty thousand men. The Inspector General alluded to a ministerial despatch of 1920 to this effect and the projection for the recruitment of between twelve, fifteen and twenty thousand men to achieve this target annually. The target had not been realised due to a number of problems which should be urgently solved.⁵³

Although Pétain did not elaborate on the very important role meant for French black African contingents later, the Inspector General, in reiterating the need for the amelioration of the conditions of service of the T.S., threw more light on this when he said: '... il n'est pas sans intérêt d'insister à nouveau sur l'important appoint due peuvent nous apporter les contingents de l'Afrique noir en cas de besoin'.⁵⁴ Apart from local garrisoning and defence duties in West Africa, the T.S., in the words of the Inspector General:

Constituent en partie le troupes de souveraineté que nous entretenons sur les théâtres d'opérations extérieures et dans certaines de nos possessions d'outre mer (Afrique du Nord, Syrie, Madagascar, Guyane, Somalis).⁵⁵

French West African forces also constitute: '... la composition de forces mobiles prête à intervenir en tous point de notre empire où l'ordre Français vient se trouver menacée'.⁵⁶ Apart from these roles, the T.S. also, 'contribuent de le temps de paix à fournir à la métropole, les effectifs nécessaires à sa défense'.⁵⁷

This reliance on the West African manpower was only heightened by the 1935 threat. In the French plan for mobilisation drawn up in 1937, France looked forward to recruiting 178,000 men from West Africa in the first year of war.⁵⁸ This was in addition to the recruitment of both skilled and unskilled labour from West Africa.⁵⁹ The implementation of this policy made France to have a large body of black African troops under arms on the outbreak of the Second World War.

As can be seen from above, even though the larger public (whose opinion Professor Ageron himself admitted was difficult to determine) was ignorant of the fact, the French government was aware of German and other threats to the French republic. German threats stemmed from ripples of the First World War;

apart from this, France also had diplomatic collisions with Italy at various parts of the international system. Not only this, the increasing rate of the utilisation of raw materials by France's extra-colonial sources of supply made France to envisage a period when these sources would be untenable. The case of American cotton supply readily comes to mind here.

Just as official perception of threat to France predated 1935, preparations to meet those challenges antedated that year. The colonies in general and West Africa in particular were meant to fulfil important roles in these preparations. Thus, in spite of ignorant public opinion, the belief in safety of France through the empire began shortly after the First World War. To prepare the colonies to fulfil these roles certain measures were taken. These included attempts to introduce mechanised techniques of processing raw materials, boosting of the defences of Dakar and the amelioration of the conditions of service of the black African troops. This dimension of the official perception of the colonies in the inter war years is indispensable for the authentic picture of the colonies in French perception.

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THE BRITISH SOUTHERN CAMEROONIANS AND THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NIGERIA AND THE CAMEROONS (N.C.N.C.), 1944-1961.

by Victor Bong Amaazee

THE CAMEROONS BECOMES PART OF NIGERIA

When the Allied Powers defeated the Germans in Cameroon in 1916, the country was provisionally divided between France and Britain. At the end of the First World War, the League of Nations was established to maintain world peace and security. The League's Mandate System was also created to administer the captured German colonies, and, for this purpose, Cameroon was divided between Britain and France along the provisional boundary of 1916. The Mandate System came into effect on 20 July, 1922, with France taking five-sixths of Cameroon and Britain taking one-sixth.¹

The British sector of Cameroon consisted of two narrow strips of land about 4308 square miles along the eastern border of Nigeria extending from Lake Chad to the Atlantic Ocean - 700 miles long. At this time, the British Protectorate of Nigeria was divided into three administrative zones: the Colony of Lagos, Northern and Southern Nigeria. The British Cameroons was also divided into the Southern Cameroons and the Northern Cameroons.

The Southern Cameroons was administered as a province of Southern Nigeria while Northern Cameroons was administered as a part of Northern Nigeria. When, in 1939, the government divided Southern Nigeria into Western and Eastern Provinces, the Southern Cameroons became a province of Eastern Nigeria. There was a Senior Resident Administrative Officer in Buea, who was responsible to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Region based in Enugu.²

The Southern Cameroons remained a separate Nigerian province for 27 years until 1949 when it was divided into two provinces - the Bamenda and Cameroons Provinces - which were later abolished in 1954, due to the granting of quasi regional status to the Southern Cameroons.³

THE FOUNDING OF THE N.C.N.C.

The first Nigerian political pressure group to attract the attention of Cameroonian youths was the Nigerian Youth Movement. It was founded in 1933 under the name of 'Lagos Youth Movement' by Dr. J.C. Vaughan, Mr. E.S. Ikoli and Oba Samuel Akinsanya. In 1937, Chief H.O. Davies became General

Secretary, and it was at this time that the name was changed to the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM). Mr. P.M. Kale had by then been living in Lagos for just a few years working as a primary school headmaster. He enlisted as a member of the movement because he saw it as a forum to put the spotlight on Cameroonian affairs. Mr. P.E.N. Malafa and other young Cameroonians soon followed Kale's example and joined the movement.⁴

These Cameroonians were greatly impressed by two articles in the charter and constitution of the Youth Movement which they felt could be applied with advantage to the Cameroons. The first article stated:

The principal aim of the Nigerian Youth Movement is the development of a united nation out of the conglomeration of the peoples who inhabit Nigeria. It shall be our endeavour to encourage the fullest play of all such forces as will serve to promote understanding and a sense of common nationality among the different elements in the country. We will combat vigorously all such tendencies as would jeopardise the unifying process.⁵

The Cameroonians found a common ground with the Nigerian youths who were working toward the oneness of Nigeria because the Cameroonian youths had always wished to bring not only hundreds of British Southern Cameroons tribes into a unit but also to bring the divided Cameroon back to the single political entity that it had been under German rule. The Cameroonians were also attracted to the NYM because of the *land question* in relation to the plantation system introduced by the German government. In its manifesto published around 1938, the NYM made the following observation on the land question:

One of the blessings of West African colonies has been the retention of native land for the use of the indigenous population and the prevention of alienation by foreigners. Unfortunately, for some years past, there has been a noticeable relaxation of this principle, particularly in the coastal towns. Foreigners now own some 10% to 20% of residential areas of the Island of Lagos. If this process of alienation is allowed to continue, a situation similar to that prevailing in East Africa whereby the African lacking in capital is deprived of his good land and forced into underdeveloped, fever-ridden locations will be created. The plantation system also threatens to upset the ideal of a country of peasantry which can be made contented by means of cooperative societies. In Benin, Warri, Calabar and Cameroon Provinces, large

first Nigerian country-wide political organisation, although its influence and presence among the Hausa was minimal.¹⁰

Cameroonians joined the NCNC through their membership of the Cameroon Youth League which was affiliated to the party. The founders of the Cameroon Youth League (CYL) were mostly students from the Higher College, Yaba, and from some secondary schools around Lagos. Although the headquarters of the Cameroon Youth League was in Lagos, branches were established in almost all the colleges in Nigeria where there were three or four Cameroonian students, and all over the Cameroons.¹¹ In the British Southern Cameroons itself, the Cameroons Youth League operated indirectly through affiliated local cultural and welfare unions in places like Victoria, Mamfe, Bamenda and Kumba.¹²

From 1944, the CYL championed the fight against the disadvantaged educational position of the Cameroons, and the need for an autonomous legislature for the Cameroons. Through a monthly subscription of six pence (6d), the CYL was able to publish a month bulletin called 'The Cameroons Youth League Newsletter', through which information was disseminated to all of the League's members and branches. But the CYL soon disintegrated, not through lack of support, enthusiasm or organisational ability, but because the majority of its members were students in colleges in Nigeria and, on graduation, they were absorbed into the Nigerian civil service and transferred from place to place. Nevertheless, the CYL left a legacy of agitation for separation from, or at least autonomy for the Cameroons in, Nigeria.¹³

BRITISH ATTITUDE TO THE N.C.N.C. IN THE SOUTHERN CAMEROONS

The problems of the NCNC in the Southern Cameroons were aggravated by the unsympathetic attitude of British administrators in the territory. British opposition to the NCNC was prompted by the NCNC's own opposition to the four bills passed by the Legislative Council of Nigeria at Lagos in March 1945. These were: (1) the Minerals Ordinance; (2) the Appointment and Deposition of Chiefs Ordinance; (3) Public Lands Acquisition (Amendments) Ordinance; and (4) Crown Lands Ordinance.¹⁴

The government was increasingly concerned with the effectiveness of the propaganda by the NCNC against the ordinances which the party described as 'obnoxious'. Thus, the government attached the utmost importance to counteraction by Administrative Officers on all possible occasions. The exact line which such counteraction took varied with local circumstances and was left very largely to the discretion of Administrative Officers on the spot who alone could judge what line was best. In order to assist such officers, notes on the ordinances were prepared together with suggestions on possible lines of approach, and copies of the notes were sent to all administrative officers.¹⁵

plantations are already in existence and a population of mixed peasants is being converted to a labour camp. We view this development with much concern and call upon the government to arrest and reverse it. We call on the government:

- (i) to reclaim for the indigenous inhabitants their sacred land;
- (ii) to check the growth of plantations and to liquidate the existing ones.⁶

Such sentiments made a deep impression on the minds of Cameroonians who were looking forward to the day when the C.D.C. plantations in the Victoria and Kumba Divisions would be handed back to the natives of the land. Unfortunately, the NYM did not live long to satisfy the aspirations of its supporters. When, because of the introduction or influence of tribal selectivity, class distinction or superiority complex within the rank and file of the movement, the NYM dwindled into nothingness, the patriots of Nigeria and the Cameroons lost no time in founding another forum wherein the problems confronting these colonies could be addressed. This spirit gave birth to the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC).⁷

The idea of a new political organisation was conceived by the Nigerian Students' Union in London in 1944, and, like most other nationalist movements in dependent territories, the union sought inspiration in the purely Western concepts of liberal democracy and nationalism.⁸ With the collapse of the NYM, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, through his public lectures and fiery journalism, succeeded in rallying to his support a considerable following among the youth of the country. In August 1944, the students and ex-students carried their idea to Azikiwe and requested him to call out and lead them towards the attainment of Nigeria's self-government. From this visit, the idea emerged of founding a 'National Council' to weld the various elements of the country together to work towards independence. Accordingly, a conference of organisations in Lagos was convened. Members of the NYM refused to attend but the conference went ahead to pass a resolution that gave birth to the 'National Council'.⁹ This resolution was passed on August 21, 1944.

The Council changed its name to the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons in order to accommodate the membership of Cameroonian associations in Lagos. Membership of the new party was not individual but organisational, which meant that for an individual to be a member of the NCNC, he had to belong to an organisation which was affiliated to it. Its membership included some trade unions, some existing political parties, professional associations and general tribal unions. The Ibo Federal Union was one. Indeed, the NCNC attracted many enthusiastic followers, and it therefore emerged as the

On the Minerals Ordinance, 1945, the notes had much to tell the administrative officers. The Minerals Ordinance was not an amending ordinance but a consolidated ordinance which replaced the Minerals Ordinance of 1916 and brought that Ordinance up to date. Much of the Ordinance was purely technical and had not been criticised by the NCNC on that line. The NCNC's main line of attack was that the Ordinance deprived the African of his sacred right in the mineral wealth of his land and gave it to the British Crown. But, as a matter of fact, Section (1) of the Ordinance which vested in the Crown the entire property in and control of all mineral in, under or upon any land in Nigeria was drafted in precisely the same words as Section 3 of Chapter 93 which had been passed in 1916. Thus, the NCNC's allegation that the Minerals Ordinance, 1945, heralded some new policy in that respect was not really true.

It was also necessary to point out that the expression 'mineral wealth' had given rise to some misconception in the minds of many of those to whom the NCNC's propaganda was directed. There was underlying the whole of the attack against the Minerals Ordinance a suggestion that 'wealth' was readily available to all and sundry, merely for the effort of what amounted to picking it up from the ground. The position was, however, that although efficient mining operations unquestionably could, given satisfactory condition, lead to substantial profits, the history of the industry showed that extremely heavy losses were frequently incurred. The fact that mining was an industry and not a simple source of wealth made available to certain persons at the whim of the government was overlooked in many of the articles written against the ordinance.¹⁶

Nevertheless, counter propaganda along such lines was suitable only for more intelligent audiences. As such, in areas where it was necessary to explain the ordinance to illiterates, it was probable that all that could be done was to stress the fact that all the mineral wealth of Nigeria was regarded as the property of the people of Nigeria as a whole and not as the property of certain individuals who happened to live on the surface below which the minerals were found. The result of this policy was that the public revenues of Nigeria benefited to the extent of a quarter of a million pounds a year from royalties paid on minerals won by mining operators, thus relieving the tax payer of the burden of having to find the money which was expended entirely on public purposes.

In defending the government against NCNC charges, Administrative Officers were advised to ask a few questions. They were to ask the people whether there was any reason why such considerable wealth should pass into the hands of individuals who had done nothing whatever to earn or deserve it, and whose only possible claim to it was that they happened to live on the land which for centuries had contained that wealth, unknown and unexploited by them. Was it not far more rational that the hidden wealth should be shared among the people

of Nigeria as a whole?

The Administrative Officers were also given guidelines on what to say about the Appointment and Deposition of Chiefs Ordinance. The Ordinance was not a new enactment but an amendment to the 1930 Ordinance. Since 1930, the Governor had powers, upon the death, abdication or deposition of any chief in the Colony or any Head Chief in the Protectorate, to approve the appointment of any person who had been appointed in accordance with native law and custom by those so empowered under native law to make the appointment. Under the 1930 law, if no appointment was made before the expiration of the usual interval under native law and custom, the Governor was to appoint a person whom he might deem fit to carry out the duties incidental to the chieftaincy in question. The Governor had also been the sole judge as to whether any appointment of a chief or head chief had been made in accordance with native law and custom. Finally, the Governor had had the power to depose any chief in the colony and head chief in the protectorate if, after enquiry, he was satisfied that such deposition was required according to native law and custom, or was necessary in the interests of peace, order or good government.

In the light of this, the amending Ordinance of 1945 did not substantially alter the position save that it empowered the Governor to take steps with regard to the appointment or deposition of chiefs other than head chiefs in protectorate as well as in the colony. In other respects, the Ordinance restricted rather than widened the powers of the Governor as he could now only approve or depose chiefs who were members of a Native Authority or of a Native Authority Advisory Council. It would be noticed that the Governor still had no power to appoint a chief himself, though he could appoint a person to carry out the duties incidental to the chieftaincy if no chief was appointed within a reasonable time. The amending ordinance also required the Governor to make due enquiry and to consult with the person concerned in the selection of chiefs before deciding any chieftaincy dispute or before deposing a chief. This, he had not been previously required to do.

Administrative officers were also advised to use a number of arguments in suitable circumstances. The people were to be told that the Governor had never abused his powers under the old ordinance which by 1945 had been in operation for 16 years, so that there was no reason to suppose that he would abuse them in future. Where the Governor had exercised his powers of deposition, this had always been done in accordance with the wishes of the people. Even where the Governor had intervened to settle a chieftaincy dispute, it had been at the request of the people themselves because they had been unable to decide who should be the next chief, and they themselves were tired of wrangling. It was desirable that such disputes should be settled expeditiously and without cost to

the people, rather than that they should be subject to the delays and expenses of protracted litigation.¹⁷

The Public Lands Acquisition (Amendment) Ordinance, 1945, like the Appointment and Deposition of Chiefs Ordinance, was merely an amending Ordinance which made no fundamental change in the law. It was obvious that in any country the Government should have the power to acquire land which was necessary for public purposes, and that it must have power to acquire compulsorily if the people who owned or occupied the land refused to part with it by negotiation. Land so acquired was not simply taken from the people: compensation was paid and, if the Government and people concerned were unable to agree on what that compensation should be, the matter went to court and the court decided what the just compensation should be. The 1945 ordinance specifically laid it down that the compensation should be the amount which the land would fetch if sold in the open market by a willing seller. The government was only empowered to take land for 'public purposes' which were specifically defined in the Ordinance. Up to the time that the amending ordinance was passed, 'public purposes' were defined to mean:

- (a) for exclusive government use or for general public use;
- (b) for or in connection with sanitary improvements of any kind, including reclamation;
- (c) for or in connection with the laying out of any new township or government station, or the extension or improvement of any existing township or any government station;
- (d) for obtaining control over land contiguous to any port;
- (e) for obtaining control over land the value of which would be enhanced by the construction of any railway, road or other public work or convenience about to be undertaken or provided by the government;
- (f) for obtaining control over land required for or in connection with mining operations.

The 1945 ordinance added another purpose: 'for obtaining control over land required for or in connection with planned rural development or settlement.'¹⁸ It was this amendment that became the main prop of NCNC agitation, and they deliberately led their audiences to suppose that it was the intention of the Government to dispossess the African on a large scale and put the European settlers on the land. However, official colonial government policy was to resist every form of European settlement on the land. The intention of the amendment, according to the government, was to implement plans for rural development and to enable land to be acquired for the re-settlement of Africans from over-populated areas in areas which could support a larger population.

Counter-propaganda by the government on this matter had to be suited to

purely local circumstances and limited to arguments which could reasonably be understood by the average man on the street. However, government's counter-propaganda was augmented with a comprehensive police surveillance on known supporters of the NCNC in the Cameroons. On 29 October, 1946, the District Officer for Mamfe was able to report on what he and the police had been able to do so far. Sampson George, Secretary of the Technical Workers' Union, had been in Mamfe since October 5, but was not making any headway to get people for Zik. Nnamme of Buca/Lagos and Ngongi of Nuea/Bamenda arrived in Mamfe late October 1946, to raise money on behalf of the Haddison Bycroft land dispute with the Baeel Mission at Victoria. Mr. Martin, the District Clerk in Mamfe, objected to such political activities by members of the Cameroon Youth League without proper consultation with the local branch. Martin also opposed the holding of a dance to raise money for this purpose. As a result, Martin was denounced by Nnamme and George at a public meeting, insinuating that he was a traitor who was unduly subservient to the Government. For this reason, Martin and Fotabong resigned from the local committee to welcome Zik. Subsequently, Martin and Fotabong were deprived of their positions in the Cameroons Youth League on alleged grounds of incompetence, but obviously it was because of their loyalty to the Government.

Thereafter, George applied to use the Appeal Court Hall for a dance but the application was rejected because the purpose was to collect money for the NCNC. Meanwhile, George had declared that his visit to Mamfe was to found local branches of the NCNC and he was going to tour Mamfe Division in this connection. The District Officer for Mamfe thought that Zik had sent George to Mamfe because the latter's mother was from Mamfe which had been chosen as the Centre for the NCNC and anti-government drive in the Cameroons. For this reason, all the activities of the Zikists were being most closely watched by the police.¹⁹

By September 1947, the Acting Resident for the Cameroons Province could report to the Secretary for the Eastern Provinces, Enugu, on the steps he had taken so far to contend Zikism. Chief Manga Williams had told the Resident that the activities of the Zikists were directed mostly towards disseminating incorrect information as to the government's intentions in regard to land settlement schemes and the immigration of strangers. The Resident at once informed the Superintendent of Police, Buca, and requested him to pay special attention to this subject. Elsewhere, Nnamme was not finding it easy to foment strikes in Victoria while Ngongi was equally failing in Bamenda in his efforts to convince the local population that they should trust their future to Zik's advice and guidance. There were also two Zikist agents in Kumba who could not achieve any prominence in any known sphere of activity.

The Resident was of the opinion that all responsible indigenous elements in the Cameroons were indifferent to Zik's propaganda, but it could not be overlooked that there was quite a large population of strangers who were only temporarily resident in the Cameroons and mostly working on the Victoria and Kumba plantations. It could at any time be possible to cause trouble through such strangers, mostly in the form of strikes. However there was a tendency for illiterates to distrust the literate clerks who were generally believed to be out for their own advantage only.

Among Government and Native Administration employees could be counted a certain number of Zik's supporters, one of the most prominent being the District Clerk in Bamenda. The government placed such people under the closest observation with a view to ascertaining their activities. This was necessary because they could carry what the government considered their 'peculiar aptitude for bluff and deceit' into many private transactions which ought to be discovered and relentlessly ventilated in public.²⁰

The colonial administration seemed to have been in a kind of panic as to how to counter NCNC propaganda. The administrative officers found it difficult to say which acts or statements of government and native administration servants were of a political nature. The clarification was necessary because a number of government and native administration workers were supporters of Zik. The administrative officers needed to know what exactly was implied by publishing anything in any manner which might reasonably be regarded as of political and administrative nature. Did an invitation to attend or the announcement of a meeting to be held by Zik or his representative to discuss his proposals come within this meaning? Was it necessary for such an invitation to contain any reference to items of the political doctrine to be discussed or lectured on? Did introducing a speaker on political subjects contravene the provisions of the government's General Order 40(c) on meetings?²¹

The administrative officers themselves were under the impression that Circular No. 33/1947 dealing with public speeches by government officers, precluded them from making any public utterances whatsoever on political matters, and that it even debarred them from explaining government's policy and point of view not only at public meetings but even at meetings with progressive unions and the like, unless they were given specific permission to do so on each occasion. The government in Lagos cleared the point by instructing that when the government's intentions were so consistently misrepresented in the press, it was essential that administrative officers should avail themselves of every opportunity they could find to correct mistaken ideas and get the truth across to the people. After all, the circular in question had been intended as a warning to members of the Junior Service who at the time had been indulging somewhat

freely in the press and at public meetings in criticism of the government. But now, as long as administrative officers confined themselves to putting across government's point of view and to correcting misrepresentations, there was no objection whatsoever to their speaking in public on matters of public interest, or even convening meetings for the purpose. It was, in fact, their duty to do all that they could do to ensure that the policy and actions of government were properly understood by the people.²²

In continuation of its campaign to counter NCNC propaganda, the government surveyed the possibility of forming debating societies in secondary schools where guest speakers could be invited to attend meetings. If the idea materialised, there was no reason why it should be confined to secondary schools. Useful work might also be done in the larger primary schools. If such societies were formed, it was the government's wish that administrative officers should cooperate to the full by attending meetings if invited to do so, and by taking as much interest as possible in general proceedings.²³

The government's drive to educate the people on government policies was justified by the low standard of the Nigerian press as a whole, its inaccuracies, misrepresentations and biased reports. The fault lay partly in the policies pursued by the editors and proprietors of the newspapers concerned, and partly in the quality of the local correspondents. With regard to the local reporters, many of them were of no great education and were paid according to the amount of copy they submitted. They were, generally speaking, particularly in the Divisions, untrained and possessed little sense of responsibility or pride in maintaining the standards of their profession which, in more advanced countries, had evolved over many years. In the circumstances, it was inevitable that they should be chiefly concerned, on personal if on no other grounds, in presenting such items of news as would afford to their editors the opportunity of pursuing, in the editorial columns, the policies of the proprietors. For the government to combat this malaise, the importance of ensuring that correspondents had at their disposal full and accurate information concerning the subject matter of their reports was too obvious to require emphasis. On 19 November, 1948, the Secretary, Eastern Provinces, Enugu, instructed all Residents to afford news correspondents access to a sufficiency of news items in order to avoid the presentation of reports too often elaborated without regard to the facts.²⁴

Although the results of the policy of press education was disheartening, the government encouraged administrative officers to continue, in every way possible, with endeavours to improve the standard of the locally-owned papers and so to avoid, so far as might be, the education of the public in discontent and dissatisfaction with the government. To that end, every effort had to be made by officers to continue and to increase contact with both the accredited

representatives and the contributors. Personal contact with those representatives and contributors was a vital consideration, so that not only might they be supplied, where it could be properly undertaken, with copies of speeches and talks given by officials, and accounts of business transacted at council and other meetings, but also that they might be encouraged, by sympathetic consideration, to seek advice as to the accuracy of the reports based on the material supplied to them. It was advisable that correspondents be invited in their official capacity to attend such functions as would be of interest to their readers and, when once a happy and mutually respectful relationship had been established, it might be possible to invite them to general conferences concerning the progress of affairs.

In addition to the issue of reports and advance information to local press representatives, it was also suggested that officers should forward to the Regional Public Relations Officer at Enugu the bare facts of news items of a character more than usually interesting which might come to their notice. Such 'hard' news items could be written up in the Office of the Regional Public Relations Officer for issue to the local press to stimulate interest in real news.²⁵

It was too much to expect that the publication of inaccurate facts or false conclusions drawn from them, either inadvertently or deliberately, could be avoided. But where those inaccuracies came to the notice of administrative officers, a true account of the facts had to be sent without delay to the Regional Public Relations Officer at Enugu, who would show them to the Government Secretary, so that a corrective press release might be prepared and issued. At the same time, the officer concerned would forward a copy of the communication to the Resident of his province, so that the latter might, if he thought fit, also communicate with the Regional Public Relations Officer.²⁶

The British themselves were not convinced that correct information to the press would alone defeat Zikist propaganda. Therefore, for reasons of security, a list was compiled of government and native authority employees who were members of the Zikist Movement. Reports on the activities of the Zikist Movement indicated that it was organising an intelligence and espionage system of its own, and it was probable that use would be made of members of the Movement in government and native authority employment to obtain copies of secret confidential documents and to listen in to confidential conversations. The security list was based on reports in the police files. Although the integrity of some of the persons named might be beyond question, in spite of their apparent political affiliations, it was clearly desirable that precautions should be taken in every office to place temptation and opportunity out of their reach.²⁷ The blacklisted Zikists in the Cameroons were variously classified as 'lukewarm', 'warm', 'hot', or 'red hot'. Most of them were Nigerians although some outstanding figures like Motomby, Mbile, Kale, Namme, Kati Burnley, Charley

and Samia Ndi, were Cameroonians.²⁸

THE NCNC AND PARTY POLITICS IN THE CAMEROONS

The identification of the fortunes of the NCNC with those of the Igbo meant that the party was going to face tough times in the Cameroons where the Igbo were hated. Anti-Igbo was tantamount to being anti-NCNC. The Igbo scare became the main topic in party politics in the Southern Cameroons during and after the Eastern Nigerian crisis of 1953 and 1954. Elections were held into the Eastern Nigerian House of Assembly during the dry season of 1951/52 under the Macpherson Constitution. The following were elected representatives for the Cameroons: V.T. Lainjo, S.T. Muna, J.N. Foncha, J.T. Ndze, A.T. Ngala, J.S. Kangsen, S.C. Ndi, S.A. George, M.N. Foju, N.N. Mbile, R.N. Charley, U.M.L. Endeley and P.N. Motomby-Woleta. These men entered the Eastern House of Assembly unwillingly because their target was a separate assembly for the Cameroons.²⁹

When this Assembly was only 16 months old, a serious political crisis broke out in Enugu within the rank and file of the NCNC in April 1953. The crisis was between Azikiwe who wanted the Macpherson Constitution destroyed, and Eyo Ita, who wanted the Constitution given a chance. The crux of the problem was who should rule the Eastern Region: Azikiwe, an Igbo and national president of the NCNC - the ruling party in the East - or Eyo Ita, from the minority Calabar area but leader of NCNC-led government in the region. Second, Zik, who was then the Leader of the Opposition in the Western House of Assembly, Ibadan, wanted a more respectable position of control in the Eastern House - being the only national leader of a political party not in control of any government. But this could only come about if the government resigned and new elections held. The crisis reached a point when the Eyo Ita government could no longer pass bills and was thrown out.

Weighing the circumstances surrounding the crisis, nine of the Cameroons assemblymen formed a bloc of benevolent neutrality. But four of them - N.N. Mbile, R.N. Charley, S.C. Ndi and P.N. Motomby-Woleta - were openly loyal to the NCNC. On May 5, 1953, the Eastern House, by 45 votes to 32, rejected Cameroons representation in the Executive Council by turning down the request of the Cameroons that the Cameroons Minister to the Regional Executive be reinstated. On May 6, 1953, Cameroonian legislators led by Dr. Endeley and Mr. S.A. George, refused to take their seats in the Eastern House but sat in the public gallery.³⁰ The Cameroons legislators decided to break their connection with the Eastern Region because they believed that, as a minority group in the assembly, they were unable to get their wishes respected. They then considered that their immediate duty was to press their demand for a separate region and

to that end they called on all Cameroonians to be prepared to make sacrifices. A conference held in Mamfe from 22-24 May, 1953, by the assemblymen, native authorities, tribal organisations, chiefs and people of every village and town unanimously agreed that a petition be addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, demanding a separate and autonomous legislature for the Trust Territory. Dr. Endeley, then Minister of Labour and leader of the Cameroon bloc, left Lagos by air for London on May 28, 1953, to submit the Mamfe Conference's petition. No immediate reply was received but things were moving very fast, politically, for the benefit of the Cameroons.

Hitherto, the Southern Cameroons had no formal political party. Whatever associations existed were only pressure groups. But in June 1953, two of these pressure groups - the Cameroons National Federation (CNF) and the Kamerun United National Congress (KUNC) - agreed to merge to form a political party. A joint statement was signed by Endeley for the CNF and by Mr. R.J.K. Dibonge for the KUNC. The new organisation was called the Kamerun National Congress (KNC). The new party expelled N.N. Mbile, Secretary of the KUNC, because of his stand against the Cameroons bloc. Mbile and his splinter group formed the Kamerun People's Party (KPP).³¹

The Eastern crisis soon spread to Lagos where the constitution also collapsed. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Oliver Lyttleton, directed that a conference be held in London for a redrafting of the constitution. In August 1953, a conference was held in Lancaster House, London, at which political parties representing all the regions in Nigeria including the Trust Territory of the Cameroons, were fully represented. Dr. Endeley, Rev. J.C. Kangersen and Mr. S.A. George represented the Southern Cameroons, while Mr. N.N. Mbile went as a delegate of the NCNC, and Mallam Abba Habib represented the Northern Cameroons. During the conference, Dr. Endeley demanded regional autonomy or a separate legislature for the Southern Cameroons. Mallam Habib submitted that the Northern Cameroons would prefer to remain within Northern Nigeria. In reply, with regard to the Southern Cameroons, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated categorically that if Dr. Endeley's party won the pending elections - as a result of the dissolution of the Eastern Nigerian House of Assembly - the question of a Southern Cameroons legislature would be a foregone conclusion.³²

This statement stimulated a vigorous campaign in the Southern Cameroons. The KNC opened the campaign on their return from London by turning a misfortune which they had met on their way to London, into political capital. The story goes that while part of the crowd at Kano Airport carried Awolowo and Azikiwe shoulder high, the rest of the crowd was edging to attack Dr. Endeley and the other delegates representing the Cameroons. This section of the

crowd flung stones, broke the windows of the Control Room in which no less than twenty police constables were on guard. One constable was injured and Dr. Endeley was hit.³³ Back home, Endeley and his team filled a Land Rover jeep with stones and displayed them all over Southern Cameroons as the stones with which they were attacked in Nigeria. In a country where Nigeria was synonymous with Igboland, it was said that the Igbo had stoned Dr. Endeley. The Cameroonian assemblymen then addressed a reception at Tikko during which Dr. Endeley recounted the unfortunate incidents at Kano airport where the delegates were stoned. Rev. Kangersen, who spoke on the events leading to the dissolution of the Eastern House of Assembly asked: 'Do you want us to break away from the Eastern Region and form a Cameroons Region with the Northern Cameroons?' The crowd answered: 'We want a Cameroons Region'. Mr. J.T. Ndize told the crowd: 'We cannot for a moment talk of self-government without regional status. Our party is contesting the Eastern elections not to go into the Eastern House of Assembly, but to block the way for the members of the Kamerun People's Party who still believe in the Assembly'.³⁴

The Igbo did not help matters by attaching their political views to their jobs. For instance, in 1953, demonstrations and mass receptions, which could have been organised by the Mamfe community on the arrival of the Cameroons members from the London talks, could not be arranged because telegrams, intimating the community of the arrival of the delegates, were delayed for some days by the postmaster, Mr. Okeke, an Igbo. Letters which Mr. S.A. George wrote from London, of political significance to the Cameroons people in Mamfe, were not delivered until a few days before Mr. George's arrival in Mamfe.³⁵ This kind of behaviour only added fuel to the anti-Igbo gospel which was preached up and down the length and breadth of the territory. It had special meaning for people who were everyday coming into a face-to-face contact with the realities of Igbo political, social, economic and administrative domination. The result was that when the elections were held, the anti-Nigerian KNC won 12 out of 13 seats. In the new Southern Cameroons House of Assembly which opened on 26 October, 1954, S.E. Ncha, was the only member for the KPP.³⁶

In his opening address to the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly on October 26, 1954, the Commissioner of the Cameroons had at the back of his mind the fact that the anti-Igbo tone had been dominant at the recent elections into the House. The victory of the KNC which had campaigned on an anti-Igbo platform had necessarily sent the Igbo settlers into a panic. Therefore, the Commissioner decided to use the occasion of his speech to reassure the Igbo of their future in the now autonomous Southern Cameroons. He said:

It also follows that we cannot afford any internal dissensions. Jealousies as between one part of the territory and another, or conflicts between traditional elders and elected representatives, hostility between one tribe and another or between persons settled here and persons born here must be shunned like plague. In so small a country either we march together or we fail to reach our goal. In this territory especially every person having responsibility must in my opinion, be prepared at all the time to accept a working compromise upon any issue in which he is interested in order that all of us may go forward together.³⁷

ANTI-NCNC/IGBO POLITICS, 1955-1961

Having achieved a quasi-regional status for the Southern Cameroons, the KNC enjoyed the confidence of a cross-section of the population, including the traditional rulers. The rival party, the KPP, suffered tremendous setbacks because it was conveyed in popular impression as being in favour of the Cameroons remaining enslaved to Eastern Nigeria. This was aggravated by the fact that the KPP was an ally of the NCNC which had been labelled as an Igbo-inspired party just at a time when the Igbo were very unpopular with the Southern Cameroonian.³⁸

The KNC did not enjoy its popularity for long because, in early 1955, the party concluded an alliance with the Action Group of Western Nigeria, and J.N. Foncha interpreted this as a complete contradiction of the 'benevolent neutrality' declaration of April 1953. Endeley, for his part, found the alliance necessary to meet up with the demands of political strategy at the central legislature in Lagos. The Southern Cameroons was too small to go it alone without a 'big brother' in the Federation of Nigeria. But Endeley forgot that he had recently defeated the KPP for the same reason that the KPP was in alliance with the NCNC. Endeley might have thought, rightly perhaps, that the alliance at the centre in Lagos was not as entangling as that at the regional level. But, to the common man, there was no difference between Nigeria at the regional level and Nigeria at the federal level. If Cameroon had to leave Nigeria, it should do so in every respect. Foncha felt that the solution was not an alliance with the Action Group; he foresaw that the KNC would abandon the cherished policy of secession from the Federation of Nigeria. Therefore, in March 1955, he took the decision to go on the opposition to form the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP).³⁹

In the 1957 elections to the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly, when the KNC had become pro-Nigeria, the KNDP exploited the Igbo scare to the degree of phantasy. Illiterate masses were made to believe that the Igbo were the only ethnic group that the Cameroonian would meet in Nigeria, and that the

struggles of the Igbo would increase if Cameroon permanently remained part of Nigeria. The result was that the KNDP won five of the 13 contested seats, the KNC won six, while the KPP had two. The 1957 elections showed that any party which deviated from the anti-Igbo stance was certainly going to lose votes whereas the anti-Igbo platform was an easy vote-catching device.⁴⁰ In the 1959 elections and the 1961 plebiscite, the KNDP continued to play on the anti-Igbo feelings of the Southern Cameroonian. This generated a creed of hatred to the extent that the supporters of the KNC/KPP were accused of wanting to sell the Cameroons to the Igbo. When the elections were held on 24 January, 1959, the KNDP won 14 of the 26 seats, thereby capturing the government.⁴¹

From the narrow margin of victory, the United Nations did not see the election results as decisive. Foncha could not be allowed to carry the country into unification with only a margin of two seats. But it was hoped that a general agreement might develop in the newly-elected House of Assembly concerning the future of Southern Cameroons. If such an agreement developed, a formal proper consultation might prove unnecessary, but if no such agreement emerged, it might only be through a consultation at some appropriate future date, probably a plebiscite, that would make it possible to resolve the basic issues.⁴² When the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly failed to reach any agreement on the future of the territory, the United Nations decided on a plebiscite to resolve the issue. The questions put to the people were:

- (a) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria?
- (b) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroon?

The colours for the ballot boxes were green for Nigeria and white for the Republic of Cameroon. The plebiscite day was Saturday, February 11, 1961.⁴³

At the campaigns, the party for the Nigerian option - the CPNC (KNC/KPP) - spoke of the importance of regional autonomy in Nigeria and a continuation of the cherished British cultural heritage. The parties for the Cameroon Republic advertised the importance of escaping from eternal subordination in Nigeria and the establishment of a Cameroonian identity through a Cameroonian nation.⁴⁴

When the plebiscite finally took place, the Nigerian alternative had a total of 97,741 votes while the Republic of Cameroon alternative had 233,571 votes. Thus, throughout the period of party politics, the majority of Cameroonians consistently stood out against the Cameroonian relationship with Nigeria. On this score, the Southern Cameroons unified with the Republic of Cameroon on October 1, 1961, to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon.⁴⁵

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OJUKWU'S LEADERSHIP AND THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967-70: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN HISTORY

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INTRODUCTION

Although historians' reservations with personalizing history is understandable, great events nevertheless crystallise around persons. This aphorism would seem to justify Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu who led the secessionist Biafran side of the Nigerian civil war (1967-70) as a proper object of enquiry and *ipso facto* the keen interest which commentators have shown in his role in that conflict. However, the retired generals, journalists, politicians and novelists who dominate this historiography have vulgarised the above aphorism. Bernard Odogwu who headed the Biafran Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) is of the view that personality clash between Ojukwu and Yakubu Gowon who led the federal side of the conflict was the vital factor that led to war.¹ A Biafran field commander, Ifeanyi Aniebo, thinks that neither the secessionist bid nor the war was necessary: Ojukwu was responsible for the war.² Ojukwu's biographer, the British novelist Frederick Forsyth, has gone further to suggest that a particular turning point in Ojukwu's life, i.e., his decision to join the army in 1957, affected the course of Nigerian history.³ The ultimate thrust of all these views is that without Ojukwu there could not have been the Nigerian civil war.

This essay seeks to demonstrate that this rather popular explanation which assumes the indispensability of Ojukwu in Nigerian history lacks theoretical basis and is an oversimplified interpretation of the forces that led to the Nigerian civil war. From the perspective of political economy - conceptualised as the distribution of wealth and power - this explanation reveals itself as an attempt to create scapegoats for the structural ills of the Nigerian society. A political economy approach reveals that the war had roots in the Nigerian colonial experience, the neocolonial nature of independence, the ethnic character of political competition and the tendency of the region-based elites to preach unity when in control of power at the centre, and disunity when out of it. Ojukwu who led the ill-fated Biafran secession against the Nigerian federal government was not a maker of any aspect of Nigerian history but merely a part of it.

Our position is presented in five parts. In part two, Ojukwu is seen to have socialized into all the existing arms of the Nigerian elite class in a manner that was bound to affect his leadership character. A distinction is made in part three between an appointed ruler and a leader of the people. Here Ojukwu's

transformation from the former to the latter in Eastern Nigeria is demonstrated. Part four deals with how Ojukwu's transformation to a revolutionary could not salvage the secessionist enclave. A conclusion is presented in part five that Ojukwu the individual has not affected the Nigerian society in any fundamental manner. In pursuing these objectives, secondary literature was complemented by oral interviews with some key participants in the conflict including Ojukwu himself. Analysis must begin conceptualising leadership and situating it in the Nigerian historical context, and this is properly the subject of part one.

I

'Leadership' belongs to the category of concepts that defy a universally accepted definition. It refers however to a situation in time of the organisation and direction of a social group for the achievement of interest oriented and sentimental aspirations. Organisation and direction of society can be done in a variety of ways, and the attainable goals may not always portend the same implication for the organiser and the organised. All, however, depends on who are being organised, by whom and under what circumstances. Consequently, leadership is dependent on the ability of the individual leader, the nature of goals to be attained, the availability of resources and the leader's awareness of the circumstances of his or her society. A leader must also be ambitious, identify with the led, and possess authority. Apart from the existence of a leader with 'resources relevant to goal attainment', for a leadership situation to exist there must also be the group (followers) defined as 'individuals interacting in the pursuit of common or compatible goals; the situation, and the task with which the interacting individuals are confronted'.⁴

The crux of leadership then appears to be: how can a leader select successful courses of action from a multiplicity of alternatives in his organisation of the implementation of the group's task? The leader does not exist in a vacuum: he is a part of the *leadership process* and must be assessed within that context. If, therefore, we choose to praise or apportion blames on the individual leader's decision or indecision, actions or inactions, we can logically do so only by seeing and explaining a particular leader as subordinate to the historical context in which s/he existed. Following Halvetius, Karl Marx observes, 'Every social epoch needs its great men, when it does not find them, it invents them.'⁵ The emergence and existence of leadership is at times more subtle than the above assertion. For instance, in trying to situate the historical significance of certain African nationalist leaders, Basil Davidson expresses difficulty in discerning whether these individuals were 'contingent' or 'structural' on their respective societies.⁶ Davidson's indecision suggests, however, that the individual still has

some relevance in the historical current. There is therefore a congruence of determinism and the impact of the human agency. The above considerations combine to provide us with an insight into what prompts a leader to take some decisions or pursue some goals, and why some of the leader's actions succeed and others fail. After all, 'All social activity takes place under structural arrangements, which in part determine the course of this activity.'⁷ There is therefore an interconnection between the phenomenon of leadership and the largely materially determined sociological factors of a given society. Ojukwu was as contingent to the events leading to secessionist Biafra as Lenin was to the Bolshevik Revolution or Hitler to Nazi Germany.

A look at Nigeria's experience with leadership tends to suggest that material imperatives have informed the fundamental socio-political impressions of that society. Before the colonial enclosure, Nigerian societies had existed piecemeal with variegated economic structures and cultural practices which were at different levels of development. One common characteristic of these societies was the existence of social classes, and through the tributes and labour exacted from subjects, the ruling classes found resources and time to engage in 'political manipulation'.⁸ The British colonial intrusion clearly marked a watershed in the evolution of leadership in the areas that Britain later called 'Nigeria' - a ruling class of a different form backed by international finance capital was now in charge - but the content of exploitation remained and was even intensified.

The satisfaction of the imperatives of capital was behind the creation of the Nigerian state which Robert Shenton characterizes as 'a sub-committee of the larger British imperial ruling class'.⁹ The imperatives of capital were also instrumental to the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914.¹⁰ The marginal involvement of local royal collaborators and 'warrant chiefs' in the extraction of Nigeria's resources was part of this exercise. This brand of leadership was unacceptable to a small group of western educated elites who felt marginalised in the political economy. In their agitation against direct foreign rule and for the control of the post-colonial state, this class splintered into rival ethnic blocs. They nevertheless 'achieved' independence in 1960. Ojukwu who has thrived in the Nigerian milieu from 1933 to the present and who played a leadership role at a specific stage in the Nigerian historical process is bound to fit into our framework as new material conditions dictated and conditioned the rationalisation for the quest for leadership.

II

Ojukwu was born in November 1933, nineteen years after the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria. His parents were Igbo from the south-east but living in Zungeru, then capital of Northern Nigeria. At the time of Ojukwu's

birth, the northern ruling classes had begun the practice of confining their southern compatriots to *sabon gari* (strangers' quarters), a brand of social segregation supported by the colonial authorities. Another significant aspect of Ojukwu's socialisation is that he had the peculiar characteristic of having been sensitised to all the arms of the modern Nigerian elite class: the merchant class, the intellectuals, the bureaucratic elite and the military officer corps. These processes of socialisation determined Ojukwu's personality, political philosophy and conditioned the seeming complexity of his character and its impact on the Nigerian social formation.

Ojukwu's father, Sir Louis, belonged to the merchant arm of the Nigerian elite class. His wealth had roots in the commodity export trade: he started life as a produce inspector and later grew into a big time transporter providing haulage services to the raw materials trade. Sir Louis was also an astute land speculator and like his class colleagues, he took part in nationalist politics, becoming the first National Treasurer of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) at formation in 1944. Once elected to the Legislative Council, he was 'a patron of the young Nigerian politicians agitating for independence' and chaired many boards of corporations among which was the Eastern Region Development Corporation. In spite of his father's 'solid influence',¹¹ Emeka Ojukwu was soon to develop his own ambitions. He had no problem switching from one arm of the elite class to another.

The money in the Ojukwu family afforded the young man the opportunity of an education which was 'designed to turn him into an English gentleman'.¹² His education included a stint at Epsom College, England - one of the public schools where the children of the bourgeoisie were 'trained for elite positions'.¹³ - and Lincoln College, Oxford University where he read Modern History. Studentship in those days was invariably associated with nationalist politics and Ojukwu was initiated early enough. In 1944, he was involved in a demonstration against the colonial authorities while a student at King's College, Lagos. The significance of this incident is well articulated by the man himself: 'The King's College episode meant a lot to me. I was in police cell at ten, high court at ten, being tried for taking part in the collective action of students'.¹⁴ At Oxford, Ojukwu became a member of the West African Students' Union (WASU) in line with popular political sentiment and appeared to have shared a sense of solidarity with the nationalist elite. The significance of this socialization is that the idea of rebellion could no more be new to Ojukwu. Had he decided to join his father's business or go into politics upon graduation in 1955, his father's wealth would have ensured success. By opting instead to join the civil service, he entered into another arm of the Nigerian elite class.

The fateful decision to join the civil service was to have a profound implication for Ojukwu's leadership character. The struggle within the Nigerian elite class over limited resources had permeated the bureaucracy. This struggle was reinforced by ethnicity especially with the regionalization of the civil service in 1954. It was therefore not possible for Ojukwu to be posted to the Northern Region as he had preferred; rather, he was sent to the Eastern Region. Ojukwu himself analysed the implication of this incident for his orientation thus: 'I became aware that I was an Igbo, and a Nigeria, and an African, and a black man, in that order. And I [was] determined to be proud of all four - in that order'.¹⁵ This development was a clear departure from his life story, having been born of Igbo parents living in Northern Nigeria, spent his childhood in metropolitan Lagos and his adolescence and early adulthood in England intermingling with different races.

His posting to the Eastern Region was significant in two ways: for the first time he was directly affected by the struggle within the elite class to which he belonged, and, for the first time too, he was exposed to ethnicity, a very potent tool in this intra-class squabble. Ojukwu then left rugby, football, horse riding and rally driving at Oxford to learn the Igbo language and way of life. By so doing, he socialized into the Igbo society. As an Assistant District Officer (an exalted position in those days), things were working out well for Ojukwu in the civil service. Yet, after just two years on the job he was thinking of leaving ostensibly because of his father's objection to his posting to Calabar - a non-Igbo town in the Eastern Region.¹⁶ In 1957, having left the civil service, Ojukwu joined the army against his father's wish even when this meant not only risking a forfeiture of his father's patronage but also enlisting in the ranks. His father blocked his way to joining as an officer cadet. Four months later, the army authorities, convinced that he was not suited for the ranks in an army in which he was the first university graduate, decided to admit him to the officer corps.

Ojukwu's claim to have joined the army in order to escape his father's pervasive influence and because of the army's truly national character is difficult to accept at face value. First, since the emergence of social classes and the state in the history of human society the military has been a coercive instrument in the hands of the power elite. The military leaders are part and parcel of the ruling class and, according to Bottomore, their importance is most pronounced in the less developed societies¹⁷ - like Nigeria. Could the army then be Ojukwu's means of realising a political ambition? It is difficult to accept that the son of an established merchant, an intellectual who had taken interest in nationalist politics and for two years a favoured bureaucrat fully aware of the prospects impending independence held for his career, could have joined the army just for the fun of it. A person like Ojukwu with his knowledge of history

and of the role the military had been playing in Latin American politics and lately then, in Egypt, could most easily envisage a future for himself in the post-colonial army. By 1960, independence year, Ojukwu's socialization into the various arms of the national elite as well as into the Igbo society, was complete.

III

With the attainment of independence in 1960, there arose the need to fill the political and administrative posts being vacated by the departing colonialists. The Nigerian political arena at this time was a network of patronage. Independence did not alter social relations in Nigeria; it only changed the colour of the ruling elite¹⁸ who now turned against themselves through ethnically compartmentalised competing factions in the race for the allocation of public bounties. The three major parties reflected Nigeria's ethnic tripod as the NPC, NCNC and AG held sway in the North, East and West respectively and drew their support largely from the three major ethnic groups that respectively dominated the regions. Post-independence politics was dominated by the mortal struggle of the elite for power and resources which culminated in the collapse of the First Republic.

Developments in the army followed closely those in the wider political arena. Like the wider Nigerian society, the army was stratified. It comprised broadly of the officer corps, on one hand, and the rank and file, on the other. The relationship between the officer corps and the rank and file has been likened to that between the capitalist and the proletariat.¹⁹ Like the Nigerian society that fostered it, the army was afflicted by corruption and ethnicity. The members of the officer corps associated freely with their civilian elite counterparts - informally as neighbours in exclusive residential areas, friends and playmates. Within the officer corps vacancies also existed owing to the recall of British officers. The method and means employed in filling these vacancies were similar to those employed by the politicians. Like other young officers, Ojukwu profited from the indigenization exercise and his educational background was an added advantage. He was the first Nigerian - indeed, African - to attend the Joint Staff Services College in 1962. His meteoric rise which saw him as a Lieutenant-Colonel as early as January 1963 and his postings (including being the first indigenous Quartermaster-General of the Army) certainly affected his perception of the political crisis in 1966. He belonged to the small group in the army, the 'non-professional graduates', whose recruitment was halted after independence due to their political consciousness²⁰ which the authorities understood to be political ambition. It has been alleged that it was this group that engineered the first military coup in January 1966.²¹ It is useful to examine Ojukwu's role in the coup that preceded the Nigerian crisis and civil war.

The information regarding Ojukwu's role in this coup suggests that he was not

part of it. One of the acknowledged architects of the coup, Major Ademoyega writes that Ojukwu was sitting on the fence, and that he was one of the politically conscious officers who 'were known to be around' but were not consulted because they were not holding any strategic positions.²² Ojukwu himself maintains that, as the Commanding Officer of the Kano-based 5th Infantry Battalion, he 'rendered the coup in the North immobile'²³ - meaning that he not only did not take part in the coup but actually actively opposed it. This view is supported by Alexander Madiobo, then Commander of the Nigerian Army Artillery Corps who was anti-coup, by Ben Gbulie, who participated in the execution of the coup, and by Ojukwu's official biographer, Foresyth.²⁴ It is easy to make sense of Ademoyega's and Okpara's explanation that Ojukwu was not consulted by the coup makers. Okpara who was the adjutant of the 1st Battalion and did not participate, insisted in an interview, that if Ojukwu had been consulted he would not have participated given that, being 'in the good books of almost all the big guys' he was likely to be pro-status quo.

When accounts of the coup became public, it became clear that most of the architects were Igbo officers. In retrospect, this may not be a surprise given their preponderance (constituting 75% of the officer corps) in the army. What aroused indignation in the long run was not the assassination of non-Igbo civilian and military leaders *per se* but the non-assassination of key Igbo personalities, civil or military (except one) either by acts of omission or commission. Consequently, it did not require special talent to convince the northerners that the Igbo were planning to colonize them, even if this sounded ridiculous.²⁵ The immediate aftermath of the coup did not alter this perception. Although it failed, the coup had succeeded in overthrowing the northern faction of the Nigerian elite from the federal government and enthroned an Igbo, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi, the General Officer Commanding the Army, as the new Head of State. In the new military government, Lt.-Col. Ojukwu was sent to his region of origin, the East, as Military Governor. The next watershed in his career was brought about not as a result of his personality but was contingent on the wind of political change. Henceforth, Ojukwu entered into national limelight.

Up to this time, Ojukwu was an apostle of national unity. He was instrumental to the promulgation of the Ironsi government's Decree 34 which attempted to unify the regional civil services. In his enthusiasm for unity, he replaced Dr. Azikiwe, an Igbo and Federal President up to the time of the coup, with Alhaji Ado Bayero, Emir of Kano in the North, as the Chancellor of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Ironsi's misdirected quest for national unity, especially through Decree 34, triggered off a chain of events which, in turn, created the circumstances necessary for the emergence of a leader in the Eastern Group of Provinces that later became the Republic of Biafra.

On the other hand, the two other ethnic power blocs in the west and the north were less enthusiastic for unity. This was especially the case with the northern elite whose domination of the federal government had just been terminated. They were responsible for the organised massacres of easterners resident in the north. The coup of July 1966 effected by officers and men of northern origin which witnessed the assassination of Ironsi and the indiscriminate elimination of officers and men of eastern origin - regardless of the ethnic stock - was geared toward the realisation of the northern secessionist goal.²⁶ There were also indiscriminate killings of eastern civilians living in other parts of the country especially in the north. Following this development and the emergence of Lt.-Col. Gowon, a northerner, as the new head of state, the eastern bid for secession also began to take roots, not minding Gowon's assurances that the bloodshed would be brought under control. Gowon and Ojukwu in separate broadcasts on 1 August 1966 challenged the wisdom in the continued unity of Nigeria.²⁷ That the northern elite was persuaded of the foolishness of northern secession by the British and American diplomatic missions in Lagos is fairly common knowledge. Notwithstanding the source of the impetus, the northern elite thenceforth emerged as the champions and apostles of Nigerian unity.

The remnants of the eastern elites returned to the region after losing their political and administrative positions as well as property. Their grievance against a Nigerian state that guaranteed them neither safety of life nor of property was shared by the generality of the people of the east who had lost their relations and their various means of subsistence in other parts of Nigeria. These traumatised victims naturally turned to their governor for protection and guidance. Thus, Ojukwu who had been 'the most unpopular regional Governor' became 'the man of the hour',²⁸ a leader as a result of the circumstances that transcended the individual. In an obvious allusion to Hitler's pogrom against the Jews, Ojukwu could now talk of a northern machination toward a 'final solution' against easterners. He would not recognise Gowon who he referred to as a rebel in the army. When in October 1966 the Gowon regime imposed a food blockade and followed it up in November with a rejection of the eastern proposal for confederation, these were attended by demonstrations in the east led by students of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. The demonstrators' insistence that the 'push' was complete complemented Ojukwu's earlier assertion that the East would not secede unless 'pushed out' of the federation. Ojukwu's ambition, the Eastern elites' quest for an exclusive domain as well as the people's quest for a separate existence all coalesced and in time crystallised in the declaration of the ill-fated Republic of Biafra.

Although Ojukwu made certain gestures towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis, he was prepared to make the prerequisites for the continuation of the

federation costly for the northern elite. At the same time, the latter would not compromise their hegemony. One of the attempts at a peaceful resolution of the crisis was the convening in January 1967 of the late Ironsi's Supreme Military Council, at Aburi, Ghana. Comments have been passed on the proceedings of this two-day meeting which cannot be ignored. It was said that Ojukwu got his way 'by being the cleverest' and exhibiting 'skilful histrionics and superior intellectual adroitness',²⁹ and that he outshone Gowon because of the latter's intolerance.³⁰ Ojukwu's performance can easily be explained by the logic of immediate circumstances. He found himself in a position in which he had to prepare well and argue the way he did in order to claim the position he was enjoying. His next option would have been to be prepared to quit his position willingly or unwillingly as easterners were fed up with the state of affairs in Nigeria. Ojukwu had no absolute control of the situation; he had to go along with the aspiration of his people or make way for another person who could. At the same time Ojukwu had no intention of relinquishing his position because he was also ambitious.

Conversely, Gowon was not under the kind of pressure in which Ojukwu found himself. He had just taken over as Head of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; things were working well for him from the perspective of the individual, and his advisers had benefited from the vacancies created by the flight of bureaucrats and military officers of Eastern origin. The crisis deepened as the interests of the two sides were diametrically opposed. While the easterners declared that 'On Aburi we stand', the rest of the federation called for its repudiation. The Gowon regime repudiated the substance of the Aburi Accord which stipulated a confederal arrangement. Henceforth, Ojukwu's speeches featured expressions from the vocabulary of international relations like referring to the federal government as the 'aggressor' and asking easterners to be 'vigilant' in order to defend 'our homeland'.³¹ At the same time he was taking military precautions.³² Ojukwu followed up his warning that if the federal government did not implement the Aburi accord he would take 'whatever measures may be necessary to give effect to those agreements'.³³ This was followed by the promulgation of the 'Survival Edicts' aimed at terminating federal control and countering the economic blockade of the East. The reaction of the federal government to the promulgation of these edicts was the declaration of a state of emergency in the East and the dissolution of the Eastern Group of Provinces. In the place of provinces generally, the Gowon government created twelve states on 26 May 1967. On 30 May 1967, Ojukwu declared the independence of the Republic of Biafra.

It is necessary to evaluate the necessity or otherwise of this declaration. The unpreparedness of Biafra to withstand the rigours of independence against a

Nigerian threat was widely appreciated at the time even by Ojukwu himself,³⁴ notwithstanding that he told the world that no power in black Africa could subdue the new republic. A Biafran field commander maintains that, as necessary as it was, secession could have been delayed, and he insinuates that Ojukwu's ambition was the overriding factor.³⁵ Ojukwu's actions at the time clearly lent credence to this belief. The options he presented to the joint session of his Council of Chiefs and Elders, and the Consultative Assembly for consideration were so eclectic that only secession seemed reasonable.³⁶ The Council and Assembly had their purpose: to give legitimacy to Ojukwu's regime and its decisions.

It might also be useful to consider that the situation which produced Ojukwu's leadership no more allowed him absolute freedom of action. He might have considered what his fate would have been in the case of his submission to the Lagos authorities. Furthermore, we now know with the benefit of hindsight that a postponement of secession would hardly have been warranted by the measures coming from the federal government. For example, the creation of states not only excised much of the territories with oil deposits from Ojukwu's control but also undermined the very territorial basis of Biafra with implications both for Ojukwu's position and the people's wish for a separate existence. These were the circumstances that plunged Nigeria into two and a half years of warfare starting from 6 July, 1967.

IV

A number of challenges confronted the Biafran state and ultimately led to its demise. These included the minority problem, the refugee crisis and the vicissitudes of the warfront. Biafra faced a far superior adversary which was determined to crush secession at all costs. To accomplish this task the northern-controlled federal government needed the support of the Western elite bloc. The government completed the incorporation of the latter with the appointment of Obafemi Awolowo, acknowledged leader of the West, to a senior cabinet position - as Finance Minister and Vice-Chairman of the Federal Executive Council, the most senior civilian in government.

Apart from the majority Igbo, Eastern Nigeria (tagged Biafra) contained many minority ethnic groups. Politics there followed the national pattern and ethnicity was an object of politicking by the elite. The Igbo elite (and their minority partners) had successfully opposed the creation of a Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers State which several minority elites had been advocating since the 1950s. The major ethnic power blocs in the country (especially the north) who were competing with the Igbo elite for control of the centre skillfully exploited these differences in the East to weaken the Igbo elite. The term 'Eastern interest' was missing

from the geopolitical vocabulary of the First Republic. What obtained instead was 'Igbo interest' *vis-à-vis* 'Northern interest' (even though the North had a larger share of minority groups whose marginalized elite were also agitating for autonomy). The indiscriminate massacres of easterners resident in the north had temporarily affected sentiments and eastern minorities now believed with the Igbo 'in some kind of political arrangement that would end contact with the North.'³⁷

The federal government move in this time of crisis to secure the loyalty of Nigeria's minorities via the creation of states introduced a new dimension to the minority question in the East. While this move was resisted in some minority quarters ostensibly on the basis of its arbitrariness,³⁸ it was widely welcomed in others as aggrieved elites now achieved their long desired goal. The loyalties of the minority elites thus split according to their interests.

Ojukwu's response to these developments largely took the form of the involvement of sections of the minority elites by committing them to positions of power and responsibility.³⁹ His other efforts were expressions of solidarity and his regime's insistence throughout the war that minorities be asked to decide their fate via a plebiscite. Certain developments that lay outside the control of his leadership effectively checkmated these efforts. These included the exploits of the federal Third Marine Commando Division whose offensive thrusts were directed on the minority areas of Biafra. The Igbo came to believe that the gains of the federal unit were facilitated by the activities of collaborating minority elements and on the basis of this suspicion meted out molestation, torture and even death on suspects thereby leading the latter to perceive Biafra as an Igbo state. These Igbos did not know as well as Ojukwu did that the attitude of the minorities under federal occupation was similar to that of Igbo speaking areas that found themselves under the same circumstances.⁴⁰ The implication of this observation is that Biafra was becoming unviable for people - minority or not.

The refugee problem and food crisis complicated this situation. These two problems occurred in tandem: one gave rise to the other and continually reinforced it. The former was older than Biafra itself dating back to mid-1966, a result of the influx of easterners fleeing their stations in other parts of Nigeria. The situation assumed crisis proportions as federal troops continued to recover the minority areas as from early 1968. In concrete terms, more refugees were now migrating into a diminishing living space with negative implications for habitation and food production since the minority areas had been the most important food producing entrepôt of Biafra; their lands were no longer available for cultivation. The escalation of these twin problems led to malnutrition which manifested itself in diseases, notably kwashiorkor.

In response to these problems, the Biafran leadership set up refugee camps and feeding centres as well as a Rehabilitation Commission and a Food Directorate which attracted the attention of international relief agencies. Furthermore, it established the 'Land Army' whose activities were inhibited by the lack of farmland. Paradoxically, the Biafran leadership sometimes sacrificed these objectives on the altar of politics: Ojukwu's refusal of a British government offer of £25,000 worth of milk on the ground that the donation was not even 1% of the latter's arms supply to the federal government was hardly warranted by the conditions in Biafra. The actions of the federal ruling class exacerbated the suffering of Biafrans. Irked by Biafra's occasional successes in the war front and propelled by their policy of starvation (as a legitimate instrument of warfare), the federal side were often harassing and intimidating relief workers and agents.⁴¹

At the human level, Ojukwu expressed grief over the state of affairs in Biafra. Could he then have ended the war much earlier and opt for inevitable exile? In fact, Ojukwu would have liked to have ended the war earlier but not in defeat. Defeat would have negated the interests which he represented and the very reason for secession. He himself articulated this problem well when he asked an international press conference in February 1969: 'Am I really responsible? What could I have done? I come to the inescapable answer that I really could not...⁴² This contradiction explains why the Biafran leadership would negotiate for food, for instance, only to be hindered by its own actions.

The most important weapon with which the Biafran leadership sought to maintain and reinforce the bond between it and the people was propaganda. If propaganda is an aspect of warfare, Ojukwu employed to advantage: Biafra's propaganda has variously been described as superb and second to none.⁴³ Its theme was a genocidal intention on the part of the federal government for a Biafran people that had a special mission to carry out. Biafra's propaganda was not only directed at their enemies and friends but to the entire international community, to Biafra's own people and its military. Nigeria was an infidel state and its leader 'fairly junior colonel and a rebel in the army' who had been 'a fairly junior officer under my [Ojukwu's] command'. Biafrans were falsely made to believe that they were invincible, that any significant loss of ground was the work of *sabo* - acronym for saboteur - and Ojukwu ensured that he left the officer corps of the military with no alternative other than to toe his lines.⁴⁴

From the beginning of 1969, radical and unexpected changes began to take place in the organisation of the Biafran state. This was the time of the Biafran 'revolution', when Ojukwu made occasional appearances in farmlands sharing work with farmers and participated in military campaigns.⁴⁵ The issue of

revolution appears to be a complicated phenomenon, however. Because Biafra was often on the receiving end of the war, the major yardsticks for an assessment - production and distribution processes - were bound to suffer distortions, we shall limit our assessment to the changing character of the organisation and prosecution of the war effort as well as the development of a people's culture. These changes were given coherence in the Ahia Declaration of May 1969 - the official proclamation of the Biafran Revolution.

Earlier in January, Ojukwu had inaugurated the National Guidance Committee which met regularly and organised workshops and seminars and whose membership was not permanent but composed of people who were randomly selected at short notice. This random selection gave Ojukwu a first-hand grasp of grassroots problems and it was this committee that produced the Ahia Declaration.⁴⁶ The People's Parliament, formed at the same time, met every Wednesday from January 8, 1969, to the end of the war in January 1970. This body enabled the Biafran leader to explain his programmes as well as receive requests and suggestions from the people. Arising from the operations of these bodies, a Special Tribunal was established to try suspected corrupt officials. About May 1969, the Biafran Army became 'The People's Army' and generally assumed a new character; a Joint Planning Committee would now decide those military matters hitherto the exclusive preserve of Ojukwu. Ideologically, the Biafran revolution was pan-Africanist to the core - at least at the level of rhetoric. Concerned about the injustices meted out to Africa by 'racism, Arab-Muslim expansionism and white economic imperialism', the Declaration proclaimed Biafra's resolve to 'discourage ideas which inspire a feeling of inferiority and dependence on foreigners and foreign interests'.⁴⁷ This made Peter Enahoro, a Nigerian journalist, to describe Biafra, in December 1968, as 'the pride of Africa and the black peoples of the world'.⁴⁸ Nwankwo described Biafrans as the spearhead of the black people's journey towards mental decolonisation and development.⁴⁹ By 1969, Biafra had established a technological culture that designed and produced items ranging from military hardware to basic necessities.

Having so far reviewed Ojukwu's career, it is pertinent to explain this change in the character of his leadership from elite leadership to a revolutionary leadership. History does not readily provide instances where revolutions were led by common people. Under what circumstances then, does this change take place? Amílcar Cabral explains the change by way of continuing contact and camaraderie existing between elites and the masses initially united by a common task. On learning that the masses are not as ignorant as the culturally alienated elites are wont to think, that in fact the former make clear statements of ideas, the latter shed their complexes. At the same time, the masses' prisms of

perception widen as they imbibe the ideas of the struggle facilitated by exposure which the inherent mobility of armed conflict fosters. Consequently, they too shed their complexes and release their energies in playing their defensive role.⁵⁰ On this note and contrary to his claim in the declaration, there is no strong basis to claim that Ojukwu set out originally to lead a revolution. Following Nzimiro, Abdul-Raheem and Olukoshi insist that Ojukwu turned to the Biafran left when all else had failed: his aim was to use the latter, not that he shared revolutionary or leftist sympathies.⁵¹ This explanation is plausible because Ojukwu himself records that, as late as March 1968, he had assured a West German journalist that his regime was laying the foundations of an unmitigated *laissez faire* economy⁵² - in sharp contrast to his anti-accumulationist stance in Ahiara. 'Spiritual reconversion' - to use Cabral's phrase - started for Ojukwu during the struggle. In any case, the war for Biafra was lost not because its people were not adequately mobilised, but because it was decided at the battle fronts where other instruments of war did count.

It is not the intention of this paper to review the returns from the war front. For our purpose it is suffice to state that the superior firepower of the federal forces made the difference. Biafra had the additional disadvantage of hunger. 'In mid-December 1969', comments Arthur Nwankwo, 'many [Biafran] soldiers died on their feet, shooting, at the Port Harcourt main axis. They were killed not by bullets or shells, but by hunger.'⁵³ This was the end of Biafra militarily and as an independent entity for, Ojukwu, who had led and symbolised the struggle had to leave the doomed enclave on 10 January 1970, proceeding to Côte d'Ivoire on exile. Having become synonymous with the struggle, Ojukwu had to leave Biafra for a surrender to take place. The implication of this for our thesis is that he was only relevant for the role which he played and was ill-suited beyond that role.⁵⁴ Thus another person, General Effiong, found suitable for the new role demanded by circumstances, effected the much-needed surrender.

V

Given the circumstances of 1966-67, if Ojukwu had not assumed the leadership of the Biafran struggle, another leader would have emerged. On the other hand, he could have remained in the army, largely unnoticed, if the events that generated the conflict had not taken place. There is no doubting Ojukwu's exploitation of the circumstances of his career. First, he voluntarily joined the civil service in 1955 but against his wish he was posted to his region of origin, something which had great implications for his socialization process as noted earlier. Secondly, he took the fateful decision to join the army but he was unable to determine his career in that institution. He became governor overnight after

a coup carried out by another group of officers. Even as governor, he was yet to become a leader until the return of eastern refugees from the north. His exploitation of the grievances of his people at this particular time was crucial to his assumption of leadership; Ojukwu did not create the circumstances but he was smart enough to exploit it. Finally, as secessionist leader, Ojukwu aimed among other things to sustain the independence of Biafra; the schemes were checkmated neither by a failure of leadership nor by inability to mobilise the people, but by a superior firepower mounted by the adversary.

Ojukwu's absence from the scene could not have fundamentally affected the course of Nigerian history. The presence of another actor could have meant only a slight difference of method or approach. Should such actor deviate from the overwhelming dictates of circumstances or the wish of the people for a separate existence s/he would have been unsuitable. Ojukwu's own ambition found fertile ground for expression in the circumstances of the Nigerian crisis. And the fall of Biafra was inevitable given the factors that ensured its collapse. The presence of another individual could only have hastened or delayed but not stop it.

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* I am grateful to Dr. Steve Ogan of the University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria, Valerie Burton of Memorial University of Newfoundland, and Chris Youé, my MA supervisor at Memorial, all of whom read the paper at different stages and made useful comments. I am responsible for any errors of fact or judgment.

1. See Odogwu's interview, *This Week* (Lagos), 13 July, 1987.
2. Ifeanyi N.C. Aniebo, oral interview, Port Harcourt, 10 April 1989.
3. Frederick Foresyth, *Emeka* (Ibadan: Spectrum, 1982), p.28.
4. See, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 9 (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968), pp.91-113.
5. Cited in Kh. Momjian, *Landmarks in History* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), p.10.
6. B. Davidson, *Africa in Modern History* (Middlesex: Penguin, 1978), pp.25-6.
7. F. Cortés, et al., *Systems Analysis for Social Scientists* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), p.6.

8. Mark Anikpo, 'Nigeria's Evolving Class Structure', in Claude Ake (ed.), *The Political Economy of Nigeria* (Lagos: Longman, 1985), pp. 35-8.

9. Robert W. Shenton, *The Development of Capitalism in Northern Nigeria* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1986), Preface.

10. W.N.M. Geary, *Nigeria Under Colonial Rule* (London, 1965), pp. 232-50.

11. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, oral interview, Lagos, 2 April, 1989.

12. Foresyth, *Emeka*, p. 12.

13. T.B. Bottomore, *Elite and Society* (Middlesex: Penguin, 1964), p. 26.

14. Ojukwu, oral interview.

15. Foresyth, *Emeka*, p. 22.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

17. Bottomore, *Elites and Society*, p. 105.

18. See, 'January 1966: The Political Prologue', in A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (ed.), *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook*, Vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 31.

19. Zainab Duke, *The Revolutionary Potentials of the Nigerian Military, 1886-1986* (Lagos, 1987), p. 29.

20. The army officer corps was factionalised into the apolitical group who rose through the ranks, generally older and, at that time held the highest ranks; the young, high brow, thorough-going combatants trained at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, England, equally apolitical; an equally young group who had undergone short training at Mons Officer Cadet School, Aldershot, England; and the 'non-professional graduates' who, by 1965, numbered only six and who had a keen interest in national politics. See, A. Ademoyega, *Why We Struck* (Ibadan: Evans, 1982), pp. 28-9. Ademoyega was himself in the last group.

21. E. Okpara, one of Sandhurst-trained officers, in an oral interview (January 5, 1989 in Port Harcourt) named Majors Ifeajuna and Ademoyega as those who instigated the majority Sandhurst Majors who effected the January coup. Ojukwu also insisted that it was Major Ifeajuna (not Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu as popularly believed) who led the coup. See, *New Outlook* (Enugu), March 1989.

22. Ademoyega, *Why We Struck*, pp. 51, 62.

23. *New Outlook*, March 1989.

24. A. Madiebo, *The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1980), pp. 22-5; Ben Gbulie, *Nigeria's Five Majors* (Onitsha: Africana Educational Publishers, 1981), pp. 65-6, 90, 97-8 (Gbulie writes that Ojukwu was actually marked for elimination); and, Foresyth, *Emeka*, pp. 50-1.

25. Arthur A. Nwankwo, *Nigeria: the Challenge of Biafra* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1972), p. 13.

26. INC Aniebo, oral interview, Port Harcourt, 5 January 1989. Aniebo was a Major in the Army at the time of reference.

27. Both speeches are reproduced in Kirk-Greene (ed.), *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria*, vol. 1, pp. 196-9.

28. Fola Oyewole, *Reluctant Rebel* (Akure: Olaiya Fagbamigbe, 1975), p. 13.

29. Walter Schwarz, cited in Kirk-Greene, *Crisis and Conflict*, vol. 1, pp. 75-6.

30. Interview with Benjamin Adekunle, *This Week*, 13 July 1987. Brigadier Adekunle was a senior Nigerian field commander during the civil war.

31. See, for example, his speech of 25 February 1967, reprinted in Kirk-Greene, *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria*..., vol. 1, pp. 362-7.

32. For instance, he sent Major Aniebo to establish a military presence in Port Harcourt; Aniebo, oral interview.

33. Excerpts from Ojukwu's broadcast, cited in Foresyth, *Emeka*, p. 90.

34. He had taken to warn the joint session of the Eastern Council of Elders and Chiefs and the Consultative Assembly that should they choose secession, there would be enormous suffering. See, C.O. Ojukwu, *Biafra: Selected Speeches with Diary of Events* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1969), p.174.

35. Okpara, oral interview.

36. The options he presented were (a) accepting the terms of the North and Gowon, thereby submitting to northern domination; (b) to continue the stalemate and drift; or (c) to ensure the people's survival by asserting their autonomy. See, Ojukwu, *Biafra: Selected Speeches*, p.175.

37. Nwankwo, *Nigeria: the Challenge of Biafra*, p.70.

38. A former federal minister and a minority from Ogoja, M.T. Mbu, addressed a press conference to this effect on 6 April 1967, a day after Gowon dropped the hint to heads of foreign missions that he intended to create a COR State. See, Ojukwu, *Biafra: Selected Speeches with Diary of Events*, pp.141-2.

39. Such appointments included that of Major-General Philip Effiong as Chief of General Staff, N.U. Akpan as Chief Secretary and Head of Service, and M.T. Mbu, Udo-Affia and S.J.S. Cooke as External Affairs, Health and Special Duties Commissioners respectively. Ignatius Kogbara was Biafran Special Representative in London.

40. Ojukwu made this observation while addressing students of the University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria, May 1989. See also, Nwankwo, *Nigeria: the Challenge of Biafra*, p.71.

41. For example, the commander of the Third Marine Commando of the federal troops, Col. Benjamin Adekunle, warned against relief activities in his operational area. The Nigerian Air Force harassed relief supplies aircrafts and on one occasion shot down a Red Cross cargo plane. See, Foresyth, *The Making of an African Legend*, pp.198, 220. The cargo plane incident led to the temporary suspension of relief supplies to Biafra by the agency concerned. See, John Okpoko, *The Biafran Nightmare* (Enugu: Delta Publishers, 1986), p.12.

42. Ojukwu, *Random Thoughts*, pp.114-5.

43. Benjamin Adekunle described it as 'about the best in the world', see, *This Week*, 13 July 1987. Nwankwo, *Nigeria: the Challenge...*, describes it as the 'most efficient and powerful in history', pp.26-8.

44. Okpara informed this author in an interview that Ojukwu's execution of certain Biafran commanders pronounced guilty of conspiracy and treason was demonstrated to other commanders because those executed included Ojukwu's best friends and a relative: 'He made sure we had no alternative [than to fight].

45. For instance, Ojukwu and his service chiefs participated in Biafra's temporary recovery of Ogota. See, Madiebo, *The Nigerian Revolution*.

46. Nwankwo, *Nigeria: the Challenge...*, p.25. This document took its name after the town of Ahiara made prominent only because the Biafran leadership chose to celebrate Biafra's independence there in May 1969.

47. See reprints in *Headlines* (Lagos), April-June 1988.

48. See, Ojukwu, *Biafra: Selected Speeches*, p.363.

49. Nwankwo, *Nigeria: the Challenge...*, p.31.

50. Amilcar Cabral, *Unity and Struggle* (London: Heinemann, 1980), pp.150-4.

51. T. Abdul-Raheem and A. Olukoshi, 'The Left in Nigerian Politics and the Struggle for Socialism', *African Political Economy*, No. 37, (1986).

52. Ojukwu, *Biafra: Random Thoughts*, p.140.

53. Nwankwo, *Nigeria: the Challenge of Biafra*, p.66.

54. This thesis is confirmed by the fact that 13 years after, Ojukwu failed in his bid to represent his district in the Senate: apparently, his usefulness was over.

A NOTE ON IFE TRADITIONAL ART AND CRAFT INDUSTRIES

by 'Biodun Adediran

The study of types of art industry is still a neglected aspect of Yoruba studies. For instance, many scholars have commented on the arts and crafts of Ife.¹ These comments are based on the various archaeological finds in the city since Leo Frobenius' visit in 1903,² and on local traditions which record the making of clay, stone, glass beads and glass bracelets, modelling in plastic clay, casting in metal, carving in wood, ivory and lithic materials. Yet no concerted effort has been made on this important aspect of Ife culture. This paper is meant to provoke and generate discussions on the subject.

The origin of craftsmanship is dated in the traditions of Ife to the remote antiquity. In fact, it has been suggested that craftsmanship in metal and wood industry dated to the early period of Ife history.³ The impression one gathers from oral traditions is that basketry was the first craft in Ife. It appears to have been widespread among Ife lineages and to have stimulated the idea of sculpturing. The latter suggestion is buttressed by the fact that motifs derived from basketry are common characteristics from the impressed and incised decoration on Ife pottery.⁴ What is certain as at now is that the first major industry in Ife was that of sculpture.

Sculpture (*onogbigbe*) as an industry is traditionally associated with Obatala (Orisanla) regarded as the patron of all sculptors. This tends to suggest that the art of sculpture, which is a major aspect of Ife civilisation, dated to the pre-Oduduwa period. Early Ife sculptures are believed to have featured stone carvings, metal castings, wood carving and ivory carving. Of all these materials, sculptures made of stone have survived and the lithic industry appears to have been the first major industry in early Ife. The various beautifully carved stone objects seen in Ife is an evidence of the importance attached to this industry. Major Ife deities such as Obatala, Oluorogbo, Orisa Ikire and Orisa Ijigbo are represented in stone.

The next major craft industry appears to have been brass casting. Of these, very little is known beyond conjectures based on the Edo tradition that Oba Oguola of Benin who reigned c.1280 A.D. introduced the art of brass smithing to Benin from Ile-Ife.⁵ It is however almost certain that many of the early *Ooni*

of Ife, such as Obalufon, were represented in brass (bronze) rather than in stone. This suggests that bronze casting is to be associated with the emergence of the Oduduwa dynasty. It probably remained an exclusively royal prerogative, since most of the bronze figures were those of early *Ooni* and their close associates, and since most of the finds were made in the vicinity of the palace.⁶

The other popular craft industry, almost as widespread as the stone industry was the bead industry. The discovery in an archaeological context of red stone and carnelian beads at the early 14th century site of Obalara⁷ indicates that the Ife bead industry may well be of some antiquity. The earliest beads were probably made from stone and baked clay; but the most prominent so far found in archaeological context are made from glass. All over the town of Ife, fragments of glass, and bead crucibles have been found. Many of these were accidental, particularly in the Ilare quarters and in major ritual groves at Ita Yemoo.⁸ Odo-Ogbe, Ita-Ijero and Moore. These indicate that many centres of the glass and bead industry existed in Ife.

Two types of bead were traditionally popular. These were the blue conical form (locally known as *segi*), and the red cylindrical type (*iyun*). Both were originally made from raw materials dug up from the soil and referred to locally as *idaro* (lit. cast and mould plaster). From Isoya, on the outskirts of Ile-Ife, a few of the materials analysed indicate that the *idaro* was a type of stone containing crypto-crystalline form of silica, one of the most generally distributed geological elements in West Africa.⁹ It would appear that the use of this material was earlier than that of glass. When exactly and why its use was phased out is not yet known. But it seems clear that as soon as the Ife acquired the knowledge of glass making, they abandoned the use of *idaro*, though they continued to refer to beads made from glass materials as *iyun* and *segi*.

The most prominent Ife deity associated with the bead industry is Olokun; a sea goddess regarded as one of the wives of Oduduwa. She is now remembered as initiating the art of bead making in Ile-Ife, and appears to have set up many production and marketing centres in different parts of the town particularly in Walode and Wasin quarters where there are shrines dedicated to her worship. It was however at Igbo Olokun that she apparently set up an extensive industry for the manufacture of *akun* beads. Excavations and accidental finds at the Igbo Olokun site have continued to yield fragments of beads, bracelets and white clay crucible which strongly give credence to the oral accounts. It is conjectural, but it may well be true that Olokun set up an extensive marketing system in beads for which she accumulated a lot of personal wealth which is particularly emphasised in oral traditions associated with her.

The knowledge of bead making would appear to have declined with the

demise of Olokun. It is perhaps in the light of this interpretation that the tradition that, in spite of her wealth, she had no child should be understood. Like most initiators of traditional crafts, Olokun probably kept much of the knowledge of manufacture to herself and apparently before her death, did not hand over the technology to anybody. Also, she probably did not disclose the locations of the *idaro*. Thus, there are extant account that after Olokun, the traditional raw materials for the manufacture of beads were quickly exhausted.

But the Ife chiefs had grown used to beads especially for purposes of decoration as part of their chiefly dresses. Furthermore, Ife had become a great centre for the exportation of beads to other parts of Yorubaland. The quest for more beads paved the way for the use of glass as raw materials in place of *idaro*. Thenceforth, tubular *iyun* and *segi* beads featured prominently in Ife bead market. The new method of bead manufacture was widely dispersed among different lineages rather than being confined to the Walode compound as during the time of Olokun. Nevertheless, attempts were made to control the production and manufacture with the institution of the *Iyamokun* chieftaincy title as head of the bead manufacturers and traders. The attempt to impose a guild system on the production and marketing of beads strongly shows how important bead was in the political economy of Ife. No other industry was so sensitively controlled. For instance, dyeing which was also an exclusively female affair did not appear to have been strictly controlled and there was a proliferation of dyeing workshops (*ebu*) and as many styles as there were dyes to initiate them.

While bead manufacture and dyeing were predominantly female occupations, wood carving appears to be an exclusively male affair. Unlike the stone and bead industries, the comparatively short life of organic materials, such as wood, makes it difficult to discern the extent and nature of this industry. But persistent demands for human portraits and figures especially for purposes of second burial ceremonies, ritual objects and trays, and domestic utensils like wooden ladles must have kept wood carvers constantly busy. In fact, the existence of a traditional chieftaincy title, the *Onayesin*, as the leader of the Ife sculptors indicates that wood carving was of the same importance as stone carving and bead making in the town.

Also of importance was pottery; a craft for which Ife's fame extends to the remote antiquity. Potsherd pavements in Ife, an architectural design by which potsherds were set on edge, were probably as old as one thousand years.¹⁰ Pottery is not just a craft, it is also an art, and only those who acquire the skill can be called potters. In Ife, potters were of two categories. A group concentrated on the manufacture of utility pots, while others specialised in ritual pots. Ritual pottery was restricted to priests (*babalawo*) for the manufacture of

Ogboni ritual tools.¹¹ Such ritual potters were also responsible for moulding objects like ram heads, terra cotta torso and heads¹² peculiar to Ife.

The sketches made above are certainly glimpses of the Ife ancient craft industries. There is no doubt that the various arts and crafts have not been pursued with the same vigour as they were before the 19th century. This had led to speculations that the art industries are extinct in Ife. For instance, J.A. Atanda, after a brief visit to the town concluded that 'the art industry died in Ife in the second half of the nineteenth century, leaving no hope of its revival'.¹³ S.A. Akintoye also remarked that 'any scholar interested in Ife is bound to consider it strange that the product of Ife's great sculpture in bronze, terra cotta and stones have to be almost entirely dug out of the ground and that no family or individual artist is known who has carried into our day the artistic skills which had produced these famous sculptures'.¹⁴ In the same vein, Alan Ryder talks of the absence of a tradition of brass casting.¹⁵

These speculations were probably influenced by Bolaji Idowu's pioneering work on Yoruba religion in which he devotes a great deal of attention to Ife.¹⁶ Idowu contends that there was an extinction of Ife sculptors and artists as a result of palace mutiny which was a boomerang and which resulted in the extermination of all artists and sculptors to such an extent that there was 'none left to continue the work of the good old school'.¹⁷ Supporting Idowu's thesis, Frank Willet¹⁸ suggests that the alleged annihilation of Ife artists took place shortly after the reign of *Ooni* Laworokolokin whose chamberlain, Lajuwa, is believed to have been at the head of the mutineers. Laworokolokin was one of the early *Ooni* usually put as the fifth or sixth after Oduwa. Willet's suggestion would mean that all the Ife terra cotta and brass sculptures belonged to the period before *Ooni* Laworokolokin. But the archaeological artifacts of Ife are known to belong to different historical periods, most of them post-dating the 14th century;¹⁹ an indication that the production of art objects continued well after the alleged mutiny.

Willet also argues that the foundation of Oyo led to a decline in the political importance of Ife and therefore, a decline in the art crafts. This is based on the idea that Ife art crafts were associated with royal cults. Apart from the fact that this suggestion contradicts sharply the Lajuwa legend, it is invalidated by the fact that a great percentage of Ife art objects were found in ritual context. Thus, even assuming that there was a decline in Ife's political importance, the arts and crafts needed not to have gone into decline since, spiritually, Ife continued to be of primary importance among Yoruba states.

Arguing further from the economic point of view, Willet insists that the loss to Ife of the trans-Saharan trade routes as a result of the spread of Islam robbed

Ifc of its source of raw materials. This is based on the assumption that the only source of raw materials opened to Ife was through the trans-Saharan routes. Dennis Williams²⁰ even pinpointed the import of copper ingots from the Saharan mine of Takedda to Nigeria in the mid-14th century. But the spread of Islam did not in any way disrupt the trans-Saharan trade and certainly not to the extent assumed by Willet. In any case, the assumption that Ife's commercial contacts with the outside world were only through the north is false. By the 13th century, the Portuguese had already started a profitable trade in brass manila on the coast of modern Nigeria.²¹ Trade between Ife and Ijebu, on the coast, is believed to have been one of some antiquity and provided an opportunity for external contact.

There is no doubt that Ife was a strong political centre up to the end of the 18th century. Even in the early decades of the 19th century, it remained a force to reckon with in Yoruba politics. But as from the middle of the 19th century, Ife knew no peace. Between 1852 and 1892, she suffered series of military degradations.²² As a result, by 1893, Ife was territorially dwarfed from a kingdom to a city-state.

These misfortunes affected the art industries negatively. Firstly, the extensive trade network in existence by the mid-19th century was disrupted. This network²³ connected Ife with the Ijebu to the south, Ondo and Benin to the east, Oyo to the west and Ijesa and Ekiti to the north. Trade on these routes was well developed providing an impetus to the art industries. Secondly, by the second half of the 19th century, the number of people available to pursue the arts and crafts were few. Out of the last fifty years of the century, Ife was intermittently at war for about forty years and spent at least sixteen years in forced exile.²⁴ Thirdly, the series of wars exposed the Ife to the importation of many objects traditionally produced locally. This negatively affected the craft industries which automatically went into decline. Thus, when Ife was resettled in 1892 under Ooni Olubuse, it was not possible to restore the traditional grandeur of the arts and crafts industries.

Things worsened with the imposition of British rule and importation of 'better' and cheaper articles which made the British to control the local markets and drive the traditional manufacturers underground. For instance, imported ceramic wares appeared more fanciful when compared with the locally made wares called *Kutupu*. Yet the former were sold at prices low enough to control the market and cripple the local industry. Thus by 1943, the situation was such that one colonial official observed that 'competition with European ware has reduced the demand only for certain types of pots.'²⁵ This set back did not however lead to the extinction of the art industry. The strong hearted artist, in

spite of the cut-throat competition with imported goods, managed to exist. This is primarily because demands continued to be made for the art objects. For instance, both the caster and the *babalawo* of *edan Ogboni* knew that no foreign *edan* (if any) would meet the standards required of an *edan* for ritual observances. Similarly, the various traditional festivals continued to make use of local artists who, it was believed, possessed the ritual qualifications to make sacred objects. Thus, after the 19th century Yoruba wars, there were frantic efforts to replace the damaged, lost or stolen ritual objects in the shrines and groves. This led to a resuscitation of the craft tradition in Ife, as the art industrial specialists resumed production.²⁶

However, since the imposition of British rule and the introduction of Western education, the sense of value of the Ife, like that of the other Yoruba sub-groups, has changed considerably. The aesthetic taste has been in favour of foreign goods and consequently, there has been a remarkable decline in the demand for the traditional art objects. It is therefore not surprising that the traditional art and craft centres have not been expanding. Nevertheless, many Ife families were still engaged in the production of art objects. This is made possible by the fact that most art industries were lineage-based, and the knowledge of working such industries has been passed down from initiation through successive generations.²⁷ In 1910, Leo Frobenius saw some of these industries and emphasised that 'the art of modelling in wax and the subsequent hollow casting in bronze survive to this hour'.²⁸ The fact is that the ritual context in which most of the art objects continue to be manufactured make it difficult for a lazy observer to perceive the continuity of the industries in their traditional setting.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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25. K.C. Murray, 'Arts and Crafts of Nigeria: Their Past and Future', *Africa*, vol. 14, no. 4 (1943), p.159.
26. L. Frobenius, *The Voice of Africa*, p.21.
27. See, O. Eluyemi, 'Ife Traditional Arts and Crafts Industries', in I.A. Akinjogbin and G.O. Ekemode (eds.), *Yoruba Civilization*, Vol. II, Table 1, for a list of Ife families and their fields of specialisation.
28. L. Frobenius, *The Voice of Africa*, p.317.

THE IJEBU AND THE POLICE IN COLONIAL NIGERIA BEFORE 1940

by Kemi Rotimi

The old order of the Ijebu collapsed, and enthusiastically the new was embraced.... In this new order the sacrifice and courage of the warriors at Pobo, Majoda and on the Yemoji sometimes seem forgotten...

- Robert Smith, 'Nigeria-Ijebu', in M. Crowder (ed.), *West African Resistance: The Military Response to Colonial Occupation*, p. 194.

Until 1970 when policing was unified, with the sole responsibility devolving on officers and men of the Nigeria Police Force, NPF, there were two types of police force in the country. The NPF had country-wide jurisdiction while the other type of force, variously named Native Administration (Authority) Police Forces/Local Government Police Forces, NALGPFs, existed from quite early in colonial times in the Northern (whole of it) and Western (in a substantial part) regions.¹ It is the attitude of the Ijebu towards joining the NPF and their disposition to those who served in it that are examined in this paper.

The *enthusiasm and forgetfulness* that Robert Smith talks about in his excerpted assessment of the 'aftermath and reckoning' of the 1892 expedition might be true of the fraction of the compromised, Ijebu ruling elite who were coopted into the colonial ruling machine. But the generality of brutalised Ijebu showed no enthusiasm about being colonised; they did not forgive or forget the rude interruption and subsequent subversion of the normal rhythm of their lives that the 1892 British expedition constituted.

II

How and why did the NALGPFs come into being in parts of colonial Nigeria? Briefly put, the forces came into existence either through the *adaptation* of pre-colonial police organisations of the centralised Yoruba and Edo kingdoms of the West and those of the emirate states of the North or through *creation* in areas, especially the more acephalous communities of the North, where they had not existed before.

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In all the centralised principalities, the men who served as police were drawn from the numerous palace officials. In common, they were (a) drawn from palace slaves; (b) appointed by, and responsible to, the king; (c) supervised by a senior official of government who was almost always a eunuch; (d) distinguished by their distinctive dress and/or hairstyle; (e) at once bodyguard, messenger and executioner and (f) diplomatic and revenue collecting agents. In Yorubaland, these officials were known variously as *ilari* (among the Oyo); *emese* (among the Ife, Ijesa and Ekiti) and *agunren* (in Ijebu-Ode). It may just be remarked that in the place of these multiplicity of names in Yorubaland, there was only one name for them in the states of the North, dating even from the pre-jihad days of the Hausa states: *dogari* (plural, *dogarai*). In all of the Yoruba kingdoms, the *ilari*, *emese* and *agunren* represented in the eyes of the populace the symbol of legitimate force. It is even said that the consent of the *agunren* was necessary to give the stamp of legitimacy to any Ijebu military campaign.²

When British colonial rule was imposed on Nigeria in the opening decade of this century the twin problems of inadequate finance and shortage of personnel predisposed the new masters to adapting suitable pre-colonial structures and organs of administration to serve colonising ends. Like the establishment of the superstructural native administration, the founding of the substructural NALGPFs was part of the incremental process by which elements of local, indigenous policing which were initially independent of imperial rule were gradually reconstructed in the imperial image as the totality of institutions of the colonising power increasingly pervaded the colonial domain.

Unlike in Northern Nigeria, where the adaptive process is more clearly delineated the situation in Western Nigeria cannot be so definitively traced. The first NALGPF in Western Nigeria - and indeed the first anywhere in the country - was established by the Egba United Government, EUG, in 1905. That force did not grow out of an adaptation of any palace organisation; but it did provide an example for the British to replicate elsewhere in the region through an adaptation of pre-colonial palace police organisations.³

In his attempt to justify the claims that the British administrators in Lagos had been practising indirect rule in Yorubaland before Lugard's later superimposition of the model that he had fashioned for the emirates of Northern Nigeria between 1900-1906, Atanda gives some details about the efforts of Governors McCallum and MacGregor to associate the chiefly authorities in Ibadan, Oyo, Ife, Ila, Ilesha and Ekiti kingdoms with the process of governance.⁴

The first NALGPF established through an adaptive process was the Ibadan NALGPF. Raised in 1906, it was constituted by making erstwhile messengers and

bodyguards of the *Baale* and senior chiefs into stipendiary officials of the nascent Ibadan native council. The members of the force with responsibility for policing the outlying districts of Ibadan were known as the *akoda* while those whose schedule was restricted to 'the vast city of Ibadan' were called *iranse*.⁵

The indications are that the British allowed pre-colonial police organisations in other parts of Yorubaland to carry on whatever police duties they had been performing. But it is noted from archival records that the label, *akoda* became generic for all such adapted pre-colonial police organisations.

The *akoda* phase of policing began to give way to the raising of more regular local police forces from the early 1920s. Depending on the character of the British Resident in charge of a province, or the District Officer in charge of a division, the *akoda* gradually lost the police aspects of their duties and were restricted to serving as court messengers.

Before delving into the disposition of the Ijebu to police service in the next section, this section may be ended with a note on the philosophy undergirding the NA police idea. In general, colonial police forces were established to incorporate the colonised society within 'the imperial jigsaw'. They often began as a quasi-military force, both in their practises of direct coercion and as a war-time reserve. And their personnel were often initially recruited on the basis of their alien origin - the phenomenon of 'strangers policing strangers'.⁶ These observations would apply more to the armed central government controlled police forces in the colonies. Wherever NAFs were allowed, the idea was for 'likes to police likes', which was the reason for building on the pre-existing police organisations. The aberration that the situation among the Ijebu constituted to this norm is examined in the rest of this paper.

III

The Ijebu province was carved out of the Abeokuta province on January 1, 1920⁷ but a regular NAF had been established for the Ijebu native administration since 1918.⁸ In general, recruitment into the NAFs was based largely on the patronage of the Oba or chiefs. There was no specific educational standard that the recruit must have attained; all that was necessary was physical fitness. As from 1920, discharged soldiers of the Royal West African Frontier Force, RWAFF, were also recruited.

The recruitment procedure took two forms. One, the Native Authority could recommend a candidate to the Assistant District Officer who was in charge of the NAFs. He would in turn, recommend to the District Officer (DO) that the candidate be recruited or rejected. The DO's decision would be communicated

to the Native Authority and the Resident. Two, the ADO or the DO could initiate the enlistment process; the recruitment of eligible candidates was referred to the Native Authority and the Resident for ratification.⁹ The second arrangement was more common in Ijebu Province where up to 1938, there were more stranger elements than indigenes in the Ijebu NAF.¹⁰ The members of the force comprised mostly discharged soldiers of the Nigerian regiment of the RWAFF based in Ibadan.

From the beginning, the administrative officers had shown great bias against the employment of an Ijebu as policemen. The first resident of the province, W. Buchanan Smith remarked in a 1922 report that 'the Ijebu makes a bad soldier and an unreliable policeman, and the only Ijebu whom it has been possible to try as Head of the Police proved an appalling failure'.¹¹ He further said that 'when vacancies have occurred, old soldiers with war experience, who are out of work, have been given preference of selection regardless of the Yoruba sub-tribe from which they have sprung. The annual reports on the administration, up to 1938, were replete with similar statements, but in some of it, it was noted that the Ijebu were uninterested in the job. So it was mutual dislike: by administrative officers against taking on the few Ijebu who were interested and by many Ijebu against service in the force.

The factor of the Ijebu NAF being peopled more by strangers than indigenes was largely responsible for the policemen's unpopularity in the province. Even with the Native Authority, the predominance of strangers was unsettling. In June 1931, the Awujale, Ali Ogunnaike, recommended two Ijebu indigenes for employment in the force. While he was still waiting to hear from the DO on the two men, he received a letter from the DO asking him to approve the appointment of two ex-soldiers who were strangers. The Awujale protested at the continued appointment of strangers while Ijebu indigenes remained unemployed and therefore withheld his assent.¹² He got a reply from the Resident's Office in which it was contended that the sole object of the political officers was to obtain the best men for the force and they would naturally prefer Ijebu if they were 'available' and 'suitable'. The Awujale was cheekily told to advise the unemployed young men to adopt farming from which no one was prevented and which required no recommendation.¹³ In the end, the Awujale had his way but the political officers had their way.

The ordinary Ijebu showed their resentment against the job and those who cared to do it in many ways, usually whenever they allegedly fell foul of the law. Some of the policemen did not help matters by mixing extortion with their ordinary duty of preventing the commission of crime or bringing a criminal to justice. Colonial rule introduced many alien laws that were unknown to the citizenry. Policemen often claimed a monopoly on knowledge of the laws and

acted against law-breakers. In the Ijebu area, there were two crimes that were of common occurrence: counterfeiting of coins and illicit distillation of gin.

Colonial rule brought the use of minted money into the economy. This caused some dislocation in the pre-existing trading arrangements. Since the new currencies were scarce and the people earned little for their goods, the Ijebu exploited all their skill in goldsmithing to make facsimiles of the new currencies. The colonial authorities frowned at the practice and outlawed it. The NA policemen had the unenviable task of enforcing laws made to check counterfeiting. In the process they mixed bribery and undue force with their ordinary duty.

The practise of counterfeiting which began in Ijebuland in the late 1920s, was heightened in the early 1930s during the global economic recession. The colonial authorities, through their surrogates, the Native Authorities, did not want to accept that the economic situation and the demands on the local people were responsible for the persistence of the illegal business. Incidentally, the Ijebu among whom this business was most prevalent had a natural aversion to police work and the few who showed interest were not recruited. So the NAPF which comprised mostly strangers had the misfortune of combining an unwelcome role with their stranger identity. Many of the people saw the policemen as local tyrants. It is therefore little surprise when in 1929, after he had been convicted and dismissed for some "breaches of discipline" top of which was regular collection of bribes, the anti-crime officer of the Ijebu NAPF, Sgt. Gbadamosi Alao, (a native of Ilorin) attracted no sympathy from the local people.¹⁴ In a letter he wrote through the Awujale to the Resident begging for reinstatement, he laid great stress on his skill and efficiency at combatting the crime of counterfeiting.¹⁵ He lamented that:

...In my present condition, no one in the Ijebu country would feel to help (*sic*) me as I am a foreigner, and by considering how I always faithfully discharged my duties *against* them they all hate me and feel not to help (*sic*) me under any circumstance than to add to my everyday (anguish) by their sarcastic talks against me since they do not see me in my official uniform again. They revenge everyday and laugh me to scorn....¹⁶ (emphases added)

Alao might have been 'faithful' to his employers but he certainly was not to the people. If he did his duties 'against' them, why expect their sympathy at his fall? Apart from his own misdeameans, he had refused to prosecute a case of abuse of office when a junior under him had assaulted a woman in a market at

Ijebu-Ife on the allegation that the woman was shielding a tax defaulter from the long arm of the justice.¹⁷ And Alao ranked in the same class with another officer, Sgt. Oladapo who connived at the abduction of the daughter of one Summola Alakija of Ijebu-Ode by a Cpl. Banjo who had boasted to the girl's father (even after the ADO had intervened) that he would pay no dowry on the girl because he was 'an official man' to whom the aggressive father could not 'do anything'.¹⁸

Illicit distillation was also rampant in the Ijebu country especially the Waterside. An ordinance was enacted to protect the business interest of the British traders who were importing various kinds of distilled gin into the country. But to prevent the local brewing of such spirits it was again the NA policeman that had to be used. It is significant to note the defiance of those who saw in the harassment by the NA policemen the grave injustice being perpetrated against them, especially during the period of the economic depression of the early 1930s. In the annual report on the province for the year 1933, it was noted while commenting on NA Police that distillation of illicit spirits was discovered among the Sobos of the waterside area and that several convictions bore fruit. It was however remarked that:

... The indignant protest by some of the accused that since they could make no money out of palm products they must turn to some other means of livelihood and the loud assertion by a female utterer of counterfeit coins that she would revisit the office for completion of her sentence for the return of her money which she hoped would be kept safe during her absence provided some welcome relief.¹⁹

If the Resident derived some fun from the righteous indignation of those on whom he and his fellow colonialists had foisted alien laws, not so some of the colonised people.

IV

How much does the disposition of the Ijebu to police service hark back to the punitive expedition of 1892? A useful guide can be found in Robert Smith's excellent analysis of the causes, courses, and consequences of the expedition. When the British authorities in Lagos had decided to wage war against the Ijebu in March 1892, it is significant that it was the armed government police that were used. The Acting Inspector-General of Police in the Colony had been involved in the acts of intimidation prior to that time. In the course of the battle, the exploits of the Lagos force were sufficiently chastening for teh Ijebu.

The recklessness of the troops and the atrocities that they committed could not have endeared the Ijebu either to the conquerors or those whom they had to employ. It is clear from the above and we can affirm that the disinclination of the Ijebu to join the NAPF and the difficulties encountered by the strangers who did, echoed the memory of the 1892 expedition.

NOTES

1. For details on the history of these forces, see E.O. Rotimi, 'A History of Native Administration Police Forces in Nigeria, 1900-1970', Ph.D. Thesis, Ife, 1990, 531pp. In this paper, the acronym NAPF is adopted because the change in nomenclature to Local Government Police Forces in the Western region from 1955 had not occurred at the end of the period covered.
2. See E.A. Oroge, 'The Institution of Slavery in Yorubaland with particular reference to the Nineteenth century', Ph.D. thesis, Birmingham, 1971, p.44.
3. For details on the history of the Egba United Government police force, see Rotimi, 'A History of Native Administration Police Forces', ch. 1.
4. J.A. Atanda, *The New Oyo Empire* (London: Longman, 1973), pp. 85-98.
5. Details on these units of the force are in Rotimi, 'A History of Native Administration Police Forces', ch. 1; only a summary is attempted here.
6. For details on the practice of this idea in respect of the Nigeria Police Force, see T.N. Tamuno, *The Police in Modern Nigeria, 1861-1965* (Ibadan, 1970); ch. 1; P.T. Ahire, *Imperial Policing: The emergence and role of the police in colonial Nigeria, 1860-1960* (London: Open University Press, 1991), ch. 2.
7. National Archives, Ibadan (NAI), CSO 21/309: *Annual Report*. Abeokuta Province for the Period 1 January 1920 - 31 March, 1921.
8. NAI, IjeProf. 4/J.1070: Memorandum on the Ijebu Native Administration by W. Buchanan Smith, Resident, 1922.
9. NAI, IjeProf. 4/J.306, Vol. 1: Native Administration Olopas; Matters Affecting, 1928-1934.

10. The following names are taken from the staff list of the force for 1932. It had a total strength of 82. The selection here is from the 22 whose foreigner-status was obvious from their surnames: (1) Ojo Efon (2) Afolabi Ibadan (3) Adamu Abinshi (4) Imonittie Jebba (5) Ben Sabongidda (6) Alli Ilesha (7) Oseni Abeokuta (8) Equayer Ebebi (9) Ojo Offa (10) Sule Lokoja. Source: NAI, IjeProf. 4/J.306, vol. 1.
11. NAI, IjeProf. 4/J.1070: *Ijebu Native Administration, Constitution of... Memorandum on the Ijebu Native Administration* by W.B. Smith, 1922.
12. NAI, IjeProf. 4/J.306, Vol. 1: Letter from the Awujale to the DO, Ijebu Ode, 11 June, 1931.
13. *Ibid.*: Letter from the Resident, Ijebu Ode, to the Awujale, 15 June, 1931.
14. NAI, IjeProf. 4/J.306, Vol. 1: Testimonial issued by the DO, Ijebu Ode, to Ex-Sgt. G. Alao, 19 October, 1929. During my field work at Ijebu Ode, Sagamu, Ilishan, Iperu and Ikenne, people still remembered this man for his activities as a policeman. Most of the people I spoke with would wish the man never existed. At the mention of counterfeit coining in any of these places, this man's name was recalled and some enumeration of his activities as a detective was made. Some even still cursed his memory. The man died many years ago.
15. *Ibid.*: Letter from G. Alao to the Resident, Ijebu Ode, 16 June, 1929.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*: Robert Runshewe to the Sgt. Major, Ijebu N.A. Police, Ijebu Ode, 3 August, 1928.
18. *Ibid.*: Summola Alakija to the ADO, Ijebu Ode, 21 January, 1929.
19. NAI, CSO.26/14556, Vol. IX, *Annual Report*, Ijebu Province, 1933, p.50.
20. R. Smith, 'Nigeria - Ijebu', in M. Crowder (ed.), *West African Resistance: the Military Response to Colonial Occupation* (London: Hutchinson, 1971), pp.170-204.

REVIEW ARTICLES

ARO SECONDARY SOURCE-MATERIAL: A BIBLIO-HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

by Apollos O. Nwauwa

From the successful exploration of the rivers Niger and Benue in 1854 by Baikie, through the establishment of colonial rule in southeastern Nigeria, and until now, the Aro have been the subject of a wide range of literature.¹ The overwhelming interest and the consequent proliferation of writings on the Aro stemmed primarily from two factors, namely, their prominence in the trade in slaves; and their widespread influence in the whole of southeastern Nigeria in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Aro secondary materials include books and published articles in learned journals. It is amazing to note that earlier writers on the Aro up to the mid-1960s were not professional historians. Thus, when they entered into Aro study, historians busied themselves disclaiming the contentions of earlier writers. They were horrified by the scantiness of the research as compared with the extensive theorising on the people. It equally became obvious to them how the "Hamitic hypothesis" and its racial panoply had pervaded Aro history. It was discovered that in the persistent search for paramount rulers for the indirect rule system the British colonial officials manipulated Aro history by taking advantage of local politics and social conflicts inside Arochuku. Hence, Aro published sources have been impaired.

Regrettably, however, the irascible manner with which the nationalist historians sought to challenge and correct these contortions, alleged or factual, especially the "Hamitic hypothesis", created another problem in Aro historiography. They put forward an indigenous interpretation of Aro origin and development predicated entirely upon "insider" (Igbo-Ibibio) initiative, thereby contradicting aspects of Aro traditions which contain account of "outsider" (Akpa) involvement. Aro history therefore, became more juggled and muddled. Since space precludes the inclusion of works (and they are many) which offer peripheral attention to the history of the Aro, only those sources which accorded profound treatment of the people will be considered in this work. Furthermore, to be placed in their proper perspective, these works have been examined chronologically following the years of publication.

Aro research and historiography have been defective. The published sources begin in 1856 with the traveller, Baikie, and then include a number of anthropologists ending in 1967 with a geographer, Ukwu. The decade of the

1970s was dominated by the books and articles of professional historians, (Afigbo, Latham, Isichei, Dike, Ekejiuba, Northrup) all published before 1980, but the latest article is by Orji in 1987. Baikie introduced the Aro to the literary world, but not much more. Talbot confused issues by arguing for a Portuguese origin of the Aro. Then followed Ottenberg on oracles, and Ukwu on marketing systems. Not one of these studies made the Aro the central focus of research. None believed in footnoting oral sources, so that the reader does not know what credit to give to statements, even whether they came from sympathetic or hostile witnesses, or from which social strata they stemmed, chiefly or commoner. The Aro have a regnal list but no regal chronicle. Even today, there is no regnal chronicle which normally can be ascribed to derivation from either chiefly families or their enthusiastic supporters. The basics do not exist thus Aro research and writings have been highly speculative.

Dr. W.B. Baikie produced "trifling stories". His work published in 1856 was the first which contained information on the Aro.² This work was primarily an account of events during the course of the Niger expedition of 1954. In it, Baikie noted the peoples with whom he came in contact, the Aro being among them, and their traditions. Baikie blazed a trail on the Aro question because he was the first to observe that the Aro wielded a great amount of influence and respect among their neighbours. This he attributed to the sway of the Aro oracle, Ibini-Ukpabi who, allegedly, protected them and enhanced their trade in slaves. Apparently, the importance of Baikie's work lies less in the accuracy of his report than in the interest his maiden chronicle later generated about the Aro history among colonial administrators and later, African scholars. As he aptly predicted: 'the time will come when these apparently trifling stories will be sought after with as much avidity as the historical antiquary of our own country'.³ Hundred years later, Baikie's prediction came to pass as the Aro story began to fascinate British colonial officials as well as Africanist scholars. Baikie's writings, though trifling tales, undoubtedly spurred Aro research.

In 1926, P.A. Talbot, an anthropologist for the colonial administration, published his work on southern Nigeria which appeared in four volumes.⁴ These books were a product of his personal notes on the land, culture and the peoples he visited while undertaking a census for the Southern provinces in 1921. He was originally mandated to classify "tribes" and "subtribes", and define their boundaries hence his Aro material was part of the general theme. Talbot's major contribution to the study of the Aro has been his much criticised hypothesis about the origin of the people. Overwhelmed by the high degree of intellect and organisation exhibited by the Aro, Talbot concluded that they must have emanated from a mix between the indigenous Africans and the Portuguese. His dating of the Aro foundation to c.1300-1400 has been highly contentious.

There is no evidential basis for the dates, hence they are preposterous. Nevertheless, when it is realised that Talbot's oral research on the Aro was scanty, if any, his obvious shortcomings would be better appreciated. At best, his hypothesis stimulated more interest in Aro study. Talbot's theory maligned the Aro.

Like Talbot, Forde and Jones' work published in 1950 was not intended to focus on the Aro as such.⁵ Rather, both men were assigned to provide the Colonial Office with concise, critical and accurate notes on the ethnic groupings and social conditions of African peoples, particularly, in relation to plans for development. Forde and Jones' area of concentration was the Igbo and Ibibio-speaking peoples of southeastern Nigeria. It was within this context that they discussed the Aro. The Aro were treated in the same confines with other numerous Igbo-Ibibio speaking communities. Not surprisingly, their discussion on the Aro was too brief and superficial to provide any historical insights. It is probable that Forde and Jones did not carry out any field work on the Aro, but relied solely on what had been written by others such as Talbot, Baikie, and Basden on the Igbo people. If they ever really worked among the Aro, it is then surprising that they did not acknowledge or cite orally collected information. Undoubtedly, this appears to be a general tendency among anthropologists, who after extracting materials from oral sources fail to acknowledge them. For one thing, they usually leave their readers in doubt, and for another, they seemed not to have yet recognised that oral tradition must be identified by source. In any case, the Aro were peripheral to their study.

Ottenberg researched Igbo oracles. The first major work on the Aro which appeared in 1958 was an article published by Ottenberg, an anthropologist.⁶ His focus was on oracle organisations in Igboland in which the Aro oracle, Ibini-Ukpabi, held prominence. Ottenberg attempted to show how the oracle organisations provided a degree of integration of the acephalous Igbo groups. He identified some major oracles in Igboland; namely, Ibini-Ukpabi of Arochuku, Amadioha of Ozuzu, Igwe-ka-Ala of Umuoneoha, Agbala of Awka and the Nri oracles. Ottenberg argued that through the agents of these oracles, external relations and a type of integration were fostered among the various otherwise totally independent Igbo units. As a result, Igbo cultural and linguistic homogeneity was spread and maintained through contacts. Obviously, Ottenberg's work is unique. As well as providing an elaborate discourse on the Aro oracle, the work further demonstrated the degree of interrelationships between the various acephalous Igbo groups which clearly introduced a new dimension into Igbo studies. However, detailed as Ottenberg's work on oracles appears, his sources were deficient. He also followed the tradition of anthropologists who did not acknowledge oral source materials. Clearly, all his

materials were not obtained from written sources. Although not well framed within historical parameters, it will, undoubtedly, be some time before Ottenberg's work in relation to Igbo oracles is surpassed.

In 1967, Ukwu I. Ukwu, a geographer, focussed on Aro trade. Though Ukwu's article⁷ was not specifically an Aro study, however, it was not much more than that because it traced the pattern of development of trade and marketing in Igboland in which the Aro were principal actors. Ukwu saw the establishment of the Aro system as a new phase in the development of trade and markets in Igboland. Ukwu's article is significant to Aro study because not only does it give details of their commerce, routes and colonies, it also considers coastal trade in a regional context. He documents ninety-eight Aro market-settlements, and discusses the major ones. As with the anthropologists, he made no identification of the informants. Even though his use of primary source materials is thus deficient, Ukwu's work obviously provides a more scholarly and perceptive understanding of the dynamics of the Aro trading system, and commerce in Igboland than previous writers.

Historians were rather slow to discover the Aro. It is worthy of note that up to the 1960s those who wrote about the Aro were not professional historians. Instead, they were either anthropologists or colonial officers who did not initially set out to produce an Aro history, but dabbled into it while performing their primary political assignments. Consequently, the superficial and hazy nature of their works were to be expected. None of these writers exhibited any evidence of personal research among the Aro themselves. Whether they entirely depended on tales they heard about the people or mere intuition is difficult to say, but if we sympathize with the predicament of the colonial political officers, whose preoccupation was the satisfactory accomplishment of British imperial objectives, the same cannot go for "independent" researchers such as Jones, Talbot and others. Be that as it may, it was not until the 1970s that historians became truly committed to Aro studies. While some historians were anxious to show the seeming misrepresentation of earlier writers, others were inclined toward conducting further fieldwork as from the 1970s.

Between 1970 and 1973, the well known historian, A.E. Afigbo, became engaged in Aro studies which culminated in the publication of several articles. While some of these dealt with the Aro trading oligarchy and its eclipse in the face of British forces,⁸ others studied the socio-historical "legends" of Aro origin. In this review, only the latter will be examined because the former more or less elaborated upon what had been first suggested by earlier scholars. The most enduring work of Afigbo in connection with the somewhat elusive origin of the Aro was "The Aro of Southeastern Nigeria: A Socio-Historical Analysis of Legends of their Origin" published in two parts.⁹ The first part dealt with

the conflicts and strains in Arochukwu when the colonial officers collected the people's traditions. It further demonstrated how local politics and social conflicts could affect the oral history of a non-literate society exposed to dramatic changes. These dramatic changes, as Afigbo noted were foisted on the people by British rule, which apart from the intra-group competition it engendered among the Aro over the ownership of the land previously inhabited by the oracle, also placed a new premium on kingship or chiefship which equally aroused fierce rivalry. Precisely, Afigbo's focus was on how Aro oral tradition has been deliberately manipulated - hence his use of the word "legend" - by the various groups hankering for leverage over others in the colonial dispensation.

The second part of Afigbo's publication formed a critical discussion of European speculations on the issue of Aro origins, and his tentative suggestions on the problem. Regarding European speculations, the high degree of Aro wit and influence inspired hysteria among racist apologists who began to theorise on the Aro question based on their usual and predisposed tradition of ascribing any meaningful achievement by Africans to outsiders, often Hamites. Afigbo picked on Sir H. R. Palmer and criticised his thesis which linked the Aro to the Junkun, and ultimately to Egypt. Afigbo was also vehemently critical of other hypotheses which traced the Aro to the Portuguese of Carthaginians. He contended that the Aro must be considered first and foremost as an Igbo clan which had absorbed many non-Igbo elements through domestic slavery, marriage and processes of contact and fusion. Invaluable as Afigbo's articles are, he appears to have stretched his critique of Palmer too far that he tended to miss some of the salient points evidenced in Palmer's thesis on the Aro in relation to the Junkun. The Junkun were referred to as 'Akpa', and the mercenary group which founded the Aro state was also known as 'Akpa'.¹⁰ Hence, it was not entirely illogical for Palmer to attempt a correlation between the two groups in a grand style. Palmer, therefore, is yet to be satisfactorily faulted on his Aro-Junkun thesis although his Hamitic penchant remained his major problem. Ostensibly, not until Afigbo himself undertakes an extensive field research on the Aro and the Ibibio peoples, which might offer new evidence and interpretation, his own conclusions on the people would continue to remain as contentious and speculative as those he belligerently criticised.

Afigbo's publications were based upon the first thorough examination of the archival materials relative to the Aro. The bulk of these 'primary' sources are a blend of 'facts' and much speculative fiction.¹¹ The British officials collected the regnal genealogy but failed to record the royal chronicle to accompany it. So meagre was the oral collection of data and so extensive the theorising! It is hardly surprising that a documentary historian would be shocked hence. Afigbo

described the emergent Aro colonial historiography as 'legends'. Furthermore, the official determination to find or create an alien 'white' origin for the Aro and the manner in which colonial officers catered to, or feared the challenge, Palmer's thesis, exhibited a classic example of the manipulation of history. This mindfix became highly offensive to a nationalist historian such as Afigbo. In reaction to the eternal search of the British for external origins, the nationalists predicated purely internal processes. The British could not conceive of the 'intelligent' Aro evolving from within Igbo 'primitiveness', and predictably the nationalists felt compelled to defend themselves against this alleged primitiveness by emphasising an intelligence emerging entirely from within the Igbo milieu. This was their problem. However, to give credit to the British, they probably provided more oral data, peculiar though it was, than any researcher until very recently.

A.J.H. Latham's book, *Old Calabar, 1600-1891*,¹² published in 1973 does not treat the Aro *per se*. Rather, it deals with the effects of the influence of European economic demands on Calabar from the advent of the Europeans to the establishment of British colonial rule. However, the primacy of this book in this review lies in the chronological data it provides in relation to trade and societies in the Lower Cross River. Significantly, these data are almost entirely relevant to Aro studies. Latham emphasised the probable correlation between the importation of fire-arms into Calabar and the foundation of Arochukwu since the alleged founders were said to have used guns. This of course, has been a momentous hint to the solution to the problematic dating of the Aro. Nevertheless, Latham's work should be read with caution as he sometimes appears very parochial and highly Euro-centric. For example, it is very controversial for him to consider the impact of the international economy on Old Calabar as completely beneficial, and perceived the slave trade as progress because instead of "eating" prisoners of war, they were sold.¹³ This smacked of a charge of cannibalism among the Igbo, a controversial issue which is outside the scope of this paper. Latham's assumptions seem to have been informed by the notion that factors which facilitate the emergence of centralised societies such as Calabar must of necessity be overwhelmingly beneficial to the people in question. Like many imperial historians, Latham is evidently not comfortable with acephalous societies - of the Igbo and Ibibio - often associated with primitiveness. Furthermore, he proceeds from the methodology that history is based upon documents supplemented by interviews. This procedure is responsible for his main focus on Calabar. Apparently Latham did not interview the Aro for oral source material. How and where he procured his somewhat substantial sources on the Aro remain difficult to guess.

Isichei synthesised. Elizabeth Isichei, a well known historian, was attracted to Igbo studies in the 1970s. In less than ten years, she has produced a considerable number of works on the Igbo people amongst which is *A History of the Igbo People*,¹⁴ published in 1976. This book explored the social, political and economic lives of the Igbo people. Isichei's fame as a historian, in fact, revolves around the intrepid zeal she mustered in delving into Igbo studies, a field which even historians of Igbo origin had generally avoided because of the non-centralised and non-monarchical nature of the society. Her treatment of the Aro in this book has been quite remarkable. She examined the issues of Aro origin, trade and inter-group relations. Isichei is agreed that the Aro chiefdom was founded as a result of the intermingling of three groups - Igbo, Ibibio and Akpa. She further suggested the possibility of Arochukwu's foundation in the early seventeenth century. Although her other books¹⁵ equally touched on the Aro, the information contained therein was essentially the same. However, in spite of the fact that Isichei has advanced Igbo historiography by her various works on the people, her treatment of the Aro and some other Igbo societies appears superficial. This is hardly surprising when it is understood that she did not personally undertake any field research on the Aro and many other Igbo peoples about whom she writes. Rather, for most of her works, Isichei depended almost entirely on archival materials, the research done by her students, and other scholars. In other words, whatever new oral evidence she employed has not been a product of her personal contact with the Aro. Remarkably, her works which are essentially works of synthesis have revealed the poor state of Igbo historiography in the late 1970s.

Between 1960 and 1970, K.O. Dike's interest centred on the Aro. It should be noted, however, that Dike - in his 1956 book - made reference to the Aro as a 'tribe' and their oracle.¹⁶ His sources were obviously those shallow and shoddy works written by anthropologists and colonial officers. It was the subsequent realisation of the weaknesses inherent in these sources which compelled Dike in conjunction with Felicia Ekejiuba, to carry out field research on the Aro from 1963-64, 1965-66 and in 1970. Their research culminated in the publication of two articles entirely on the Aro. The first, 'Change and Persistence in Aro Oral History',¹⁷ was published in 1971. This article deals with the problem of reconstructing Aro history. Dike and Ekejiuba disapproved of the entire reliance by modern Aro researchers on archival materials left behind by the British to the absolute neglect of indigenous sources. To them, this tendency had led to constant repetition and over-flogging of the little which was known about this remarkable people. They, however, observed that some Aro groups deliberately distorted parts of their history just for the sake of fitting

properly and more advantageously into, or gaining leverage over others under the circumstances of the colonial situation. Dike and Ekejiuba expressed disgust over researchers on Aro history who had tended to reject or accept versions of the people's traditions in accordance with their personal prejudices.

Dike and Ekejiuba's second article, 'The Aro State: A Case Study of State Formation in Southeastern Nigeria',¹⁸ was published in 1978. This article was based almost entirely on oral traditions they collected among the Aro in the course of their field work. In it, they attempted to show how the Aro state developed from a unique combination of processes consummated in the seventeenth century. According to Dike and Ekejiuba, Igbo and Ibibio societies generally, have been erroneously designated as acephalous by scholars who are not mindful that states and kingdoms of Onitsha, Aboh, Oguta, Osomari, and Arochukwu thrived in Igboland. Their contention was that the Aro chiefdom was a product of internal migrations within the Igbo and Cross River area as a consequence of ecological, social and economic factors.¹⁹ The import of Dike and Ekejiuba's second article to the problem of Aro origin is apparently to be drawn from this internal migration thesis. It is however, unfortunate that Dike and Ekejiuba subordinated the external factors evidenced in the Aro tradition in their effort to stress the internal process. Furthermore, the perceptibility of their major argument in this article tends to be blurred by an extensive glorification of the reign of Akuma. Evidently, Akuma's was the first ruler of the Aro chiefdom but his reign was a brief one. He became a hero-ancestor presumably because of his role in the formation of what later culminated in the Aro confederacy, a union of three distinct ethnic groups namely, the Igbo, Ibibio and Akpa. Yet it was Okanachi who consolidated the Aro chiefdom, and launched her into the slave trading business.²⁰ Furthermore, Dike and Ekejiuba failed to relate their thesis to the dynamics of the traditional theories of state formation processes. This weakness virtually betrays the title of the article. Despite the fact that this work was almost entirely based on oral traditions, few footnotes were cited to reflect the extent or oral interviews conducted, almost in the tradition of the anthropologists. Those footnotes which did appear were to scanty interviews and to the checking process which they undertook when considering traditions which earlier writers had suggested were distortions. Above all, Dike and Ekejiuba should be credited as the first historians to undertake any meaningful research on the Aro. It is however regrettable that they were unable to advance any firm chronology of the Aro chiefdom.

Northrup focused on the Igbo and Ibibio. His work, *Trade Without Rulers*, published in 1978 extensively treated the Aro.²¹ Like Latham, Northrup's book centred upon economic history. But unlike Latham who concentrated on

Old Calabar, Northrup considered the whole of southeastern Nigeria which he attempted to integrate into a regional commercial chronology. His work covers the period between the coming of the Portuguese and the establishment of colonial rule. Northrup's book is unique in that it demonstrates to those scholars who have avoided Igbo economic history that there is no necessary correlation between large-scale trade and political centralisation, and there are no obstacles to writing about the former, merely because the latter did not exist. The Aro feature prominently throughout the work. On the issue of Aro origin, Northrup noted that in so far as the location of Arochuku along the main trade route to the Rio del Rey and Calabar may have been a factor in the foundation of the chiefdom, it is simplistic to reduce such a complex event to economic conditions thereby omitting social and political considerations.²² Interestingly enough, Northrup has been able to indicate that the Aro did not possess exclusive economic and political control over the whole of southeastern Nigeria as historians who are monolithic tend to emphasise. The significance of Northrup's work to Aro study lies more in the realm of regional trade. While Ukwu had focused on Igbo trade, Northrup surveyed the whole area south of confluence and Benue River to the coast. The Aro were principal traders in Northrup's survey. Nevertheless, his research was mainly on the Ibibio. He was based in the Ibibio country. Out of his thirty-nine interviews, thirty-two were Ibibio informants. Unfortunately, Northrup conducted only four interviews with the Aro. Not surprisingly, his conclusions on Aro history were bound to be weak.

The most recently published work on the Aro has been J.N. Oriji's article, 'The Slave Trade, Warfare and Aro Expansion in Igboland',²³ which appeared in 1987. As the title suggests, this work focuses on the Aro system of slavery and slave trade; and how the Aro expanded their influence in Igboland through the agency of Ibini-Ukpabi and mercenaries. Oriji presented little new material in the on-going search for Aro history, but the simplified manner in which he presented his ideas is attractive. Oriji's article and many others not considered here represent part of the almost endless fascination with the Aro. Rarely has there been such an outpouring of analysis, theories and hypotheses on so narrow and restricted a factual base. It would almost appear as if the less factual base exists, the greater the proliferation of studies which appear in print.

Clearly much has been written on the Aro focusing on their commercial network, oracle, origins and reasons for their wide-spread influence in the whole of southeastern Nigeria in the nineteenth century. It is regrettable that despite the interest shown in the history of the Aro, and the outpouring of literature on the people, very little, if any fieldwork has been actually carried out. All the theorising has been based on the little known facts. It is worthy to note that one

of the major problems in the Aro research has been that all of the evidence is permeated with strong biases. Those British officials who flaunted a Hamitic origin did so in an attempt to persuade the colonial authorities to use the Aro and their model as instrument of indirect rule while those against such an interpretation were claiming that the Aro were as "primitive" and "unsophisticated" as the rest of the Igbo. As for the nationalist historians, all their efforts were to prove that although remarkable, the Aro were not Hamites but Igbos. They saw it as an affront to describe the Aro as either "primitive" or as Hamites. Apparently, what is urgently required in Aro historiography is a sponsored research project centred in Arochuku which would aim at between one and two hundred oral interviews concentrating on regnal and commoner genealogies, and chronicles. This is more so when intra-Aro politics are considered. The people's history has been even distorted by the various Aro sections to suit their partisan needs. For instance, no group wants to be associated with slave ancestry any longer. Everybody claims noble descent. Evidently, what is presently available has been primarily "outsiders" views of the Aro. Thus, it is not out of place to assume that the Aro definitive history from an Aro perspective has yet to be written.

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A CHALLENGE TO EURO-CENTRED HISTORIOGRAPHY

by Erving E. Beauregard

"There is always', the ancient Greeks used to say, 'something new coming out of Africa', and Pliny, the Roman encyclopedist who recorded their saying in his *Natural History*, captured the imagination of Europe for more than fifteen hundred years with his stories of strange African beasts... and of man even stranger."¹ Now from 20th Century Africa has come a shattering assault on European-centred, veritably Caucasoid-centred history, i.e., attacks on long-time prevailing view that Western civilisation, equated with world civilisation, harkens back to the Greco-Roman world which built on the foundations of the Caucasian genius of the Fertile Crescent and Egypt.² The leading wielder of the battering ram has been Cheikh Anta Diop. This Senegalese has trumpeted his pronouncement:

The Egyptian origin of civilisation, and the Greeks' heavy borrowing from it are historical evidence. One wonders therefore why, in the face of these facts, the emphasis is laid on the role played by Greece, while that of Egypt is more and more passed over in silence. The foundation for this attitude can only be understood by recalling the heart of the question.

Egypt being a Negro country, and the civilisation which developed there being the product of black people, any thesis to the contrary would have been to no avail; the protagonists of these ideas are certainly by no means unaware of this fact. Consequently, it is wiser and surer purely and simply to strip Egypt of all her achievements for the benefit of a people of genuine white origin.

This false attribution of the values of an Egypt conveniently labelled white to a Greece equally white reveals a profound contradiction, which is not negligible as a proof of the Negro origin of Egyptian civilisation.

As can be seen, the black man, far from being incapable of developing a technical civilisation, is in fact the one who developed it first, in the person of the Negro, at a time when all the white races, wallowing in barbarism, were only just fit for civilisation.

In saying that it was the ancestors of Negroes, who today inhabit principally black Africa, who invented mathematics, astronomy, the calendar, science in general, the arts, religion, social organisation,

medicine, writing, engineering, architecture... in saying all this, one is simply stating the modest and strict truth, which nobody at the present moment can refute with arguments worthy of the name.³

The Nigerian writer, Abiola Irele, has dissected his fellow West African's approach. 'The whole thesis is based on an implied correlation between history and culture which determines the nature of society, and of the individual: and its intention was to prove that the African was essentially a technical man - *homo faber*.'⁴ Thus, interestingly, Diop crossed swords with the coiner of the term 'Negritude', Aimé Césaire, who said of Blacks:

Those who invented neither gunpowder nor compass

Those who tamed neither steam nor electricity

Those who explored neither the sea nor the sky.⁵

Diop has modern precursors, some white, most Black. One white, the French scholar and politician, Count Constantin de Volney (1757-1820), won Diop's esteem. After visiting Egypt in 1783-1785, Volney wrote: '... the ancient Egyptians were true Negroes of the same type as all native-born Africans.' Furthermore, Volney claimed: 'Just think that this race of black men... is the very race to which we owe our arts, sciences and even the use of speech!'⁶ Later, there appeared the potent voice of the one-time Black West Indian and later West African, Edward Wilmot Blyden, who in 1869, in the first article by a Black in a scholarly quarterly declared that 'Negroes' played 'an active... part in early Egyptian civilisation' and thus helped to transmit to posterity 'the germs of... the arts and sciences.'⁷ Still later, Alexander F. Chamberlain, a Clark University anthropologist, had stated in 1911: 'Egypt acted as a sort of channel by which the genius of Negro land was drafted off into the service of Mediterranean and Asiatic cultures.'⁸ Edward and Josephine Carlisle affirmed in 1920: 'Egyptian history is Negro history as we have abundant proof from the earliest dynasties through Egypt's age of splendor; the royal line was strongly imbued with the blood of the Negro.'⁹ In 1946, Dr. W.E.B. DuBois asserted: '... the Egyptians were Negroids, and not only that, but by tradition they believed themselves descended not from the whites or the yellows, but from the black peoples of the south. Thence they traced their origin, and toward the south in earlier days they turned the faces of their buried corpses.'¹⁰ There have been others who have concurred in this view.¹¹

However, it is Cheikh Anta Diop who systematically developed the thesis that civilisation began among the Egyptians who were Blacks with cultural and blood

origins in Nubia and whose civilisation laid the bases for those of the Near East, Europe, and both North and Sub-Saharan Africa.¹² He did so in his proposed doctoral thesis at the Sorbonne which became the basis for the work *Nations Nègres et Culture* (1955), a volume followed by numerous books and articles. Diop has been splendidly prepared for his determined onslaught on entrenched academe, having had an excellent early education in the Muslim schools of Diourbel, Senegal, a baccalaureate in that one-time French colony, and graduate studies at the Sorbonne.¹³ Moreover, he is the only Black of his generation to have obtained an Egyptologist's training.¹⁴

Diop argues correctly that the ancient Egyptians were Black.¹⁵ One source is literary evidence. Herodotus is cited: 'It is certain that the natives of the country are blacks....' Again '... by calling the dove black, they (the Dodonaean) indicated that the woman was Egyptian.' The dove symbolised an Egyptian woman kidnapped from Thebes, Egypt, to found the oracle of Dodona, Greece. Herodotus believed the Colchians to be of Egyptian origin: 'My own conjectures are founded, first, on the fact that they are blackskinned and have woolly hair....'¹⁶ Diop holds that Herodotus 'demonstrated... that Greece borrowed from Egypt all the elements of her civilization, even the cult of the gods, and that Egypt was the cradle of civilization.'¹⁷ Diodorus Siculus considered the Egyptians and Ethiopians as being of the same Black race.¹⁸ He also claimed that Egyptian civilisation came from Nubia, the centre of which was Meroe.¹⁹ Strabo held that the Egyptians and Ethiopians belonged to the same race.²⁰

The distinguished Egyptologist, Sir Gaston Maspero, summarised the opinion of all the ancient writers on the Egyptian race: 'By the almost unanimous testimony by ancient historians, they belonged to an African race (read: Negro) which first settled in Ethiopia, on the Middle Nile; following the course of the river, they gradually reached the sea.'²¹

Moreover, Diop makes use of ancient painting and sculpture depicting various Egyptians, aristocrats and commoners, to support his theme of the Egyptians being of the Black race. For example, he summons forth: the ironically named 'Handsome East African Hamitic type'; the protohistorical figure of Lord Tera Neter of the Negro Anu race, first inhabitants of Egypt; Egyptian woman; battalion of forty armed Sudanese; Egyptian fishing; Egyptian heads; Black peasant prisoners; Egyptian princess; totemic coiffure; Egyptian couple; the prisoners of Abu Simbel; and guests at feasts with attendants.²²

Furthermore, Diop takes his readers down the magnificent panorama of ancient Egyptian history to repeatedly bolster his thesis of the Egyptian Black racial character and the Egyptian basis of civilisation. Pharaoh Narmer (Menes)

unified Upper and Lower Egypt and became the founder of the Old Kingdom. He was Black.²³ Pharaoh Zoser of the Third Dynasty, another Black, 'inaugurated large architecture in hewn stone; step pyramid and tomb at Saqqara. With him, all the technological elements of Egyptian civilization were already in place and would be perpetuated from then on.'²⁴ Cheops, a Black pharaoh, built the Great Pyramid.²⁵ 'Astronomers have noted in the Great Pyramid indications of the sidereal year, the anomalistic year, the precision of the equinoxes for 6,000 years whereas modern astronomy knows them for almost 4,000 years. Mathematicians have detected in the Great Pyramid the value of 'pi', the exact distance between the sun and the earth, the polar diameter of the earth....'²⁶ Cheops' brother and successor, Chephren, is said to have been the model for the Sphinx. Chephren also built the second Giza pyramid.²⁷ Cheops' son, Mycerinus, built the third Giza pyramid.²⁸ Pharaoh Mentuhotep I, a Black, founded the Eleventh Dynasty which revived administrative centralisation.²⁹ Another Black Dynasty, the Twelfth, 'fully established the triumph of administrative centralization.'³⁰ This dynasty included Sesostris I, conqueror of Nubia and patron of architecture.³¹

Black blood flowed noticeably in the Eighteenth Dynasty during which period Egypt was 'the foremost technical, military and imperial power in the world'.³² This imperial family included Hatshepsut, 'the first queen in the history of humanity'.³³ Also a member of the Eighteenth Dynasty was Tutmosis III, whose mother was a Sudanese Nubian. He became the great Egyptian conqueror.³⁴ Tutmosis III's descendant, Akhnaton, first sponsored official monotheism.³⁵ The latter's son, Tutankhamen, won immortal fame because of the splendours of his tomb.³⁶

The members of the Nineteenth Dynasty also had Black features. This included Ramses II.³⁷ His son, Merneptah, sent out an expedition to pacify Palestine. Merneptah's commemoration of this on the 'Stela of Israel' was the first mention of the name Israel in history (1222 B.C.).³⁸

The Twenty-fifth Dynasty, which was Sudanese, 'sparked a powerful movement of cultural revival and national resurgence. Shabaka proceeded to restore the great Egyptian monuments.'³⁹ His nephew, Taharqa, advanced the architectural renaissance.⁴⁰

Egypt's grandeur continued. During the Hellenistic period 'Alexandria was the intellectual center of the world. Assembled there were all the Greek scholars we talk about today. The fact that they were trained outside of Greece in Egypt, could never be overemphasized.'⁴¹ Diop stresses the diffusion of civilisation from Egypt. Mesopotamia was a belatedly born daughter of Egypt.⁴² For example, there is Egyptian influence in the Gilgamesh Epic.⁴³ The ancient writers considered the Chaldeans a caste of Egyptian astronomer-priests, that is

to say, Negroes.⁴⁴ The most ancient kings of Elam were blacks as attested by monuments.⁴⁵ The famous Persian palaces at Persepolis and elsewhere were built by Egyptian workers forcibly carried off by King Cambyses.⁴⁶ The Phoenicians, who were originally Blacks, had religion and beliefs 'to some extent mere replicas of Egypt's'.⁴⁷ The Phoenicians, in turn, left their imprint on Greece, Italy, Spain and North Africa.⁴⁸ Also, 'the Etruscans brought all the elements of Egyptian civilization to the Italian peninsula: farming, religion, arts, including the divining art. When they destroyed the Etruscans, the Romans assimilated the substance of that civilization, while eliminating those aspects most alien to their Eurasian patriarchal conception.'⁴⁹ Egypt transmitted circumcison to the Semitic world in general.⁵⁰ The Hellenes adapted Egyptian values to Greece.⁵¹ 'Egypt was indeed the classic land where two-thirds of the Greek scholars went to study.'⁵² 'Even Greek architecture has its roots in Egypt.'⁵³ Greek sculpture showed Egyptian influence.⁵⁴ The Egyptian Negro, Aesop, introduced into Greece 'The typically negro... kind of fable, with animals as characters.'⁵⁵ The Greeks borrowed their deities from Egypt.⁵⁶

Diop also dwells on the profound connection between Egypt and Sub-Saharan Africa. There was, for instance, the Egyptian origin of the Yoruba as proved by similarity or identity of languages, and religious beliefs, ideas, and practices; and, furthermore, there were survivals of Egyptian customs and names of persons, places and objects.⁵⁷ The Peul probably came from Egypt.⁵⁸ Also, linked to Egypt were the Songhai, Toucouleur, Serer, Agni, Fang, and Bamum.⁵⁹ The Egyptian legacy also radiated into famed Zimbabwe.⁶⁰

One is not surprised at the presence of Diop's critics. Although marshaling no substantiation, Professor L. V. Thomas, a Frenchman, accused Diop of weaving a vast synthesis into a modern myth.⁶¹ Another Frenchman, Dr. Raymond Mauny, has vehemently attacked his former student, strongly denying that the Egyptians were Negroes and maintaining that Egypt was a melting pot of many races.⁶² However, Diop staunchly defended himself against his old professor.⁶³

On the other hand, Diop has an impressive list of admirers. James G. Spady has emphasised the significant role played by Cheikh Anta Diop 'in enumerating the facts which prove the Black origin of the Egyptians.'⁶⁴ The noted Senegalese scholar, Alioune Diop (no relative) wrote: 'We must render homage to the initiative of men such as Cheikh Anta Diop who were the first to put their fingers on the falsification of history throughout the centuries, to the advantage of a minority - the white minority - and the disadvantage of the colored peoples.'⁶⁵ Indeed, the Congolese Egyptologist, Théophile Obenga, has stated: 'The historical theory of Cheikh Anta Diop has more than influenced African thought of the 20th Century.'⁶⁶ Moreover, the great Martinican intellectual and

will aid in the awakening of Africa.'⁶⁷

Not only Blacks have welcomed Cheikh Anta Diop's outlook. Professor Adriano Moreira of Portugal has commented favourably on the worth of his generalisations.⁶⁸ The brilliant Columbian University Africanist, Professor Immanuel Wallerstein, has judged Diop's writings as 'Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to reconstruct African history... Diop's hold hypothesis, which is not presented without supporting data, has the interesting effect of inverting Western cultural assumptions.'⁶⁹

In conclusion, every serious student of the origins and diffusion of civilisation must come to grips with Cheikh Anta Diop. He stands as a titan in historical writing.

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25. *Ibid.*, p.15.
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Prof. M.B. Abasiatig, *Reflections about the conduct of the incorporation of the near Harbel highly*
 Stirling; Prof. De, *Ibadan*; Prof. J. *Ibadan* (AFL) in
 State University, *the much-*
scholarly debate on the
embarrassing
is a timely and

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...unting task of healing a
 ...st, global concern and
 ...continue. Today, Liberia;
 ...ngside Somalia and Rwanda the
 ...geable sorepoints. M. Weller's book,
 ...ate on the on-going Liberian Crisis. It is
 ...a balanced and authoritative manner it captures the background to the conflict
 ...and presents a sequential media reportage of landmark events beginning with the
 ...1989 Christmas Eve insurrection in the Nimba country led by Charles Taylor.
 ...The volume covers every significant phase of the conflict: it gradual escalation
 ...and internationalisation, the fluctuating fortunes of all the warring factions, and
 ...the tortuous and yet elusive search for peace through mediation, peace-keeping
 ...and international enforcement. In this regard, texts of high level official
 ...correspondences, documents, peace accords, communiqués, press briefings and
 ...transcripts of verbatim recording of relevant meetings among the warring
 ...factions under the auspices of ECOWAS, the UN as well as the United States
 ...Congress were reproduced, many appearing in published form for the first time.
 ...This volume places considerable emphasis on the search for peace in Banjul,
 ...Yamoussoukro, Cotonou, Lagos, Geneva and New York under the auspices of
 ...ECOWAS or lately through a joint ECOWAS/UN initiative. It reflects on the
 ...active role played by non-governmental organisations including the Inter-Faith
 ...Mediation Committee on Liberia (p.90), the International Committee of the Red
 ...Cross, the UN High Commission on Refugees (pp.278-323), among others.

One is bound to be impressed by the painstaking attempt by Mr. Weller to
 collate seemingly disparate data to form a coherent chain of information.
 Considerable effort was evidently made to present a balanced editorial
 compilation: new items were monitored mostly from the BBC; and, the
 divergent views of the *dramatis personae* - NPFL, AFL, INPEL, ULIMO IGNU
 - and of countries (Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo, Libya, the United States,

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etc) that for certain reasons did not share popular expectations about the conduct of the war, was also reflected. In this respect, one finds the incorporation of the UN Panel of inquiry report on the Carter Camp Massacre near Harbel highly illuminating, for its not only indicated the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) in particular, and accused ECOMOG of negligence... but contradicted the much-taunted views that the Taylor-led NPFL was responsible for the racial act (pp. 382-394).

Beside throwing light on hitherto unclear aspects of the Liberian crisis, certain documents reproduced would, for a long time, continue to provoke intense debate. For instance, popular opinion till date continues to berate Washington and indeed the global community, for a seemingly impassioned response to the crisis. When it mattered most, the U.S. safely distanced itself from the ignominious turn of event in Liberia having evacuated its citizens (p.42) and sold its blue-chip investment, Firestone Liberia - reputed to be the largest rubber plantation in the world - to the Japanese (p. 54 on 43-56). Leaving Liberia in a lurch was most unfortunate, as the book reveals, since the United States assisted greatly in creating the Frankenstein monster that threw that country into a huge graveyard. To quote the chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives sub-committee on Africa, Hon. Howard Wolpe:

the crisis that we are now seeing had its real seed in the failure of democratisation in Liberia at a much earlier point. And I think that the American policy in those earlier years had the effect of exacerbating the problems that we are now seeing in full view. (p.44).

With this unwholesome misadventure in Liberia and similar ones in other troubles - spots in Africa, the overarching concern remain the extent to which the African continent is still of geo-political and strategic relevance to the great powers in a post cold war era that is fast tending towards unipolarity with Washington as the undisputed epicentre.

In performing the final 'ritual' of recommending this invaluable book to scholars, libraries as well as the general reader, I would like to note the satisfaction that if, indeed, the aim of this volume is to make "accessible in a timely manner the materials which are required for the analysis of current conflicts..." (p.x), a remarkable goal has been achieved.

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